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ABSTRACT
Collision Avoidance Systems for use by single-engine general aviation
aircraft must be simple and inexpensive if they are to gain widespread
acceptance by general aviation pilots. They also have to be compatible with
equipment installed in other aircraft flying in common airspace.
The present report summarizes a seven-month program of work involving
selection and design of a Time/Frequency Collision Avoidance System for use
in general aviation aircraft. Minor modifications to the ATA Collision
Avoidance Specifications are required in order to reduce the design complexity
and cost of the GA CAS equipment.
The present simplified GA CAS design utilizes a 1. 5 millisecond time
slot structure (with accurately synchronized range transmissions) and altitude
telemetry which conforms to the ATA CAS characteristics.
Slight modifications to the ATA CAS frequency-switching logic
 ;are
proposed to permit assignment of approximately 1000 of the 2000 available
ATA CAS slots for use by low-flying aircraft.
Simplification of the GA version of Time/Frequency CAS involves deletion
of requirements for phase-coherent long-pulse transmissions, doppler proces-
sing, and multifrequency reception. Use of synchronous reference pulse
transmissions by ground VORTAC stations also permits reduction of trans-
mitter power and receiver sensitivity requirements and deletion of the back-up
mode. The transmission of auxiliary data (as biphase modulation of the
transmitted pulse) is also eliminated.
Deletion of doppler range rate extraction involves some increase in the
protection envelope about own aircraft. However, use of a shorter pulse
to distinguish GA CAS transmissions, and inclusion of pilot selection of
temporary terminal logic reduces this increment to tolerable proportions.
Detailed system design and associated costing information is provided,
which indicates that if there is sufficient user interest, the system target
cost to the user will fall below $1500 within a reasonable time after intro-
duction of the simplified GA CAS equipment on the market.
in
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PART ONE
SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
A. CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS
1. Objectives. The objective of NASA Contract No. NAS1-10653 is
stated in NASA Langley Research Center Statement of Work L53-1556 of
December 17, 1970. The following extracts constitute the principal require-
ments and priorities established under the guidance of NASA technical
personnel.
"Analyze the overall problem of providing anti-collision protection
for all classes of aircraft... in which general aviation aircraft equipped with
less costly collision avoidance equipment can participate with aircraft equipped
with the ATA collision avoidance equipment. "
The Statement of Work calls for maximum utilization of the "com-
putational capability of the ATA collision avoidance system equipment in order
to simplify the general aviation collision avoidance system equipment. "
"Recommendations of minor changes to ANTC-117 are acceptable,
provided they are justified by cost or equipment simplification considerations"
because "low cost will be the prime objective. "
2. Low Cost. The Statement of Work specifies that "a projected cost
of $1, 500 or less per unit is desirable... The design will attempt to attain a
target selling price of $1, 500 per unit for the minimum configuration. "
3. Light Aircraft Equipment. This must be equipment "attractive to
the light aircraft owner" featuring "minimum cost and complexity to operate
in the airspace normally occupied by light aircraft." It may "reflect the
limited capability of general aviation aircraft" and "the capabilities and
limitations of light aircraft may be used as a justification for reducing the
performance requirements and complexity."
4. System Configuration. "The result will be a system configuration
resolved to the block diagram level with signal format, bandwidths, power
budget and data processing... The level of detail will be sufficient to allow
-an-accurate-cost-aiialysis^to-be-performed~and~an~independent^evaluation of
the design to be made."
5. Clarifications. An amendment to Solicitation L53-1556 clarified that
"this work represents an intermediate step between a conceptual design and
the construction of prototype hardware for evaluation. " It is also expressed
that NASA desires "not to discourage competition between schemes for
producing a low-cost general aviation collision avoidance system. "
B. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
The present report is subdivided into four portions. Part one examines
the Time/Frequency Collision Avoidance System from the viewpoint of
requirements, possibility for modification to minimize cost for light General
Aviation aircraft, and the effects of these modifications on the Air Traffic
Control System.
In particular, section n includes the rationale for selecting the principal
distinctive features of the system. After discussing the essential features
of the Time/Frequency System for Collision Avoidance, selected by ATA,
this section discusses changes in certain less fundamental system features.
The selected approach deletes dependence on transmission of long phase-
coherent pulses and detection of doppler, in order to extract range rate
information in encounters involving GA CAS equipped aircraft. Threats are
evaluated on the basis of range and altitude separation, although use of
distinctive short pulse transmissions by the lower performance GA CAS
and incorporation of pilot-selected temporary terminal logic permit use of
reduced threat boundaries in such encounters. Moreover, requirements for
transmitting or receiving on more than one CAS frequency have been elimi-
nated. Incorporation of synchronous reference pulse transmissions from
the ground VORTAC system is recommended as a highly cost-effective
method for providing needed CAS synchronization over the conterminous U. S.
This approach permits safe reduction in GA CAS transmitted power by allow-
ing such equipment to utilize available higher powered airborne DME and
ground VORTAC transmissions for synchronization.
The deletion of requirements for phase coherency, reduction of power,
and shortening of the transmitted pulse all contribute to the design of a
relatively low-cost transmitter. Other simplifications include reduced
requirements for receiver sensitivity and elimination of the asynchronous
back-up mode and of auxiliary data transmission. These simplifications
in addition to limiting GA CAS receptions to a single frequency and deletion
of doppler processing (which were mentioned earlier) permit a CAS equipment
design that can meet specified target costs to the user.
A detailed discussion of sync donor requirements and the capabilities
of the Ground VORTAC System for meeting these needs is provided in
section IE.
Detailed system parameters are discussed in section iv, V, and VI.
Section IV discusses the single-frequency approach to the GA CAS design,
while a detailed discussion of the selected GA CAS threat parameters and of
the required pilot display are presented in section V. Section VI provides
a detailed analysis of transmitted power requirements and receiver sensiti-
vities required to provide timely warnings.
The effect of the selected threat logic on airspace requirements is
presented in section VII, which focuses on the results of deleting doppler
transmission. This section shows that the protected boundaries exhibit some
increase over the air-to-air separation required by a safe GA Tau-CAS
protected unit. However, the Tau-CAS boundaries would be about 75% as
large as for the present GA CAS design. This is not a spectacular decrease
and thus appears to justify the use of the less sophisticated threat logic.
Section VTfl examines various expanded capabilities for the GA CAS.
Part Two contains a detailed design of the selected low-cost Time/
Frequency General Aviation Collision Avoidance System for use by light
aircraft. Specific itemized costing information is included in sufficient
detail to permit technically oriented evaluators to verify the practicability
of meeting the contractually specified target costs.
Section I contains a functional description of the resulting GA CAS
design.
Section II provides specific detail designs for each of the major
functional blocks. Section in provides detailed estimates of the cost of
producing each of these functional blocks and of assembling the CAS unit.
A projected cost to the user is provided.
The cost estimates are made in two alternative versions: Version A is
self-contained, although it requires inputs from an encoding altimeter and
an airborne DME, while Version B is intended for those users who have
elected to install a quasi-one-way DME with self-contained crystal clock
and associated synchronization circuitry.
A first year cost to the user of $1956 for Version A and $1572 for
Version B are projected. These costs are expected to fall to $1565 and
$1257, respectively, by the third year.
Conclusions and references appear in Part Three. Appendices follow.
-G-.—GLOSSARY _____
There are certain non-standard terms and abbreviations that are used
in this report and other terms that may be used in a non-standard way.
This subsection lists some of these phrases and abbreviations and interprets
their use in the present report.
ANTC - Air Navigation/Traffic Control Division of ATA.
ANTC-117 - This references the Airline Air Traffic Control Committee,
CAS Technical Working Group document, "Airborne Collision Avoidance
System, " issued by ANTC division of ATA as ANTC-117 dated June 30, 1967;
also the various revisions to this document. References to this document
are intended to relate to the Full-CAS equipment as described in the basic
document (parts A and B-l through B-5) and in parts 1, 2, and 3 of Attach-
ment 1. Except where sync donor or back-up mode capabilities are involved,
these references also include Limited Equipment, Level 1, as described in
part 4 of Attachment 1.
ARINC Characteristic 587 - "Air Transport Time-Frequency Collision
Avoidance System, " by Aeronautical Radio, Inc., issued September 1, 1970.
ANTC-117 is included in the ARINC characteristic. However, 587 applies
specifically to Full-CAS equipment.
ATA - Air Transport Association of America.
ATA CAS - An air-to-air (time/frequency) Collision Avoidance System
as defined in ARINC Characteristic 587 and in Part A and B-l through B-5 of
ANTC-117 (as revised), and in Sections 1, 2, 3, Attachment 1 of that
document, (Full CAS). Except where sync donor or back-up mode capabilities
are involved, these references also include Limited Equipment, Level 1, as
described in part 4 of Attachment 1.
BUM - The asynchronous back-up mode described in Section B-4 of
ANTC-117.
CAS - Air-to-Air Collision Avoidance System.
DME - Airborne distance measuring equipment that is capable of extract-
ing range from ground station replies on the cross-banded TACAN frequency.
Full-CAS - A collision avoidance system defined by ARINC Characteristic
587 and/or by the applicable parts of ANTC-117 listed earlier.
GA - General Aviation aircraft, especially single engine GA aircraft.
Lim-CAS, Limited Capability CAS - Collision Avoidance Systems similar
to those defined in part 4 of Attachment 1 to ANTC-117.
Lim-CAS, Level 1 - See Lim-CAS.
Lim-CAS, Level 2 - Level 2 Limited CAS equipment similar to that
described in part 5 of Attachment 1 to ANTC-117.
T. F. - Time/Frequency systems, utilizing very precise clock synchro-
nization and assigned slot transmissions to permit non-interfering transmission
and "one-way" ranging from time of arrival of the reference pulses.
VORTAC - In this report, the focus is on TACAN or DME stations that
can provide ranging information to DEM equipped airborne interrogators.
Such equipment includes collocated VOR/TACAN installations, ground
TACANS and ground DME installations that do not provide azimuth information
on the TACAN frequency.
SECTION H
SYSTEM SELECTION
A. COMPATIBILITY WITH ATA CAS
The selected approach to the design of a low cost collision avoidance
system (CAS) to protect light General Aviation (GA) Aircraft against encounters
with other (similarly equipped) aircraft and encounters with airliners and other
higher performance aircraft is explained in this section. In accordance with
contract specifications, it is assumed that the more sophisticated aircraft will
be equipped with a Time/Frequency CAS. Such a Collision Avoidance System
has been described by the Air Transport Association's (ATA's) Technical
Working Group on Collision Avoidance * in report ANTC-117, and has been
defined in an ARINC document. Contract specifications permit minor changes
from ANTC-117 provided they are justified by cost or equipment simplification
considerations. ANTC-117 discusses several versions of Collision Avoid-
ance equipment. These versions include a full CAS for the more affluent
users, a limited CAS (Level 1), and other lower level limited systems with
reduced capabilities. In this report, the term "ATA CAS" will refer to the
full CAS equipment and to the limited system, level 1.
The essential features of the ARINC characteristic may be summarized
as follows:
Separate time slots for each aircraft's transmissions.
Multiple frequencies to avoid "ghost"-threats from high-flying air-
craft a long distance away.
Sufficient communication range to permit timely detection of potential
threats from other equipped aircraft.
Threat evaluation on the basis of range, altitude, and range rate
information.
In addition, the following less essential features are included in full CAS
equipment specifications:
Telemetry of additional data. '
An associated asynchronous Back-Up Mode.
This contractor has examined the detailed system attributes and has
classified certain of these as "essential", and others as "desirable" but not
essential. The reasons guiding this selection and the resulting system
approach are explained in the following paragraphs.
B. MAINTAINING PROTECTION AGAINST OWN KIND
In making this selection, we first summarized several possible alternative
simplified design approaches for GA CAS equipment (refer to table 1). Of the
various changes mentioned, the first two approaches (receive-only and
transmit-only) do not provide NASA specification mandated protection-against-
own-kind (i. e., protection against other aircraft equipped with like equipment).
The third basic approach: Use of a single receiving and transmitting frequency
for GA CAS, in conjunction with unmodified four-frequency ATA CAS equip-
ment is not attractive because the aircraft utilizing a given frequency would be
blind to threats from aircraft assigned to the other three frequencies. This
approach could work adequately during initial introduction of equipment, if all
aircraft elected to operate on a single frequency. However, only 500 slots are
available on each frequency. Thus the system capacity limits might be ex-
ceeded as soon as widespread deployment of CAS equipment is achieved.
The fourth approach, that was selected, requires some simple modifica-
tion of the ATA CAS to yield a viable method for simplifying the GA CAS design.
In particular, this approach permits threat evaluation, in encounters with
GA CAS equipped aircraft, through use of a single RF frequency.
C. REDUCING COMPLEXITY TO MINIMIZE COST
The ATA CAS has been designed to provide protection between approaching
aircraft under a wide variety of anticipated encounters. Significant simplifica-
tions are required to permit design of collision avoidance equipment that is
fundamentally compatible with the ATA CAS design, but that can be built at
significantly reduced cost. These simplifications can either involve a reduc-
tion in system capabilities or use of an alternative method for providing
similar capabilities.
1. Simplified Threat Evaluation
a. Deleting ATA CAS Threat Evaluation Parameters. An essential
approach to the design of a reduced cost GA CAS involves use of less compli-
cated threat-evaluation techniques. Alternative threat evaluation techniques
are summarized and compared in table 2. This chart starts with the basic
ATA CAS threat evaluation and considers the possibility of eliminating any one
(or any pair) of the three basic threat-determining parameters from the CAS.
In each case, some increase in the number of unnecessary evasive maneuvers
will result. Because of the significant complexity introduced by the doppler
measurement, and the restricted effectiveness of doppler measurements at low
closing rates, this contractor's approach has concentrated on the deletion of
range rate information.
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An interim report compares the threat envelopes of the ATA
CAS and of such a range/altitude CAS for single-engine GA aircraft. The
interim report has been updated and embodied in section VII of this final
report.
b. Inclusion of Azimuth Information for Threat Evaluation. It
should be noted that table 2 also mentions two other alternatives. One alter-
native involves use of azimuth information for collision avoidance. As
explained by Morrell, 3 rather good accuracy may be required to make effec-
tive use of azimuth information for threat evaluation. Nevertheless, use of
azimuth in addition to the other threat evaluation techniques might provide
useful information to the pilot. Since this is an increase over ATA CAS com-
plexity, it does not provide an attractive approach to an ATA-compatible
low-cost CAS design.
c. Alternative Extraction of Closing Rate. Replacement of the
doppler measurement of closing rate with an approach that utilizes range
change during successive measurements was proposed by TRG and discussed
by the CAS Technical Working Group during their deliberations ^» ^ > ®. while
this approach was not adopted, it still shows promise of providing a viable
alternative approach for extracting range rate. This approach would permit
deletion of the long doppler pulse and would permit equipped aircraft to
extract range rate without requiring the GA aircraft to provide coherent
transmissions. The ATA CAS equipped aircraft would have to utilize addi-
tional logic and some memory.
These changes would permit higher speed ATA CAS equipped
aircraft to conserve airspace by measuring the closing rate to all intruders,
while GA CAS (who normally fly at lower speeds in less crowded airspace)
could rely on range and altitude measurements for CAS threat evaluation.
While such alternate range rate extraction may cost no more
than the doppler measurement, it would require further modifications in the
ATA CAS specification. Very good range rate accuracy could be achieved by
requiring all clock fine sync phase adjustments to be made in small time
increments. (The present 200 nanosecond clock corrections correspond to a
66 ft/sec, closing rate error with a 3-second averaging. Much smaller phase
corrections could be utilized, once the clock frequency has been corrected.)
In addition, it would be necessary to control slot jumping since two successive
range readings have to be secured in the same slot. This may require ground
assignment of CAS slots.
None of these changes appear overwhelming for aircraft equip-
ment. However, use of such range rate calculations seems excessively costly
for the GA CAS.
11
The ensuing discussion assumes the use of range/altitude threat
logic in all encounters involving the GA CAS.
2. Single-Frequency Approach. In its proposal to NASA, this contractor
suggested a modification of the ATA CAS frequency selection logic that would
permit reception and transmission of CAS location information on a single
frequency at the lower altitudes. This approach involves use of only 3 fre-
quencies for transmitting normal CAS ranging and telemetry information. The
approach reserves 1000 of the 2000 slots for use at lower altitude. With minor
modifications, the proposed single-frequency system has been embodied as an
essential feature of the present GA CAS design.
Before describing these changes in detail, it seems appropriate to
review attributes of the General Aviation aircraft which permit the design
simplification.
D. GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE LIMITATIONS
In designing a minimum configuration collision avoidance system for
general aviation aircraft, we are restricting ourselves to aircraft of limited
speed and restricted altitude (service ceiling) capabilities. In particular,
this equipment is intended primarily for use by single-engine general aviation
aircraft.
n
An examination of general aviation aircraft sales in 1968-1969 ' reveals
that more than half of the single-engine aircraft shipments in 1969 (5102
aircraft shipped out of a total of 10, 167) were produced by Cessna. Another
30 percent (3112 aircraft) were produced by Piper. If we ignore the agricul-
ture and'trainer aircraft, then Cessna 172, with its maximum recommended
airspeed of 131 mph, service ceiling of 13,100 feet and maximum climb rate
of 645 feet/min., represents a lower bound on performance specifications for
aircraft in current production. The owner's manual** quotes a climb rate of
730 fpm. This climb rate decreases to 310 fpm at 10, 000 feet. Similarly,
the Piper Cherokee group provides a maximum recommended airspeed of
152-176 mph, a service ceiling of 13, 000 to 16, 400 feet, and a climb rate of
750-1050 feet/minute.^ The lowest climb rate indicated for single engine GA
aircraft manufactured in 1967 was 600 fpm, and this rate of climb involved
lower-speed agricultural aircraft. 10
If the CAS is to gain acceptance it must not command excessive unneces-
sary evasive maneuvers. The required protection radius is proportional to
the closing speed and inversely proportional to climb rate, as will be explained
hereafter. Actual closing speed is no greater than the sum of own airspeed
and the intruder's airspeed. A dependable limit on the intruder's airspeed is
required to guarantee safe evasions for a reasonably small penetration radius.
Thus a limitation on maximum velocity for aircraft utilizing GA CAS is needed
12
to permit use of restricted airspace in GA/GA encounters. The alternative
telemetry of maximum airspeed could be utilized to reduce airspace require-
ments to a minimum. While attractive, this approach involves some addi-
tional hardware complexity and therefore telemetry of own maximum airspeed
has not been adopted for the low-cost GA CAS. The restriction on maximum
airspeed .for aircraft utilizing the lowest cost GA CAS would, require somewhat
larger expenditures for CAS protection for the more sophisticated, faster
flying aircraft.
Requirements for a minimum rate of climb are not clear. It might be
appropriate to require an available climb rate of at least 500 to 600 fpm for
aircraft equipped with this GA CAS. This would not represent a major limita-
tion, since all but 10% of the GA fleet exceed this climb rate.11 In fact, an
overall variation in ratio of climb rate to cruise velocity of between 1/17 and
1/7 for almost all GA aircraft is indicated.11 Even typical trainer aircraft
(Cessna 150 and Piper Cherokee 140-C) can provide climb rates of 600 fpm at
sea level. !2 the 600 fpm climb rate would not generally be available at the
higher altitudes, however. The minimum climb rate is required at low alti-
tudes since a dive maneuver would not be practical near the ground and the
climbing aircraft would have to provide safe separation.
While it might appear desirable to mandate a minimum climb rate in
order to reduce airspace requirements, this could interfere with the more
urgent goal of providing moderate-cost anti-collision protection to a high
percentage of all aircraft. Thus it seems appropriate to modify the threat
boundaries on the basis of actual performance characteristics of the protected
aircraft. This would permit minor parametric changes to provide protection
to almost all single-engine GA aircraft.
It is also essential to specify intruder airspeed in the airspace where the
GA CAS will be used. Since controlled airspace and the associated jet route
structure extends down to 18, 000 feet in the East and along the busier air
routes, and down to 24,000 feet over the rest of the country, it would seem
mandatory to limit the GA CAS equipment for use below such altitudes. Air-
craft above 10,000 feet altitude typically fly at high speed so that large pro-
tected areas must be utilized in the absence of actual measurements of closing
rate.
A natural breakpoint for the lowest cost system occurs at about 10,000
feet MSL since the available climb rate in typical single engine aircraft drops
"rapidly ~ffonTabout~107000"feet~towa~rclthe"aircraft's~sefvic¥ ceiling. Further-
more, while most single-engine aircraft fly at airspeeds of 175 mph or less,
intruder aircraft may fly considerably faster at higher altitudes.
This is not generally true below 10, 000 feet MSL since FAA regulation
FAR 91. 70 prohibits indicated airspeeds in excess of 250 knots below 10, 000
13
feet MSL. (This would involve maximum true airspeeds of;291 knots (335 mph)
at 10, 000-foot altitude.) It would appear mandatory to limit this general
aviation equipment for installation in aircraft having a maximum cruise speed
significantly less than 291 knots or 335 mph, and to "red-line" equipment use
above 10, 000 feet MSL, or to guard a much larger penetration radius above
10, 000 feet MSL, since higher intruder airspeeds may be anticipated there.
A somewhat higher altitude cutoff (probably with a somewhat enlarged
protected area) could be used if subsequent FAA rule-making establishes
airspeed limitations (e.g., in the regions from 10, 000 to 14,000 feet and from
14, 000 to 18, 000 feet MSL).
The following aircraft operational parameters have therefore been utilized
in designing the low-cost CAS for single-engine GA aircraft:
Airspeed Up to 260 ft/sec.,
Climb Rate: Typically 500 to 600 feet per minute or more,
Protected Maximum 10, 000 Feet (corresponding to
Flight Altitude: Federal Air Regulations limiting airspeed).
The significance of these performance limitations is recapitulated in the
following summary:
1. Speed
a. Even the best pulse doppler measurements have poor percentage
accuracy compared to the 100 to 176 knot airspeeds of typical single engine
GA aircraft.
b. Reasonably good estimates of anticipated maximum closing
speeds (and climb rate) define the mandatory maneuvering radii for safe
evasion.
c. The maximum speed of any aircraft equipped with the GA CAS
must be specified for encounters involving such GA intruders. Similarly, the
maximum speed of ATA-CAS equipped aircraft in the common airspace must
be well defined. Any aircraft flying at excess speeds in the common airspace
must maneuver soon enough to provide a safe evasion.
2. Climb Rates
a. Low climb rate aircraft may require longer warning times than
full-CAS.
14
b. At lowest altitudes, climbing aircraft must provide protection.
c. At higher altitudes, diving aircraft may provide the requisite
protection.
3. Design Altitude
a. To limit the required protected area, it is essential that the
protected aircraft be able to count on prescribed limited speeds for the various
categories of intruders.
b. This suggests designating GA CAS for use below 10,000 feet
altitude (250 knots IAS per FAA regs.).
c. This altitude limitation also limits line-of-sight range to similar
low-flying aircraft, which justifies a simplification of the ATA CAS four-
frequency-approach.
E. PROPOSED APPROACH
In defining requirements for system compatibility, it is essential to
establish the principal attributes of the present ATA CAS system and then
focus on the parameters that are unchangeable, those that can be changed
slightly, and those that can be left out of the minimum system (refer to table
3), The ATA CAS attributes were summarized in an earlier paragraph.
Based on the listed attributes, this contractor suggested the following approach
to the design of a low-cost GA CAS in its proposal to NASA:
Restricting the CAS system to a one-frequency operation (for
aircraft below 10, 000 feet MSL).
Reducing peak power transmissions for the short range threat pro-
tection requirements of general aviation aircraft.
Deletion of requirements for long-pulse transmission and doppler
detection.
Deletion of additional telemetry.
Deletion of the asynchronous Back-Up Mode.
This still permits adequate threat determination from a combination of
range and altitude difference information (as discussed hereafter). Minor
changes in ATA CAS design would be required, but these changes would not
impose a significant cost penalty if they were adopted before a considerable
number of CAS units were deployed in air carriers. An overall comparison
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between the ATA CAS design approach and the approach used in the present
low- cost GA CAS design is presented in table 3.
A major feature of the ATA CAS is the requirement for precise timing
with specific time slots assigned for each aircraft's transmissions, and a
specific frequency assigned to each slot. In such a cooperative system, it is
mandatory that all participants be precisely synchronized to operate in the
same time slot structure, and on the appropriate common frequency. Any
significant time-slip could result in interference between the maverick and the
other participants in the precisely-ordered system. In particular, early
transmissions could result in false threat detection while late transmission,
or transmission on the wrong frequency, could prevent other aircraft from
detecting a threat.
Thus a compatible CAS for GA must employ common synchronized timing
for the ATA- CAS .equipment in the air carrier aircraft, and the minimum CAS
equipment in the GA aircraft. Either the GA CAS must employ precisely the
same timing and frequency control presently mandated for the ATA CAS
system, or else minor modifications must be imposed on the full- CAS system
and a new common timing and frequency control system adopted.
The various proposed changes and their impact on system complexity
were discussed, in the original proposal. Two of the proposed changes are
rather obvious and hardly controversial. These changes involve restricting
the peak power and deletion of the "additional" digital telemetry transmissions,
both of which were considered in the discussion of limited- CAS equipment by
the ATA's Technical Working Group on CAS, and embodied in the Sierra-
Wilcox limited CAS equipment. Similarly, the Back- Up Mode was generally
considered to be a possibly desirable but optional system add-on, so that
deletion of this mode and its replacement with a dependable system of ground
synchronizing stations should be readily accepted.
All of the proposed system changes have been reexamined during the
course of the present study and have (with minor modifications) formed the
basis for the overall system design. Thus the study effort was concentrated
on specifically exploring the three major changes:
Reduction in transmitted power output.
withGA CAS^ _
equipped aircraft, and the consequent elimination of requirements
for coherent transmission.
Use of a single frequency for all GA CAS transmissions and
receptions below 10, 000 feet MSL.
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Specific analyses have been made of the threat boundaries and of the
changed airspace requirements resulting from use of the modified threat logic.
The major concentration of effort was directed at the specific system design
requirements that resulted from the proposed approach.
F. DESIGN ECONOMIES IN GENERAL AVIATION CAS
The proposed modifications to the ATA specification and the performance
limitations of the GA CAS permit the selection of relevant areas for design
economies. In particular, this contractor has concentrated on the following
specific areas:
Use of moderate cost airborne crystal clock for system timing.
Reduction in RF power transmission.
Simplified Transmitter design, eliminating requirements for
ultra-precise frequency control with negligible incidental FM
(Coherent Transmitter).
No doppler processing.
Reduction of the number of transmitting and receiving frequencies
utilized.
Deletion of Back-Up Mode and Data Transmitting capabilities.
These various areas are explored in the following paragraphs:
1. Use Moderate Cost High Quality Crystal Clock. The ATA Collision
Avoidance System is time-ordered and uses one-way ranging, which requires
precise clock synchronization (sync) for all users. Any time error because
of initial setting error or accumulated oscillator drift error causes a corre-
sponding range error.
High quality crystal clocks, capable of performing to an accuracy of
one part in 10** (or better) are available at reasonable cost. Such units ex-
hibit long-term frequency drift that can be detected and corrected during a
sequence of resynchronization intervals. The ARINC CAS characteristics
permits use of such crystal clocks in all classes of equipment. Such clocks
cannot maintain or pass-on accurate time without frequent resync and update
from a higher accuracy unit. Atomic clocks which do not require frequent
updating are of course available. However, such units are unduly expensive
for most users. The CAS characteristic does provide for air-to-air sync,
but as shown in a subsequent section, present traffic patterns make such air-
to-air synchronization unreliable over large areas. Deployment of adequate
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ground synchronization facilities eliminates uncertainties in time transmissions
and permits use of less expensive airborne timing equipment by all categories
of users.
Ground navigation facilities can provide adequate sync update to main-
tain clock time (phase) to an accuracy of 200 to 500 nanoseconds (one-sigma).
This permits clock frequency correction to 1 part in 10** after 1 minute and to
3 parts in 10^ after an interval of two-to-five minutes. A method for passing
on time with the air of reference transmissions from the VORTAC system was
devised by Sierra Research engineers in 1968, and an unsolicited proposal was
submitted to FAA. Recognizing the importance of such a system, Sierra
Research employed internal funding to build and flight-test a version of the
system during 1970. The performance of the system indicated that this
approach was quite capable of providing the required synchronization function.
In the Spring of 1971, the FAA contracted with Sierra for the design
and fabrication under Contract No. DOT-FA71WA-2571 of a feasibility model
of ground and airborne synchronization equipment to permit the ground DME
to transmit precisely-timed reference pulses with its normal transmissions
and to permit an aircraft to synchronize an on-board clock to the ground-
station transmissions. (In addition this contract includes equipment fabrica-
tion for extracting quasi one-way range from time of arrival of the reference
pulse transmission.) Extraction of time sync for CAS and introduction of
quasi one-way ranging for measuring traffic capacity constituted two of the
four system changes discussed at the 1971 RTCA Assembly.
The TACAN/DME Subcomittee of RTCA's Special Committee on
VORTAC Improvements SC-121, has passed a resolution^ supporting this
"application of time frequency techniques with periodic updating by DME .. "
The SC-121 System Requirements Subcommittee has also endorsed the trans-
mission of accurately timed reference pulses by VORTAC ground-station to
permit synchronization of airborne clocks.
Successful use of such crystal clocks requires receipt of synchro-
nization pulses within seconds of takeoff, intermittent receipt of sync update
information for one-to-five minutes thereafter, and subsequent resync at
intervals not to exceed once every three minutes or so. (Actually, longer
delays between sync update are tolerable if the clock frequency is previously
corrected to one part in 10^ or better, or if the protected range boundary is
extended-outward-to-compensate -f or-the-increased-clock-error...)_ _Within_
reasonable limits, somewhat larger sync errors may be tolerated. Thus a
relative sync error Sab between aircraft A and aircraft B might increase A's
estimate of B's range by CSab (where C is the speed of electromagnetic
propagation), but would then decrease B's estimate of A's range by the same
amount. The complementary nature of these range errors helps maintain
system safety even with some sync inaccuracy. This feature is most
important in encounters when either aircraft can maneuver.
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In any event, clock resynchronization must be available at least at
five-minute intervals wherever protection is to be provided against encounters
between such crystal clock equipped aircraft. The ATA CAS specification
assumes that the more affluent users will provide air-to-air synchronization
to any crystal-clock CAS equipped aircraft. It will be explained in a later
section tjiat presently established flight patterns would not provide adequate
resync capabilities (from air-to-air sync) over much of the conterminous
United States. This has motivated FAA-sponsored development work to
utilize the existing chain of (VORTAC) navigation aids to provide resync
capabilities in the airspace where significant numbers of instrument GA
aircraft fly.
Based on the successful preliminary results of this development
program, the GA CAS design described hereafter assumes the widespread
deployment of a ground resynchronization network to permit reliable synchro-
nization of the airborne crystal clock. Thus the design utilizes a high-quality
airborne crystal clock together with inputs from an airborne (VORTAC) DME
unit which permits error detection and correction.
2. Reduction in RF Power Transmission and in Receiver Sensitivity.
One constituent factor that contributes to the cost of the ATA CAS design is
the requirement for transmitting enough power and providing sufficient re-
ceiver sensitivity so that the aircraft can detect each other in time to provide
adequate corrective action. It will be possible to reduce the transmitter
power (and receiver sensitivity in the GA CAS) because of the shorter
communication range required.
The requisite transmitted power is an inverse squared function of
the required communication range (for a fixed receiver sensitivity on the
other end). The required range is directly proportional to the maximum
closing velocity and to the required warning time. Thus the range is also an
inverse function of the available climb/dive rate. The protected range de-
creases substantially as a result of the reduced speed capability of the GA
aircraft (and the limited intruder airspeed in common airspace).
If the intruder is a high-performance ATA-CAS equipped aircraft,
then the required warning times (and the ATA CAS receiver sensitivity) are
reasonably well defined, so that the lower closing speed provides one estimate
of the minimum transmitter output requirement.
Similarly, if the ATA CAS transmits and the GA CAS receives,
presently defined ATA CAS power outputs may be utilized in conjunction with
estimates of the required warning time to verify GA receiver sensitivity
adequacy.
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Finally, we must verify the adequacy of reduced transmitter output
and receiver sensitivity in encounters between two GA CAS aircraft.
It is evident that a substantial reduction in transmitter power can be
tolerated for GA/airliner encounters at typical maximum closing rates of
some 700 ft/sec, (as compared to possible closing rates of about 2000 ft/sec.
in higher altitude encounters between two subsonic airliners). Selection of
specific transmitter power requirements for GA CAS is explained in section
VI, after a specific discussion of the threat boundaries. An overall power
budget (including the specification of receiver sensitivity requirements) is
provided there. This power budget permits timely detection of the GA-CAS
equipped aircraft at a range of about 54, 000 feet by equipped military high-
speed low-altitude VFR aircraft (or by such aircraft flying "heavy wagon" or
"oil burner" routes) in the event that the GA aircraft strays into one of these
restricted military zones.
It should be noted that one reason for higher power transmission and
receiver sensitivity in the ATA defined "limited- CAS" equipment specifica-
tions is the need for obtaining synchronization from distant air donors of time
sync. Use of a network of ground sync stations on the VORTAC frequency,
deletes this requirement for long-range CAS frequency communication.
3. Simplified Transmitter Design. In addition to reducing transmitter
power, it is essential to eliminate other significant sources of transmitter
design complexity in order to meet the target price requirements. The main
source of complexity (and associated cost) in the CAS transmitter is the
requirement for transmitting a long (200 jusec. ) pulse with stringent require-
ments for spectral purity.
For example, a 50 ft/sec, closing rate corresponds to a total doppler
frequency
f. = (v/c)f = (1.6) (109) (50/109) = 80 Hertz
Cl C* f "
at the CAS carrier frequency of approximately 1.6 GHz. Over a 200 /isec.
interval, this corresponds to a total phase shift of 80 (200/10^) cycles = . 016
cycles or .016 (360°) = 5.8°.
This introduces very significant requirements for phase stability
above J:he-nominal-one-part-in-10° -- '- -
carrier-frequency accuracy specified in the ATA CAS document. Decay of
system transients, avoidance of effects due to thermal shock during pulsed
transmission, power supply droop, and other transient phenomena present
significant problems to the equipment designer. Avoidance of such small
phase changes in a pulsed system requires significant design sophistication.
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Significant savings can be achieved by reducing the pulse width of the
transmitted pulse and by deleting these phase coherency requirements. This
is achieved by eliminating dependance on doppler range rate in encounters
involving GA CAS equipped aircraft.
Instead of doppler, the present GA CAS design uses a very coarse
measurement of range rate together with range and altitude difference to
determine a potential collision threat. This coarse estimate of closing rate
is provided by coding GA CAS range transmissions in the form of a relatively
short (30 /usec) pulse while the ATA CAS transmits a longer (200 /isec) pulse.
Closing rate is estimated from the sum of own and intruders maximum air-
speed, (where the single engine GA CAS equipped intruders are restricted to
a maximum airspeed of 260 fps, while the ATA CAS equipped aircraft are
assumed to fly no faster than 550 fps in common airspace).
Pilot activated Special Terminal Area Logic may be utilized for short
intervals in areas where GA and intruder airspeeds can be assumed to be
substantially slower than the preceding numbers (which are used for enroute
conditions).
ATA CAS equipped aircraft would utilize the Tau threat logic on
received long-pulse transmissions (from other ATA CAS equipment), but
would utilize similar coarse range rate estimates combined with appropriate
range/altitude logic to evaluate threats from general aviation aircraft trans-
mitting shorter pulses.
It is recognized that this approach requires somewhat more airspace
than might be required by the ATA's system. However, as will be seen in
ensuing discussions, presently achieved doppler accuracies require consider-
ably extended threat boundaries to assure timely detection of potential threats
in low-speed encounters. Thus the resulting increase in unnecessary maneu-
vers seems tolerable compared to the alternative of precluding deployment of
CAS in GA aircraft because of the associated excessive cost of a somewhat
more discriminatory Tau CAS design.
4. Deletion of Doppler Processing. In addition to simplifying the trans-
mitter design, elimination of the doppler range rate measurement for threat
evaluation in encounters involving GA CAS, permits deletion of the doppler
discriminator circuitry in the GA CAS. This equipment is no longer required
for detecting intruder doppler velocity nor for verifying the purity of own CAS
transmissions. The resulting cost savings are again substantial.
It should be noted here that equipment utilizing coherent rf trans-
missions to permit detection of closing velocity by doppler detection must
take special care to ensure the correctness of the rf transmissions. CAS
transmission of such doppler rf phases, that are not phase coherent and on
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frequency, constitutes a potentially serious hazard. The circuitry needed to
check the coherency of the rf transmissions is, in large part, similar to the
circuitry utilized in the doppler processing. Therefore, deletion of the
doppler processing alone, does not yield significant savings. Deletion of
both the coherent rf transmissions and the doppler processing, on the other
hand, will result in considerable savings.
5. Reduction in Number of Transmitter/Receiver Frequencies. The
present ATA CAS system employs four separate frequency-bands to avoid
mutual interference. Thus three 1. 5 millisecond slots intervene between
successive transmissions on a given frequency. It is shown in section IV
that less interference protection is required for aircraft flying at lower alti-
tudes. This permits use of a single intervening slot, with transmissions on
different frequencies, between any two cofrequency CAS slots used for low-
altitude transmissions, see figure 1. One frequency would be reserved for
transmissions by all aircraft flying below 14, 000 feet pressure altitude, while
two other frequencies would be used with long doppler pulses by all aircraft
equipped with ATA CAS units, flying above 14, 000 feet pressure altitude. The
fourth frequency would be reserved for air-to-air sync of low-flying aircraft.
Aircraft equipped with the minimum system would be fully protected
only to 10, 000 feet MSL. The common low-altitude frequency would be
utilized by these aircraft for all transmissions and for threat monitoring.
(Synchronization would be obtained by GA CAS on the VORTAC frequency
rather than on CAS frequency.)
As noted in section IV, almost 1000 slots would then be available
below 14,000 feet pressure altitude and a like number would be available for
higher flying aircraft. The GA CAS equipment would transmit short pulses to
permit range/altitude threat evaluation while ATA CAS equipped units would '
transmit long "coherent" pulses on the appropriate frequency, to permit
doppler extraction of range rate.
Since all range/altitude transmissions below 14,000 feet MSL would
be on a single common CAS frequency, there would be no requirement for GA
CAS equipped aircraft to monitor the other frequencies. Thus no frequency
switching circuitry is required, and the GA CAS transmitter and receiver are
both fix-tuned units with consequent design simplification.
6. Deletion of Back-Up,Mp_de_and.Data^Transmitting Capabilities. The— -
asynchronous back-up mode (BUM) was introduced to allow CAS protection
between aircraft in areas where no sync information is available. With the
assumed deployment of synchronization transmissions from the ground
VORTAC system, the requirement for a back-up mode largely vanishes.
Deletion of BUM capabilities in limited ATA CAS equipment is a recognized
possibility. 15
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F1 F2 F3 F4
l
Transmit on at least one frequency.
Receive on all four
A. FREQUENCY SWITCHING PER ATA CAS SPECIFICATION
F1 F3
• • . . .
B. PROPOSED FREQUENCY SWITCHING FOR HIGH ALTITUDE ATA CAS
F4 F4
Transmit on F. or F,, Receive on all
frequencies.. (only Fj, Fj pertinent when
above 18000ft)
Transmit on F4, Receive on all three.
<Only need receive on F4 below 10000 feet)
i i .1
C. PROPOSED FREQUENCY SWITCHING FOR LOW ALTITUDE ATA CAS
F4 F4 Receive and Transmit on F. only.
D. PROPOSED FREQUENCY SWITCHING FOR GENERAL AVIATION CAS 1264428
„ Figure 1. Modified CAS Frequency Switching
The BUM system utilizes an estimate of doppler closing rate to
control the timing of reply pulses. Thus deletion of the doppler measurement
precludes the use of the ATA CAS BUM by the GA CAS equipped aircraft.
Furthermore, all BUM transmissions are on frequency Fl and would not be
heard by the GA CAS equipment. The BUM equipment is a source of complex-
ity in the ATA CAS equipment. Thus inclusion of such capabilities in the
GA CAS equipment seems unwarranted. Rather, it is suggested that ATA
CAS aircraft also utilize the available VORTAC sync signals. Of course
BUM may provide additional protection between ATA CAS equipped aircraft
in special situations.
Data transmission capabilities are included in the ATA CAS to permit
development of a sync hierarchy and for other growth capabilities. Since the
GA CAS equipment will rely on the VORTAC system for synchronization, it
appears desirable to delete this capability. In any event, the digital data
transmission is associated with the long (200 jusec) pulse transmission, and
the GA CAS design is based on the use of much shorter pulse transmissions
to distinguish these non-coherent signals and to avoid inadvertent attempts by
ATA CAS to develop wrong doppler data from these signals.
The ATA CAS Technical Working Group has always considered this
data transmission approval for limited equipment. It is believed that inclusion
of data transmission capabilities in the GA CAS would involve an unwarranted
cost increment. Thus, this feature has also been deleted.
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SECTION III
LIMITED CAS EQUIPMENT AND SYNC DONOR CAPABILITIES
A. GA CAS SYNC REQUIREMENTS
It is vital, to the entire flying community that a substantial proportion of
air carrier, general aviation (GA) and military aircraft be equipped with CAS
in order to reduce the probability of collisions. The only presently tested
equipment for providing air-to-air collision protection to aircraft is the ATA
CAS. This time-ordered system uses one-way ranging, which requires pre-
cise clock synchronization (sync) for all users. Any time error because of
initial clock-setting error or accumulated oscillator drift error causes a
corresponding range error.
Atomic clocks of sufficient accuracy to provide very accurate time with
an infrequent resynchronization schedule are available but are priced beyond
the reach of the typical GA aircraft owner. Moderately priced high-quality
clocks are available, but require update at intervals of about 5 minutes to
assure adequate range measurement. Resynchronization can be provided by
ground stations, airborne units, or even by satellite relay. The latter could
provide near universal coverage but would require special receiving equip-
ment and would involve costly installation and maintenance costs.
15The ATA CAS specification for Full CAS equipment requires sync
donor capabilities (for providing sync to lower hierarchy CAS equipment and,
in particular, to any limited CAS units without capability for transmitting data
with biphase modulation). At one time it was thought that all airliners would
be equipped with such Full CAS equipment having sync donor capabilities.
This now appears to be unlikely, since the airline representatives, meeting in
administrative session during the August 1971 AEEC general session in
Kansas City, voted to write a hardware definition for Air Carrier Limited
Level 1 CAS which would probably not include requirements for transmitting
sync. 16
Suggestions for requiring sync donor capabilities of all airline CAS equip-
ment have been based on the assumption that this would go a long way toward
meeting the sync requirements of the GA community in general and of those
aircraft flying limited CAS equipment in particular. Unfortunately, there is
-no evidence-to-support-the-adequacy-of-such-a-time-distribution-system-—In
particular, there are many areas in the United States where airline jet air-
craft (in fact any IFR-equipped aircraft) appear fairly infrequently.
In such areas, sync update would have to take place at very long range
and would require excessive CAS transmitter power to ensure reliable
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communication. Even if all air carrier aircraft were uniformly distributed in
space and time over the conterminous United States, there would be large
gaps without adequate sync coverage. During calendar 1968, some 6.486
million hours were logged by U. S. air carrier aircraft of all categories. If
these air hours were uniformly distributed over the 3.022 million square
miles of conterminous United States, then the average density during these
hours would be
6.486 aircraft , .
 e. 0_0,3. 022 (365) (16) sq. miles = 1 aircraft per 2721 sq. miles
This corresponds to an average of one carrier aircraft within a 29. 5-
statute mile radius of any point over the conterminous United States or one
aircraft within a 25. 7 nautical mile radius of each such point. This would not
provide adequate re synchronization capabilities for GA CAS equipment that is
designed to provide a reliable communication range of approximately 9 nauti-
cal miles or less. The 9 db reduction in communication margin at 25. 7-nauti-
cal mile range could reduce the synchronization quality significantly.
However, this assumption of uniformly distributed'aircraft is highly
idealistic. A more realistic indication of the distribution of sync donors is
provided by figure 2 which was reproduced from an FAA document. This
figure indicates the number of IFR flight plans filed between paired cities on
the PEAK day. If the sync recipient is in the heavily travelled airspace of the
northeast (corresponding to the Boston-Chicago-Washington triangle) then air-
borne sync may be adequate. For the majority of the rest of the country, less
than 50 IFR flight plans for travel between most pairs of cities were filed with
the FAA's Air Route Traffic Control Centers during their peak day in 1969.
Typically, airline flights are concentrated during certain peak hours, and
significant gaps occur at other times. Even if 50 flights were evenly distri-
buted over a 16-hour day, an airliner aircraft would only overfly a given
ground point on an air route between two such cities once every 19. 2 minutes.
Thus the closest IFR aircraft (flying at 550 knots) might be 88 nautical miles
away from a given GA aircraft. The above estimates assume, conservatively,
that all ATA aircraft would carry sync-donor CAS and that all of the IFR flights
involve air carriers (actually, of 32, 555 Peak Day IFR flights, only 22,319
involved turbine-powered aircraft).
Even if all the IFR aircraft had donor capabilities there is a good chance
that no donor would be within reliable communication range with the GA air-
craft. Many locations are more than 30 miles from the nearest air route con-
necting major cities. It can be seen from the figure that a substantial portion
of the United States would fall outside a 10- to 30-nautical-mile radius about
the principal air routes. The GA CAS equipment has been designed with a
transmitted output power of approximately 75 watts (peak) to yield a 9-nauti-
cal mile detection range for threats at ATA CAS equipped aircraft. The
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critical path in extracting sync from airborne sync donors is similarly in the
transmission from the GA aircraft to the donor. (Refer to RF Power Calcula-
tions, section VI). The associated resync range can be expected to be greater
than 10 nautical miles. Resynchronization is not absolutely required every
3-second epoch for system operation. It should be possible to communicate
intermittently with less than the 10 db assumed fade margin. Thus the
estimated sync range would be 20 to 30 nautical miles.
The maximum allowable time interval between sync updates is the time it
takes for a time error of one to two microseconds to accumulate on a clock
with maximum permissible offset in frequency. A moderately priced clock
with an inherent accuracy of approximately ±1 part in 10® has been selected
for this application. However, airborne clock frequency adjustment during
sync can correct the frequency to agree with the standard within about 3 parts
in 10 . Such clocks require updating at intervals of about 5. 5 minutes or less
to maintain 1-microsecond accuracy. Even the 19. 6-minute mean resynchron-
ization interval mentioned earlier would be intolerable. However, statistical
variations in aircraft passage intervals, and complete lack of synchronization
until an airliner comes on the scene makes this a very hit or miss method for
providing collision avoidance protection.
Even in much busier airspace, the present ATA-CAS sync donor approach
may cause difficulties when low power CAS-equipped aircraft request sync.
The ATA specification requires a capable airborne sync donor to restrict his
reply rate to 1/N, where N is the number of airborne sync donors (with hier-
archy and time validation) that any given airborne sync donor may "hear".
This restriction was introduced to eliminate possible interference between
transmissions of the fine sync triad from different donors. The procedure
has potential drawbacks. 16,17 This is most readily understood by covering
a situation where a large number of potential donors (e. g., 50) are in a; busy
airlane, just beyond communication range with a sync requester. In addition,
one donor is located midway between the requester and the cloud of aircraft.
The closest donor, hearing N = 50 other donor aircraft, would only transmit
sync replies 2% of the time. The other potential sync donors could not reply
to the requester if they were out of communication range. Thus the resync
rate would drop from once every 3 seconds (or once every 6 seconds) to once
every 150 to 300 seconds. If the requester and donor were on antiparallel
courses, they might even fly out of communication range by the time that the
I/N circuitry allows a sync reply. Similar problems arise if one isolated .sync
requester is at marginal communication range with a cloud of sync donors,
and if one of the donors has a particularly sensitive receiver. Again the
presence of the other donors would inhibit most sync replies from the only
donor that can hear the sync request.
It is obvious that a large number of appropriately distributed ground
stations on the established instrument navigation routes provide an ideal
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method for distributing accurate time synchronization to GA aircraft. This
approach does not depend on the availability of airborne sync donors to fill
gaps left by eliminating ground stations, nor is the ground station sync reply
limited to a 1/N reply rate. The alternative inclusion of sync donor capabili-
ties in all air carrier aircraft, besides imposing cost and weight penalties
(and thereby displacing payload), would not necessarily suffice to provide syn-
chronization to a sufficient percentage of GA aircraft.
*~N
However, for economic reasons, it would be necessary to modify virtual-
ly all VORTAC stations used by GA aircraft, if the resulting synchronization
capability is to be available to these aircraft. At any one time, a GA aircraft
listens to just one VORTAC, and this VORTAC station is selected on the basis
of FAA-established routes. Use of area navigation equipment will provide
considerably greater freedom for selecting VORTAC stations. However, it is
not necessary nor recommended that GA-equipped aircraft should first have to
purchase area navigation equipment in order to utilize VORTAC sync. If
every ground VORTAC is modified to provide sync donor capabilities, then the
airborne clock can be synchronized without requiring pilot (or automatic) re-
tuning from the navigation DME to one of a limited number of sync DME's.
1. Low Altitude Coverage. It is essential to provide synchronization at
the lowest possible altitudes in order to permit use of CAS as soon as possible
after takeoff. Figure 3 shows that for an aircraft 500 feet above an assumed
smooth earth, an expected line-of-sight path exists for some 28 nautical miles.
While there will be locations where the aircraft will not have sync available at
the takeoff airport, these locations are minimized by use of the VORTAC nav-
igation system which was specifically deployed to meet air traffic
requirements.
2. Associated Benefits. An especially beneficial feature of systems
utilizing VORTAC synchronization is that no CAS signals need to be trans-
mitted until the airborne unit is in fine synchronism with CAS time. Present
CAS equipment may be coarse synchronized with large propagation delays at
ranges where fine sync is not available. The CAS, if not equipped with BUM,
would continue requesting sync for extended intervals with possible resultant
interference in adjacent slots. If the CAS is equipped with the asynchronous
backup mode (BUM) then it could alternate between BUM and fine sync re-
quests. In any event, there is a possibility that a limited CAS unit would
transmit in the BUM mode for extended intervals if receiver sensitivity or
other minor system degradation inhibited resync capabilities.
The resulting asynchronous transmissions could be detected during
"shut-up and listen" cycles and could involve considerable slot jumping and
associated interference with the orderly time/frequency transmissions. Syn-
chronization via VORTAC avoids the requirement for a backup mode. By
avoiding asynchronous CAS transmissions, this approach eliminates a
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Figure 3. Minimum Altitude for Line-of-sight Air-to-ground Communications
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significant source of mutual interference. This is not accomplished in any
other presently-applied synchronization technique, including the present ATA
CAS scheme.
B. GROUND SYNC DONORS
The preceding discussion clearly indicates the need for a large network of
ground stations to provide frequency sync updating for low-cost general avia-
tion CAS.
1. Ground Station Distribution. One approach to providing ground sync-
donor stations involves the deployment of such a network of stations on a geo-
metrical grid. The desired ground station distribution may be determined by
first approximating the conterminous United States with an 870- by 2600-nauti-
cal mile rectangle. Assuming the maximum sync range (for the general avia-
tion CAS) to be 30 nautical miles, a ground station deployment in the form of
a triangular grid could be considered (see figure 4). This requires 50 stations
at 52-nautical-mile intervals, in the east/west direction, parallel to the long-
er side of the rectangle. There would have to be 19 grid lines at 45-nautical
mile intervals in the north/south direction.
The ground station locations would be shifted 26 miles east (in each
successive east/west grid line) so that equilateral triangles, with 52 nautical
GROUND STATION
52NMI
99M>ltt
Figure 4. Geometric Grid of Ground Stations
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miles long sides, are formed. The maximum distance from ahy'point within
or on the triangles is 30 nautical miles. A total of approximately 950 ground
stations would be required for general aviation sync using this method. Note
that a square grid, with dimensions of 30 /2~nautical miles would require
some 21 by 62 stations or about 1300 stations. The number of stations would
decrease if gaps in coverage were permitted. But even the proposed 30
nautical miles resync range only provides marginal coverage.
Another contractor's report indicates that only 600 ground stations
are required (see figure 5) for complete coverage (gap D = 0) above 1000 feet
altitude. The disparity between their estimate and that of Sierra Research
results from differing estimates of sync communication range. Figure 5
does not include the communications link as a dependent variable in the deter-
mination of the number of ground stations required. However, even the de-
ployment of 600 ground stations would involve considerable expenditure and
delay.
MAXIMUM DISTANCE
BETWEEN ZONES (NA.MI)
VELOCITY
MAXIMUM SYNCHRONIZATION
INTERVAL
VT
1 2 3 4 5
MINIMUM ALTITUDE OF GENERAL AVIATION CAS OPERATION - K-FT
Figure 5. Number of CAS Stations Required for Ground-based
Synchronization Network (from reference 11)
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If CAS implementation had to await deployment of an extensive net-
work of new CAS-frequency ground stations, the resultant delay would
probably scuttle the whole program. Under these circumstances, this con-
tractor has worked with FAA to develop a simple modification to existing
ground navigation (VORTAC) facilities in order to transform these stations
into a ground donor of time synchronization, without interfering with the
stations1 intended navigation capabilities.
2. VORTAC Sync Donors. Modifications of the Ground VORTAC network
to provide the requisite synchronization function has two major advantages.
From an economic point of view, the VORTAC system is already deployed
along the most travelled air routes, so that costly shelter and site acquisition
for the sync donor stations is not required.
In addition, sufficient communication range and coverage is provided,
so that synchronization would be available almost everywhere that GA aircraft
fly in significant numbers.
Figure 6 indicates the fine coverage given by the VORTAC network
and is one of the primary reasons it was chosen. The ATS Fact Book indicates
that in 1967 there were 950 VOR/VORTAC stations in operation (including
military and non-federal installations) many of the stations have an operating
range of up to 130 nautical miles. This includes 561 VORTAC stations and
seven VOR/DME stations. A significant portion of the remaining stations have
been modified or are scheduled to be modified to include a DME capability ^.
Approximately 1050 FAA-operated stations are expected to have DME capa-
bilities by 1981 (reference 19). These stations provide coverage over the
counterminous United States with near-saturation coverage in the regions of
maximum air traffic.
In view of the long-range capability (up to 130 nmi) of VORTAC
stations, excellent coverage could be achieved by modifying a limited number
of ground stations. Even more extensive coverage will become available
(especially at low altitude) if a significant number of VORTAC and VOR/DME
stations are modified and synchronized.
A method for passing on time with the aid of reference transmissions
from the VORTAC system was devised by Sierra Research engineers in 1968,
and an unsolicited proposal was submitted to FAA. Recognizing the im-
_poriance_of_such_a_syst_eni,_Sierra Research employed internal funding to build
and flight-test a version of the system during 1970. 7fhTe performancelif^the
system indicated that this approach was quite capable of providing the required
synchronization function. 20
In the Spring of 1971, the FAA contracted with Sierra for the design
and fabrication under Contract No. DOT-FA71WA-2571 of a feasibility model
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of ground and airborne synchronization equipment to permit the ground DME
to transmit precisely-timed reference pulses with its normal transmissions
and to permit an aircraft to synchronize an on-board clock to the ground-
station transmissions.
The advantage of utilizing VORTAC over other navigation aids for
passing on time were summarized21 and a detailed discussion of the selected
system approach22 was provided to FAA in May 1971. The completed feasi-
bility model of the ground unit is scheduled for shipment to NAFEC on
16 November 1971 for flight test evaluation. The airborne unit, which includes
capabilities for extracting quasi one-way range from time of arrival of the
reference pulse transmissions, is scheduled for shipment in January 1972.
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SECTION IV
DESIGN OF A SINGLE FREQUENCY GA CAS
A. INTRODUCTION
The ATA's Collision Avoidance System requires each CAS-equipped air-
craft to monitor four RF frequencies sequentially in order to assess potential
threats. In addition, at least the sync-donor equipment would have to include
capabilities for transmitting on each of the four RF frequencies utilized by
CAS. Thus, a Full CAS system* is a four-frequency system requiring the
generation of eight different frequencies (four different transmit and four
different local oscillator frequencies).
In order to reduce costs, Sierra proposed to delete the requirement on
the General Aviation CAS for sequentially monitoring four different CAS fre-
quencies. This simplification of the GA CAS equipment is obviously desirable,
if it can be accomplished without any deterioration in overall system perform-
ance, provided the impact on the Full CAS system is not of great significance,
in particular, there must be ho deterioration in system capacity, no increased
danger of mutual interference, and no loss of capability for evaluating poten-
tial threats.
In the ensuing paragraphs, we will summarize the single-frequency dis-
cussion from our original proposal and discuss the detailed impact of these
changes on the ATA CAS. We will explain the minor modifications in ATA
CAS that may be desirable to permit use of a single-frequency system by low-
flying GA aircraft, without deteriorating system performance.
It must be emphasized that the proposed single-frequency approach
involves specific changes in the ATA CAS.
This report documents the most economical approach to the design of a
GA CAS, based on making necessary changes in the overall CAS logic.
B. BACKGROUND
The CAS system, designed by ATA's Technical Working Group on
Collision Avoidance utilizes a sequential pattern of transmission on four sepa-
rate frequencies in order to guard against mutual interference-between-air^
craft within line of sight. These four separate transmitting and receiving
* As used in this report, "Full CAS" and "sophisticated CAS" are used almost
interchangeably with "ATA CAS" which includes the ATA's Limited System
(level 1) except where sync donor capabilities are required. "GA CAS"
refers to the low-cost design under study of NASA. ,
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frequency-allocations are located in the 1.6-GHz band (centered at 1. 600,
1. 605, 1. 610, and 1. 615 GHz) and are generally referred to as FI, F2,
and F4, respectively. The system employs a 6-second repetition cycle (see
figure 7). This cycle is subdivided into a three-second ground epoch followed
by a three-second air epoch. Each epoch is further subdivided into 500 six-
millisecond groups of four successive slots where the transmission (and
reception) frequencies are successively switched through the frequencies FI,
F2, FS, F4. Each aircraft transmits on one of the four available frequencies,
in an appropriate slot, during the ground epoch and in the corresponding slot
during the air epoch. Various slots are reserved for ground stations, test
purposes, etc. so that this 2000 slot system has an ultimate capacity to
accommodate somewhat less than 2000 aircraft. Approximately 500 slots are
available for transmission on each of the four frequencies Fj through F^.
This pattern of frequency-allocations was selected to utilize line-of-sight
limitations for preventing mutual interference. In the present one-way CAS
system, the signal attenuation with range obeys an inverse square law. Thus
every time the range doubles, the power goes down by 6 db. If adequate fade
margin is provided, there will be conditions when interference may result
from unwanted intermittent good communication at extreme range. By utiliz-
ing frequency-switching, an additional increment of attenuation can be intro-
duced. In particular, some 30 db of adjacent channel rejection is assumed in.
the ATA CAS. (Actual adjacent channel rejection will depend on the filtering
employed in the receiver and on the nature of the transmitted pulse modulation.)
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Figure 7. Frequency Switching Pattern in ATA CAS
Line-of-sight refers to the smallest range separation where the interven-
ing earth severely blocks electromagnetic propagation. The line-of-sight
distance, Dj + D2 (see figure 8) can be calculated for two aircraft that are
respectively at heights Hj and H2 above a perfect spherical earth, by assuming
straight-line propagation. By the Pythagorean theorem, (R+H^)2 - R2 = Dj2,
(R+H2) - R - D2 where R is the radius of the earth. But aircraft are
restricted to fly in the atmosphere where H is much less than R so that H2 can
be neglected in comparison with 2RH.
D, + D9 = \J2RH, -f NJ 2RH0 .
Thus the line of sight is given by:
38
If we just use the earth' s radius of 3440 nmi with HJ = H2 = '10 nmi
then DI + D2 - 2 \| 20 (3440) = 2 \|68, 800 = 524 nmi. (All distances
are given in nautical miles. )
Center of Earth
Figure 8. Grazing Line-of-sight Transmission
Refraction effects typically extend line-of-sight coverage. In performing
line-of-sight calculations, an "effective" earth's radius of 4587 nmi is used
to approximate these refraction effects.23 with such a 4/3 radius earth, the
line-of-sight becomes:
= 606 nmi. Electromagnetic energy travels one
corresponds to a one-way propagation delay of
6.19 x 606 jusecs or 3. 76 milliseconds.
Dl + Do = 2 \| 20 (4/3) 3440 
mile in t> . 19 usecs, so this :
The CAS has been designed for use at a maximum altitude of 87, 500 feet,
where the 727-nmi line-of-sight range provides a propagation delay of about
4. 5 milliseconds. A signal transmitted during the first half of a given slot
will arrive at a receiver 727 nautical miles away in the first half of the third
following slot. But the frequency switching provides 3 intervening 1. 5-milli-
second slots where different frequencies are employed (see figure 7). In
combination with range attenuation and line-of-sight cutoff, this effectively
prevents interference between aircraft transmissions on the same frequency.
C. APPLICABILITY TO GA CAS
Sierra Research Corporation believes that significant cost savings can
be realized by limiting all CAS transmissions and receptions by the smaller
General.Aviation aircraft to a single RF frequency. In order to achieve this
simplification it would be necessary to limit all transmissions by potential
threat aircraft (i. e., by all aircraft flying in the same airspace) to the
selected common frequency.
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An apparent solution would involve restricting all threat (range, range
rate, and altitude) transmissions by low-flying aircraft to a single one of the
four previously mentioned CAS frequencies. ATA CAS logic requires evalua-
tion of threats from all aircraft within ± 3500 feet of own aircraft's altitude.
Since the relevant GA aircraft are assumed to fly at altitudes below 10, 000
feet, it would be necessary to restrict threat transmissions, by all aircraft
below 13, 500 or 14, 000 feet, to a single CAS frequency. But this only leaves
some 500 distinct slots available for use by low-altitude aircraft.
24Based on estimates in the Alexander Committee's report there may be
a peak of some 1700 aircraft above the Los Angeles Basin, (a 60 by 120 nautical
mile area) by 1995. Some 80% of these are projected to be below 10, 000 feet.
Similarly, some 6250 airborne aircraft are projected within the entire
Los Angeles sector. Some 70% of these aircraft are assumed to be below
10, 000 feet.
With such a preponderance of low-flying aircraft, it would be absolutely
unrealistic to assume that 500 low-altitude slots would suffice for the low-
flying aircraft. (It may also turn out that 2000 slots will not suffice for all
CAS-equipped aircraft.)
Assigning half the available slots for low-flying aircraft and the rest to
high-flying aircraft appears more realistic. This need for more slots, com-
bined with a desire for equipment simplification has motivated us to propose
a modified frequency switching system. In particular, it is proposed that
every other slot be reserved for use by low-flying aircraft and that all low-
flying aircraft be constrained to transmit in one of these reserved slots. A
single CAS frequency (F4) would be used for threat transmissions by all air-
craft flying below 14, 000 feet. Aircraft flying at 10, 000 feet or lower would
never have to monitor the other three CAI3 frequencies for threat evaluation.
Thus the GA CAS (which is to be restricted for use by aircraft flying below
10, 000 feet) would be a truly one-frequency system, transmitting and receiv-
ing on F. only.
It remains to show that this change would not cause interference or other
problems to the resulting CAS. We consider the line-of-sight transmission
path between the highest flying aircraft on F4 and the highest flying intruder.
The aircraft on F4 may be at 14, 000 feet and may interact with aircraft that
are up to 3500 feet higher still. In evaluating threats between (transmitting)
aircraft at 14, 000 feet altitude or less and (receiving) aircraft at 17, 500 feet
or less^ the maximum propagation delay becomes _
-5- (3440): (14000/6076) + J-|- (3440) (17500/6076)6.19
= 6. 19 ( VJ21200 + vj 26500) = 6.19 (146 + 163) = 1915 /isecs or 1. 915
millisecs.
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Any signals transmitted by the lower-flying aircraft, during the first 1085
microseconds of their assigned slots, would arrive at the higher-flying air-
craft in that same slot or in the next subsequent slot (where a different fre-
quency is utilized and therefore the signals can be ignored). The ATA CAS
signal transmission format involves completion of all transmissions by the
slot occupant within the first 765 microseconds of the slot. The specification
reserves a block of up to 350 microseconds for "additional communications
and navigation information" (e.g., telemetry of airspeed components as PPM
data). This could be reduced somewhat (to 320 microseconds or less) to
complete all transmissions during the first 1085 microseconds and thereby
avoid any reasonable possibility of interference between transmissions (see
ATA CAS Signal Transmission Format, figure 9).
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Figure 9. ATA CAS Signal Transmission Format
D. REQUISITE CHANGES IN ATA CAS FREQUENCY SWITCHING
The availability of a 1.9 millisecond guardband (consistent with line-of-
sight limitations) motivated our proposal for use by the higher flying aircraft
of a single intervening frequency slot between each pair of "F4 " slots to be
used by any aircraft flying at or below 14, 000 feet altitude (see figure 10).
Essentially, this frequency switching technique was suggested in our proposal
to permit all aircraft below 10, 000 feet to receive and transmit on frequency
F4 only. Aircraft in the buffer zone between 10, 000 and 14, 000 feet of altitude
would have to monitor frequencies Fj and F3 (as well as F4) in order to hear
aircraft range transmissions and evaluate threats from aircraft in the region^ _
~above~r47000~feer^ltitude^ Similarly, aifcrafOrFthe'regibn above 1A~"OWleeT7
altitude might have to monitor transmissions on F^ (as well as F^ and Fo) but
would only be allowed to transmit range pulses and similar data on F j or F3
in order to provide altitude, range, and range-rate threat information. F^
replaces F2 in the ATA CAS frequency switching logic. All CAS-equipped
aircraft flying through 14, 000 feet of altitude would have to switch slots.
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F1 F2 F3 F4 Transmit on at least one frequency,
Receive on all four
A. FREQUENCY SWITCHING PER.ATA CAS SPECIFICATION
B. PROPOSED FREQUENCY SWITCHING FOR HIGH ALTITUDE ATA CAS
F4_
7////////
F4
C. PROPOSED FREQUENCY SWITCHING FOR LOW ALTITUDE ATA CAS
F4 F4
Transmit on T^ or F3> Receive on all
frequencies, (only Fj, Fj pertinent when
above 18000 ft)
Transmit on F4> Receive on all three.
<Only need receive on F. below 10000 feet)
Receive and Transmit on F. only.
i ii i • . i i
D. PROPOSED FREQUENCY SWITCHING FOR GENERAL AVIATION CAS
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Figure 10. Modified CAS Frequency Switching (for Threat Determination)
As noted earlier, the actual signal in space transmitted from any given
synchronized airborne station in the ATA system does not include any threat
information beyond the first 765 microseconds of each slot except for a
possible set of additional communication or navigation signals that may be
transmitted immediately thereafter. This leaves some 400 microseconds of
dead time at the end of each given F4 slot. This delay, in conjunction with
the 1500-microsecond guard band provided by the intervening Fj or Fo slot,
corresponds with the required 1.915 millisec line-of-sight guara band needed
to prevent interference between common frequency transmissions in every
other slot.
As noted earlier, a slight (30 microsecond) reduction is desirable in the
350 jLtsecs. reserved by the ATA CAS for additional communication. Re-
duction of this reserved time should cause no difficulty since no actual equip-
ment, embodying such additional (pulse position modulation) telemetry has
been built as yet. There would be no problem of mutual interference between
range and presently-planned telemetry transmissions utilized for threat evalu-
ation in a given slot and the corresponding transmissions two slots later.
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E. SYNCHRONIZATION
Since the proposed GA CAS system could not depend on air-to-air syn-
chronization, Sierra Research suggested the use of VORTAC for synchroni-
zation. These GA CAS units would synchronize on the appropriate TACAN/
DME frequencies rather than using one of the four CAS frequencies.
However, any CAS units that may wish to employ air-to-air synchroniza-
tion will utilize additional transmissions on one or more of the four CAS
frequencies. This is illustrated in figure 11, which shows overall frequency
management in the previously-defined ATA CAS, including transmission of
sync triads by donors and the reception of such pulses by requestors.
All airborne aircraft must go through the zero to 14, 000 foot altitude
layer, at least during takeoff and landing. Since we are considering a re-
quirement for use of F4 in this altitude band, it would appear desirable to
include provisions for such aircraft to utilize air-to-air synchronization if
they so desire.
When we consider possible use of the frequency F4 in the air-to-air sync
of aircraft below 14, 000 feet altitude in the proposed modified GA CAS, then
a small probability of interference might be anticipated between the range/
altitude transmissions by one aircraft and the air-to-air sync pulses at the
very end of the preceding F4 slot. Specific cases could arise where aircraft
within line of sight might receive range pulses from one aircraft and sync
pulses directed to another aircraft in an earlier slot. While such interfering
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Figure 11. Frequency Management per AT A-CAS Specification
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sync would generally be of low amplitude, they still could cause some errors
in judging'initial rise time. It would certainly be preferable not to have such
possible interference.
Complete protection against mutual interference is provided through use
of the frequency F2 which had not been previously intended for use in this
system. If Fo is utilized in air-to-air sync of those aircraft utilizing the
"earlier" F4 channel, then all problems disappear. In fact, by restricting
any aircraft desiring to utilize air-to-air synchronization to the second channel
in each group (where the slot number modulo 4 equals one) and by utilizing F2
in that channel for any needed air-to-air synchronization, we provide three
intervening slots for an overall delay of approximately 6 milliseconds to guard
against any possible interference (see figure 12).
By assumption, all low-cost Gene.ral Aviation CAS would be synchronized
utilizing the VORTAC synchronization technique, described in our original
proposal, and therefore would not need the air-to-air synchronization capabi-
lities. In fact, in these GA CAS systems, we plan to exclude capabilities for
utilizing either air-to-air synchronization (or ground-to-air synchronization,
unless that synchronization comes from the VORTAC system) in the interest
of simplifying system hardware. There are no technical impediments to the
use of both synchronization techniques but this would cost slightly more. Since
we are convinced that the VORTAC sync will be required in order to permit
synchronization at moderate to long ranges, the deletion of synchronization on
the CAS frequency appears to be cost effective for the GA CAS.
The use of frequency Fo for synchronization purposes (figure 12) involves
only minor additional sophistication of the ATA CAS units. It should be
emphasized that this approach maintains the concept of a single-frequency
(transmit and receive) system in the General Aviation CAS while requiring
very little modification of the Full-CAS equipment.
Any Full-CAS equipment utilizing air-to-air sync below 14, 000 feet would
have to utilize one of the 500 F4 slots which utilize frequency F2 for synchro-
nization. (Slot numbers congruent to one modulo 4.) Such ATA CAS systems
would have to monitor F2 in the last quarter of their slots for initial synchro-
nization and during resynchronization. Similarly, any air-to-air donors
would have to be able to shift their transmitters to F« in the last quarter of
every fourth slot in order to provide synchronization capabilities. No air-to-
air sync would be provided on frequency F4, although ground-to-air sync on
F4 would not cause problems.
F. ALTERNATIVE FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS
The proposed frequency management (figure 12) could be improved to
simplify the design of the low-cost GA CAS receiver somewhat, by a slight
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Figure 12. Proposed Modified Frequency Management
further departure from the ATA CAS frequency management scheme (figure
11). . This is achieved by interchanging frequencies F2 and F3 in figure 13.
This substitution of frequency F2 in the present FS slots was suggested in our
proposal. In that case, the frequency F3 is never used immediately before
an F4 slot, and less adjacent channel rejection would be required of the GA
CAS. While this alternative frequency assignment would appear to show
greater change from the ATA's original frequency management proposal,
these additional changes are quite minor and should not increase the Full-CAS
cost. ,In fact, none of the proposed changes should cause a significant per-
centage increase in the cost of a Full-CAS system.
G. COARSE SYNCHRONIZATION
The GA-CAS equipment described in this report would only include the
capability to receive on one frequency (F4). There would be no necessity for
receiving transmission on any of the three other frequencies (:Fj, F2, Fo),
since all other synchronized aircraft in the common airspace (below 14, 000
feet pressure altitude) would transmit range and altitude information on F4 .
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Figure 13. Proposed Alternative Modified Frequency Management
Similarly, since the GA CAS will employ the VORTAC system to provide fine
sync, it will not be necessary to transmit or receive on a CAS frequency to
achieve synchronization. In particular, the GA CAS will not have capabilities
for receiving sync replies on F3 (or F2) and will not receive the coarse sync
triad on F...
Instead, coarse sync information will be transmitted from the VORTAC
at 6-second intervals corresponding to the start of "ground-epoch" slot zero.
Since synchronization is so fundamental to the design of CAS equipment, it
seems appropriate to include some comments on the format of the reference
and coarse sync pulses to be transmitted by the VORTAC station. Basic
transmissions are in the form of a standard TACAN pulse pair with a constant
12 millisecond spacing.
However, once every six seconds, two successive normal pulse pairs are
deleted. A replacement pulse pair, delayed precisely 6 microseconds, and a
supernumerary pair, produced precisely 128.8 microseconds thereafter,
replace the first deleted pair. A second double pulse pair is transmitted
instead of the next successive 12 millisecond pulse pair. The first pair in
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this group is also delayed 6 microseconds, while its following supernumerary
pair is delayed 140. 8 microseconds thereafter (see figure 14). These two
double pulse pairs provide successive opportunities for coarse sync, to over-
come pulse dropout due to other transmissions from the ground station.
At this moment, the reference pulses do not have priority over other
transmissions. However, the normal reply efficiency of the VORTAC is
sufficient to permit fast lock-on to the train of reference pulses. The 12
millisecond spacing is an octal multiple of the CAS slot width and is not likely
to change significantly. However, it is conceivable that the epoch sync pulses
(at 6-second intervals) might be modified in the future.
In any event, this approach (which is scheduled for installation and
imminent evaluation at FAA's NAFEC facility near Atlantic City, New Jersey)
should suffice to provide complete airborne clock synchronization with fairly
simple interface from the airborne DME.
H. BACK-UP MODE
Since no signals can be transmitted or received on Fj, the simplest
GA CAS equipment can not utilize the Back-Up Mode (BUM). This eliminates
some protection for GA/GA encounters in areas where no ground VORTAC
sync stations are available. However, inclusion of BUM logic would add
substantially to system cost and might introduce potential problems of mutual
interference between this asynchronous mode and the highly organized Time/
Frequency CAS. Capabilities for transmitting and receiving on F* (in addition
to transmitting and receiving on F^) could be provided together with BUM logic
for an appropriate cost increment.
Of course, it would be possible to modify the basic system to provide
(optional) BUM operation on F4- Alternatively, the frequency management
scheme could be modified to define Fj as the common frequency below 14, 000
feet pressure altitude. Neither approach would have a major impact on
system cost, and associated changes in transmitter and receiver design in the
GA CAS would not be substantial.
This contractor continues to prefer the frequency management scheme
detailed in figure 13.
I. RESERVED SLOTS
Specific slots have been reserved for ground station operation and for
special test message transmissions in ARINC Characteristic 587. These 32
slots are defined in appendix I of the characteristic (which is revision 9 of
ANTC-117). A significant expansion of these reserved slots to permit their
use for ground obstacle avoidance (refer to section VIII) is provided in the
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recent (10th) revision of ANTC-117 (and of ARINC-587). It is obviously essen-
tial to assign these ground stations to operate on the common frequency so that
they may be heard by GA CAS equipment. This should not present problems.
Of course appropriate logic must be incorporated in the GA CAS to avoid
selection of any "reserved slot". The logical design of the equipment, de-
scribed elsewhere in this report, prevents occupancy of the reserved slots
described in revision 9 of the ANTC document. It is obvious that some changes
in reserved slot definition will result if the one-frequency GA CAS approach is
adopted. The selected obstacle avoidance slots could then be reserved with
minor changes in the reserved slot logic that are easily incorporated (refer to
section VIII).
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SECTION V
RANGE THREAT PARAMETERS
A. THREAT ZONES INVOLVING GA CAS
In designing the low-cost CAS for single engine general aviation aircraft,
it was convenient to utilize system parameters that are appropriate for a
Cessna-172, since the 172 is one of the most popular aircraft of this type.
In accordance with present thinking of the ATA Special Working Group on
Collision Avoidance, only two threat zones categories are provided. These
are a mandatory maneuver zone (Tau 1 in the ATA CAS) and an alert zone
(Tau 2). These zones may also be called range zones 1 and 2.
The parameters for the mandatory-maneuver zone (Tau 1 in the ATA
CAS) have been selected in accordance with the discussion on threat deter-
mination. Four separate range boundaries are suggested, corresponding to:
En-route encounters with ATA CAS-equipped aircraft,
En-route encounters with GA CAS-equipped aircraft,
Terminal-area encounters with ATA CAS-equipped aircraft,
Terminal area encounters with GA CAS-equipped aircraft.
B. MANDATORY MANEUVER DECISION TIME
1. Methodology. The selection of an appropriate mandatory-maneuver
range boundary for these cases has been discussed in an interim report .,
The maneuver range is chosen as the sum of the range uncertainty plus the
product of the maximum anticipated closing velocity by the total time
(including sensing, display, pilot, and aircraft delays) required to detect the
dangerous situation and change altitude sufficiently to provide safe vertical
separation.
The present ATA CAS logic calls for mandatory evasive maneuvers
when the ratio, r , (tau) of range to closing rate falls below a preselected
level, and when the indicated altitude separation is inadequate (less than
600 feet below 10,000 feet MSL). The prescribed evasive maneuver is either
a climb or a dive (depending on the relative altitude of the intruder). The
climb-or^dive maneuver is-supposed-to-be-away- from -the_mtmde.r.,_ahd
specific action is provided to force the two involved aircraft to move in
opposite directions. In particular, once a climb or dive maneuver is selected,
the aircraft automatically biases its altitude transmissions in the direction of
the selected evasive maneuver and maintains this bias for 6 seconds after the
threat disappears.
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These precautions do not preclude the possibility that both aircraft
may be ordered to move in the "wrong" direction. Thus there is always the
chance that altimeter and telemetry errors may be sufficiently large to cause
a lower aircraft to climb while a higher intruder holds altitude or dives. A
worst condition occurs when the various altimeter and telemetry errors cause
an aircraft to sense an intruder as precisely co-altitude, while the logic
arbitrarily generates a climb command even though the other aircraft is
really above.
The amount of vertical motion required in this apparent co-altitude
case is just the worst-case altitude error plus a suitable increment for inter-
aircraft clearance. In the subsequent discussion, we will estimate the three-
sigma root-sum square altimeter and telemetry error and will then add a
minimal inter-air craft clearance estimate to indicate the desired altitude
change for a safe evasion.
In selecting a range boundary for a mandatory-evasive maneuver, it
is appropriate to utilize an estimate of the requisite evasion time, which is
roughly equivalent to the selection of the time constant "Tau" in the ATA CAS.
This total evasion time is the sum of the nominal time required to achieve the
desired altitude change, at the selected climb/dive rate, and the time delay
between the instant when an intruder reaches the threat boundary and the *
instant when own aircraft achieves the desired climb/dive rate.
This delay includes the time delay for transmission, reception, and
display of the threat, the time delay for the pilot to react, and the aircraft
response time delay. Since the ATA CAS equipment alternately transmits
from top- and bottom-mounted antennas, (at successive three-second intervals),
a full six seconds may elapse between the time that an intruder crosses the
threat boundary and the time that the next range/altitude transmission is
received from the intruder. We add three seconds for pilot reaction and two
seconds for the aircraft to reach its desired climb/dive rate, for a total
delay of 11 seconds (in addition to the nominal climb/dive time corresponding
to the ratio between the desired altitude change and the climb/dive rate
employed).
2. Calculating the Root Sum Squared Altitude Error.
a. Basic Calculation. The root sum squared altitude error is
extracted from the combination of the altimeter errors in own and and
intruder's aircraft, and the truncation errors caused by encoding the altimeter
output in 100-foot increments. Three separate cases will be considered,
involving two different-quality altimeters that might be utilized by ATA CAS-
equipped aircraft and GA CAS-equipped aircraft. A three-sigma RSS altitude
error is used, since such an error will not be exceeded with a probability of
99.7%.
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b. Use of Quality Encoding Altimeters. The ATA CAS threat logic
is based on altimeters with a 150-foot (30 ) error below 10,000 feet MSL. If
both the intruder and the GA aircraft have such a 150-foot three-sigma error,
and if the altitude is telemetered in 100-foot increments (with a consequent
uniformly distributed error of ±50 feet) then the overall three-sigma altitude
uncertainty (in feet) is given by:
3a =3 v/ 2( V ) + 2 (-^H = 3 76667 = 245
6
 2/3"
c. Use of Reduced-Accuracy Altimeters. There may be valid
reasons to believe that single-engine GA aircraft may elect to buy encoding
altimeters that do not quite meet the accuracy specifications envisioned by the
ATA's Technical Working Group. If this should happen, it might require some
compensatory increase in the range boundaries for all encounters involving
such GA CAS-equipped aircraft. While this contractor has no specific reasons
for believing that GA encoding altimeters will provide reduced accuracy, it
seems desirable to explore the increased altitude uncertainty that would
result.
If the encounter is between a GA aircraft (with a 3-sigma alti-
meter error of 250 feet) and an ATA CAS-equipped aircraft with a 3-sigma
altimeter error of 150 feet, and if both altimeters are digitized in 100-foot
pressure-altitude increments, then the anticipated 3-sigma altitude discrep-
ancy (in feet) is
100
In addition, if we should decide to use 250 feet as an assumed
three-sigma altimeter error for the GA CAS instrument, then somewhat
longer decision times would be required in encounters between two GA CAS
aircraft. In particular,
2
3CT = 3 7 2 (-^-) + 2 (-^-) = 375 feet.
a2 V 3 2/3"
These various calculations will be employed in the selection of
appropriate threat boundaries.
3. Calculation of Total Evasion Time. As noted earlier, the range
boundaries are calculated by the sum of a range margin component and the
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product of the total evasion time by the maximum anticipated closing, rate.
The total evasion time is the sum of the nominal evasion time plus an appro-
priate allowance for delay in evaluating and reacting to the threat. This
maximum delay has been calculated as about 11 seconds, in a previous
paragraph.
The nominal evasion time is just the ratio of the required altitude
change to the climb/dive rate. One component of the required altitude change
is just the altimeter error. The other component that must be included is the
required aircraft-to-aircraft clearance. In particular, the clearance will be
a function of the overall dimensions of the aircraft. Tail height of a typical
single engine GA aircraft is only about 11 feet. Thus 100 feet should suffice
to provide adequate clearance between two GA aircraft. However, the
corresponding height of Boeing 707's and 747's is over 39 feet and 72 feet,
respectively. The net result is a requirement for 30 to 60 additional feet of
clearance. Thus at least 160 feet of vertical clearance is recommended in
encounters between a single engine aircraft and an airliner, while 220 feet
would be desirable in encounters between two large aircraft. Addition of the
appropriate clearances, to the three-sigma altitude errors defined in a pre-
vious paragraph, yields the total desired altitude change for any specified
encounter. When this estimate is divided by the Cessna's climb rate of .
645 feet per minute (10.75 fps) this yields the nominal evasion time require-
ment.; Inclusion of an additional 11-second allowance for delays yields the
total evasion time requirements (refer to table 4). This table includes calcula-
tions based on both the assumption of using a very accurate (150 foot, 3cr)
altimeter and a less accurate (250 foot, 3<j) altimeter by the GA aircraft.
While calculations for both assumptions are utilized and compared,
in this report, the more pessimistic calculations have been used in the specific
GA CAS system design provided here. Change to the more optimistic num-
bers could readily be incorporated in the GA CAS design if appropriate
mandatory specifications for such encoding altimeters are adopted.
4. Effect on ATA CAS Design. More pessimistic assumptions for GA
altimeter errors could have some effect on the design of the ATA CAS. Thus
a change from a 150-foot (three-sigma) altimeter error to a 250-foot error,
by the GA CAS-equipped intruder, would correspond to a required altitude
maneuver of 416 feet rather than 345 feet (as calculated in subparagraph 2).
But we also pointed out that encounters with an airliner may require 60 feet
of additional height clearance (over the clearance required between a GA air-
craft and an airliner). Required clearance between two airlines could require
an additional 120 feet of altitude separation. Following this reasoning, the
required altitude travel changes froni 345 + 120 = 465 feet for encounters
between two airliners to 416 +60 = 476 feet for encounters between an airliner
and a single engine aircraft. At a steady state climb rate of 2000 feet per
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minute, this 11-foot altitude difference requires less than one second and does
not appear to introduce any need for a different decision time.
It should be emphasized that no attempt has been made to consider inter-
action with trailing vortices of large aircraft. Such vortices would not be
encountered in head-on encounters while some additional time margin is
provided to the GA CAS-equipped aircraft in the overtake situation.
C. DECISION TIMES IN THE ALERT ZONE
Turn-rates are limited in ATA CAS encounters with "co-altitude" intruders
in Tau Zone 2. This prevents undue reduction of warning time while the
intruder enters Tau Zone 1 and is detected. The limitation is unnecessary in
the GA CAS since range/altitude logic already protects against maximum
closing rates. The only requirement in the alert zone is to limit dive/climb
rates. Accomplishing this requires no more time of the GA pilot than of the
airliner. Thus the 15-second incremental warning used by the ATA CAS
equipment should suffice for GA CAS.
The ATA CAS logic also includes a 1. 8 nautical mile offset, RQ so that
the Tau 2 (Alert) boundary is given by R = RQ -T 2 R. The RQ term corre-
sponds to the incremental distance travelled by both aircraft as a result of
closing acceleration after the nominal threat boundary is crossed (refer
to Holt and Anderson2^). Since the proposed GA/CAS threat evaluation is
already based on maximum anticipated closing velocities, it seems unneces-
sary to include such a term. The only likely exception involves ATA CAS
equipped aircraft flying at higher speed, at an altitude just above 10, 000 feet
MSL. Such aircraft would be slowing down as they approach the 10, 000-foot
altitude boundary. If we provide 3 seconds of additional alert time (over the
15 seconds provided in the ATA CAS), then this yields an alert display
3 (742) feet early or some 2200 feet early, in encounters with an ATA-CAS
equipped aircraft. But this 2200 feet is quite comparable to the extra dis-
tance that would be travelled by the intruder during the 33 seconds or less .
between the time that the "alert logic" is actuated in the GA CAS and the
instant when the Tau 2 warning indication is provided by the ATA-CAS. Dur-
ing this interval, even a significant deceleration of 140 knots per minute
(4 feet/second2) would yield a distance change of at2 /2 = 2. 0 (33)2 ^  2180
feet. Thus extending the boundary 2200 feet (in addition to the 1000-foot
margin provided as a compensation for range inaccuracy) is conservative in
our case. Thus, the alert range boundary will be based on 18 seconds more
than the mandatory maneuver decision time. (This provides three complete
CAS ground and air epochs.)
D. ANTICIPATED CLOSING VELOCITIES
The mandatory evasive-maneuver range for these various encounters
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can be calculated from the product of the decision time by the maximum
closing velocity anticipated plus a margin of about 1000 feet to allow for
synchronization/ranging errors. Thus it is essential to estimate the peak
closing rate under various circumstances. In particular, peak closing rates
will be estimated for the single engine GA aircraft in encounters with other
GA CAS-equipped aircraft and in encounters with ATA CAS-equipped aircraft.
Separate calculations will be made for the case of en-route encounters and
terminal area encounters.
1. En-Route Encounters with ATA CAS-Equipped Aircraft. The
anticipated maximum closing rate is the sum of the Cessna's 192 ft/sec and
the maximum speed of the airliner (or other ATA CAS-equipped aircraft) in
the airspace below 10,000 feet MSL. This closing velocity is not completely
defined. When Sierra Research submitted its original proposal, it was noted
that indicated airspeed is restricted to 250 kts below 10,000 feet MSL in
Federal Aviation Regulation 91.70, except as specifically authorized by the
Federal Aviation Administrator. A known exception is made for low-level,
high-speed training flights by military aircraft in restricted corridors. Such
flights are made at speeds up to 500 knots, on low-level "heavy wagon" routes,
and at unspecified speeds for "oil burner" and "low altitude high speed VFR"
routes. These speeds are substantially greater than anticipated airspeeds
for normally-encountered traffic at these altitudes.
While it might be possible to design the GA CAS to provide safe
evasions under such higher closing rates, it would impose substantial require-
ments for added airspace (at such closing rates) on the GA CAS. Thus the
present report anticipates that the general aviation pilot will avoid the
reserved regions of airspace. As a backup, the high-performance military
aircraft should be able to maneuver (if need be) in considerably less time than
is practical for the GA aircraft. Section VI verifies the capability of timely
receipt of GA CAS transmissions by the fast flying military aircraft, if it is
equipped with ATA CAS. The GA CAS threat evaluation is based on assumed
flight; by any encountered aircraft, in reasonable compliance with the
stated speeds in FAR 91.70.
In recent discussions with personnel from FAA's operational
and Air Transport Office, it was noted that turbojet aircraft, flying below
10,000 feet MSL could exceed 250 knots, IAS when conformance to the 250-
knot rule would require operation below the"minimum safe airspeed. "
Apparently this rule introduces excessive buffetting for certain aircraft
~(707's~or 747fs)~when"they depart the~terminal-in a heavily-weighted-con-
dition, e. g., for an overseas flight. This could involve flight at somewhat
over 260 knots IAS. We were also informed that certain military jet air-
craft may fly at airspeeds of 275 to 280 knots to permit adequate safe control.
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In the following analysis of anticipated maximum intruder speeds,
it has therefore been assumed that the ATA CAS-equipped intruder may be
flying at indicated air speeds that range to 280 knots. This indicated air-
speed may correspond to a somewhat higher true airspeed since the indicated
airspeed is proportional to the square root of the ram pressure, Pr, where
Pr .= . 5p V . In this formula, P represents the air density, while the air-
speed meter is calibrated to read correctly at sea level pressures. Thus the
indicated airspeed is given by
i = 72 P r /p 0
where P
 o is the sea level density of the standard atmosphere, while the equiv-
alent airspeed would be
Pr/P
so that
In particular, at an altitude of 10,000 feet MSL, the density of the standard
atmosphere is given by
P I p = . 7384.
Thus V = V./ 7/7384 '= 1.163 V.
An indicated airspeed of 280 knots or 472 fps corresponds to an equivalent
airspeed of
V = (1. 163) 472 = 550 fpsi
^
Thus if we add the Cessna's speed to the maximum assumed speed_
of the intruder, we obtain a maximum closing speed of 550 + 192 = 742 ft/sec.
2. En-Route Encounters with GA CAS-Equipped Aircraft. It is
anticipated that the GA CAS will be restricted for use on slower low-flying
(single engine) aircraft. In particular, we assume a maximum true airspeed
of 260 ft/sec: for GA CAS-equipped aircraft. This is near the maximum
speed of existing single-propeller aircraft. It results in a maximum closing
speed of 260 + 192 = 452 ft/sec. This closing speed will be used in selecting
the parameters for encounters between two GA CAS-equipped aircraft.
3. Terminal Area Encounters with ATA CAS-Equipped Aircraft.
As noted in our earlier analysis, there is need for a reduced threat
boundary radius in the terminal area. Federal Air Regulation 91. 70 also
restricts aircraft below the lateral limits of (high density) terminal control
areas to 200 knots, IAS. These areas normally encompass a radius of 5
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statute miles about the airport. It would appear reasonable to assume that
the ATA CAS-equipped aircraft would not fly faster than 200 knots IAS in the
immediate vicinity of any terminal, and at the low altitudes where s ingle -
engine aircraft may be encountered during approach and departure operations.
Furthermore, these terminal operations will generally be within 5000 feet
MSL. The nominal air density at 5000 feet MSL is 0. 8616 times the density
at sea level. Thus it is proposed that terminal threat logic be based on
maximum indicated airspeeds of 1. 69 (200)=;338 fps for ATA CAS-equipped
aircraft.
The GA CAS would similarly reduce its own indicated airspeed
to about 90 mph, corresponding to 132 fps. Thus we could design for a
combined maximum closing speed of (132 + 338)/\/ 8616 = 505 fps. Transi-
tion to terminal area logic would require operation of a control, with auto-
matic return to en route logic after a preselected interval.
4. Terminal Area Encounters with GA-CAS Equipped Aircraft.
Other GA CAS-equipped aircraft would also tend to operate at somewhat lower
speed in the terminal area. It appears desirable to utilize a maximum in-
dicated airspeed of about 120 mph as the maximum approach and departure
speeds of the single-propeller GA CAS-equipped aircraft. When added to the
90 mph assumed maximum terminal area speed for the Cessna, this yields
a closing speed of
22
(210) ( -jjj- ) / /. 8616 = 332 fps.
Note that the maximum closing speeds that are proposed for
selecting the terminal area logic do not quite yield the reduction of the alarm
zone to 60% as proposed in our interim report. Such a further decrease
could result in a reduced number of unnecessary evasive maneuvers, but
would not provide full protection against head-on encounters.
5. Resulting Threat Boundaries . The resulting threat boundaries
are summarized in tables 5 and 6 for the cases with a 150-foot 3-sigma
altimeter error and 250-foot 3-sigma altimeter error, respectively.
E . ATA CAS TAU ZONES
Since the GA CAS will not transmit a "coherent" long pulse, it will be
necessary for ATA CAS either to modify their threat determination procedure
-in-encounters with-GA- CAS-equipped-aircraftyor-to utilize differencing of
successive range measurements for closing rate measurements.
In the latter case, the ATA CAS threat 'boundaries could be utilized,
although some reduction in threat boundaries might result, if range rate is
extracted with improved accuracy.
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In the following discussion, we assume that the ATA CAS will simply use
a range boundary in encounters with GA CAS-equipped aircraft (as is done by
the GA CAS) in the reciprocal case. Again assuming two separate cases (one
en route case and one terminal area case) we can calculate the relevant range
boundaries. In particular, for these higher performance aircraft, we use the
established 25- and 40-second warning times for the mandatory evasion time
and the alert time respectively. If we employ the maximum anticipated en-
route airspeed of 260 feet/second for the GA CAS-equipped aircraft and 550
feet/second for the ATA CAS-equipped aircraft (below 10, 000 feet MSL), then
the maximum en route closing speed would be 550 + 260 = 810 feet/second.
The corresponding closing speeds in the terminal area would be 338 fps and
22/15 (120) = 176 fps indicated airspeed for a true closing speed of
(338 + 176)/ /0.8616 = 514 /07"866 = 553 feet/second
at a pressure-altitude of 5000 feet or less. Finally, as noted earlier, some-
what higher speeds may be anticipated above 10, 000 feet. It is suggested that
50 kts = 85 feet/second of additional airspeed be assumed in this case. However,
0. 5-nautical mile to 1. 8-nautical mile acceleration allowance, Ro, is again not
required, since we have already allowed for worst case closing velocity in our
estimates. The resulting threat boundaries are summarized in table 7.
These threat boundary estimates are of importance in the present analysis
for two reasons. They provide an indication of expected threat envelopes for
all interactions with GA CAS-equipped aircraft, and also indicate the required
transmission range so that GA CAS signals may be heard by various cate-
gories of intruders. Thus GA CAS transmissions must be heard by other
GA-CAS equipped aircraft at ranges of approximately 34, 000 feet (refer to
table 6). ATA CAS transmissions must be heard by GA CAS at ranges of up
to 55, 200 feet (refer to table 6), while GA CAS transmissions would have to be
received by the ATA CAS at ranges of 36, 800 feet (refer to table 7).
In this connection, one other type of encounter must be considered. This
involves encounters between a military jet flying at high subsonic speeds (in
the designated low altitude high speed VFR routes) and a GA CAS-equipped
aircraft. As noted earlier, the military aircraft would have to provide the
evasive maneuver under these VFR conditions. To do this successfully, the
military craft would require a timely alert. Since this aircraft could be
traveling at 95 percent of the speed of sound, a true airspeed of up to 1050
feet/second must be assumed. With a maximum GA CAS speed of 260 feet per
second, this could result in closing speed of 1310 feet/second. The high
performance military aircraft would have to detect the GA aircraft at a range
that would be no more than the 25 seconds for the mandatory maneuver zone
(or 40 seconds for the alert zone) that are specified for the ATA CAS-equip-
ment. This requires a communication range of at least 53, 400 feet for
transmissions by the GA CAS and receptions by the military aircraft. This
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exceeds the 36, 800-foot reception range required for reception of GA CAS
transmissions by ATA CAS-equipped aircraft, operating at speeds of 280 knots
or less. These numbers will be used to define the power transmission re-
quirements for the GA CAS equipment. *
F. PILOT DISPLAY - -
1 • Two Aircraft Encounters. The GA CAS pilot display is readily
adapted from the ATA CAS threat logic table. Figure 15 shows the proposed
GA CAS display logic. Range Zones 1 and 2 respectively, correspond to the
"mandatory maneuver zone" and the "alert zone" in the co-altitude case. If a
coaltitude (±600 feet of altitude) intruder is encountered in range zone 1,
commands to Climb'. Do Not Turn'., or Dive! Do Not Turn! (as appropriate)
are displayed to the pilot, and an audible alarm is sounded.
As noted earlier, the range/altitude threat logic of the GA CAS does
not require any modification in the threat zones based on aircraft horizontal
acceleration. However, stall characteristics recommend leveling out during
such climb/dive maneuvers for flight safety. Furthermore, sophisticated
CAS units that can extract range rate from successive range measurements
for threat evaluation would need to be protected against acceleration by either
aircraft. Thus the Do Not Turn command is especially necessary in encounters
with ATA CAS-equipped aircraft. However, the Do Not Turn command is also
used in encounters between two GA aircraft.
In encounters with co-altitude aircraft (within ±600 feet of own alti-
tude), in Range Zone 2, the Do Not Turn command appears to be unnecessary
1300
600
INTRUDER'S
RELATIVE
 n
ALTITUDE
-600
-1300
2AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTER
L.C.500
1. DIVE
2. UNI
1. CLIMB
2. DNT
1. L.C.O
1. L.D.O
L.D. 500
.
RANGE ZONE 1 RANGE ZONE 2
•
126*033
Figure 15. Threat Logic Table (2 Aircraft Encounter)
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since the Range 2 threat zone for the GA CAS is generally beyond the Tau zone
limits for the more maneuverable ATA CAS-equipped aircraft. Thus the Do
Not Turn command has been deleted in this case. This leaves a command for
Don't Climb with an intruder close above, and Don't Dive with an intruder
close below. The pilot display has been modified to "Limit Climb (Dive) to
0 fpm" since this causes less confusion for true co-altitude encounters. In that
case, either one or the other instruction is displayed, to suggest an upcoming
encounter and to avoid staying strictly co-altitude during the approach. Finally,
in the non-co-altitude encounters (with an intruder at a relative altitude of 600
to 1300 feet), in both Range Zones 1 and 2, the command "Limit Climb (Dive)
to 500 fpm" is displayed. This alerts the pilot to a potential encounter and
slows vertical approaches to the intruder according to the latter's relative
altitude. It has not appeared necessary to use a command to limit climb (or
dive) to 1000 fpm, since the single engine GA aircraft are not normally able
to maneuver that fast.
2. Three Aircraft Encounters. As in the case of the ATA CAS the three
aircraft encounter logic is patterned directly after the two aircraft logic.
Three cases are considered:
Both aircraft above
Both aircraft below
One aircraft above and one aircraft below.
See figure 16, parts A, B, and C. Generally, the display is governed by the
more dangerous of the two encounters. A particularly dangerous case results
when both intruders are within Range Zone 1, with one intruder co-altitude
above, and the other co-altitude below. The pilot display shows limit dive to
0 fpm and limit climb to 0 fpm. (The pilot maintains altitude and sweats.)
Note that any simultaneous display of dive and climb limits is an indication of
intruder aircraft above and below.
As in ATA CAS, commands of Limit Dive to 200 fpm and Limit Climb
to 200 fpm are incorporated when one of the intruder aircraft is co-altitude
±600 feet but in Range Zone 2, and neither intruder is co-altitude in Range
Zone 1. As in the two aircraft encounters, "Do Not Turn" is commanded
whenever an intruder is within ±600 feet of altitude and in_Range_Zp_ne_l.._ -This
display logic has been utilized in the system design described in Part Two of
this report.
3. Application to ATA CAS. It appears that the ATA CAS should be able
to use an unchanged pilot display in their encounters with GA CAS equipped
aircraft, after replacing Tau 1 and Tau 2 violations with the appropriate range
violations.
65
- *
- - • • " c
Ul
H
- • • z
- ' D
8
Ul
• • ' - • " • ' t
' DC
U
ffi
• • • ' • • • <
en
CM "•
•o o • oc 8 '
S ' S > K O H g
"' 3 5 * Su «g
£ "~ *" OC M 1C g Q
H. r . - 2
§ ' .' o ' .0 • . t o ? . ,a • " •§ a " >- u, CM t; a g
5 q q 11 |jjj <| |
1 f1 "- i^ . u. n
CO iu UJ Ul 111 ^ O j
>. H •£ *- •?» ^ 4 f ^ J o <Z 2 Z U iu < 3
00 00 00 | Z J O
-" *l -' « -^ C N f f S
N H N.I- «- h» i^»^5^
o 2 g £ | 5 v^> S
•* ^ 8 rf uJ <t bj ^^^?kk ^
z H - . '• < . < ' 8
CC ^ UJ UJ •• • UJ
. ,- ' oc a • i-
i LL
• = . - . 2
; . - • • ' . . S E
• • • • • • • <
«
,
7
 ' "•
•
§ §
cj o
-' r<l
CM S
q Q
J J
^ -CM
o
5 Q J
r; oi n
CM K
; i
•Z O
O 1-
N 0
Ul g
h'oc <
-1
Ul
£C
§
q
q
m
j 2
U 0
^ CM
CM »-
DC "•
0 g
ii
si
z ^*rf _JS <
UJ
CC
' .- •
;
 88 -
. tj Q
-: CM
1 CM
q P
J -j
r-' CM
•
ul . .
> z o
0 Q J
r^ CM m
CM 1-
Ul "•
1 §
W Ki °
2
 S
_l
Ul
oc
1
q
i
Q
J
00
z ,_
Ii z
U Q
»~ CM
s t§ §
2 e§ °
< Htt
 ^^
'
Ul
oc
1 §3 fe q
u a -J
^ CM n
,
S ^
O Q J
^ CM n
H 0 0
Z u Q
Q J J .
W CM n
- t
li
g °
o
<
Ul
oc
m
S
 H
d §
00
5 1
v^ CM
03
£ H
3 z
u a
^ CM
ul t§1
E g
i°
S S
ul
oc
£ H-
K .8
2 ^S 15S« <2 3
Z z _i ul
S o ul 8 •OBS oc 8 uz
H uT
Ul CM ^ Q O
z z ^ ^
< O J P OCOC N ul t~ ul
• OC 0 Q
3
.t z
Oui < g z '
S 9 ui i- u
OC 0 ,
^
W4-S^^V^SL.
Vj^^V&k
^7^V* i^V
^
1—
fy
 o
--siii d| s
OCN C2 0
Ul
03
^ £Ul CM '"I Q Ul
0 Ul < g 0
Z Z . „ 3
< o -i P oc
OC N Ul •- 1-
oc a z
X
\- o
,_. U. 03
§ rd
< O -iO
OC N Ul K
CC 0
%^
^
66
SECTION VI
R-F POWER CALCULATIONS
A. POWER REQUIREMENTS
The proposed system must provide adequate communication range for
evaluating CAS threats in the following types of encounter:
1. Encounter Between Two GA CAS Equipped Aircraft. An examination
of tables 5 and 6 indicates that the maximum hazard range involved in a GA-to-
GA encounter is 34,000 feet or 5. 6 nautical miles. The output power and
sensitivity of the GA equipment must be compatible with this range.
2. GA-CAS Protected Aircraft With ATA CAS Equipped Intruder. Table
6 indicates that the GA CAS must receive signals from the ATA CAS equipped
aircraft at a range of up to 55,200 feet. The GA receiver sensitivity must be
adequate to meet this requirement.
3. High-Speed ATA-CAS Protected Aircraft With GA-CAS Equipped
Intruder. Table 7 indicates that the ATA CAS must receive the signal from
the GA CAS at 53, 400 feet. The power output of the GA CAS must be suffi-
cient to meet this requirement.
The GA CAS power requirement has been calculated for the first case
of a GA CAS encounter with another GA CAS equipped aircraft. This power
requirement is based on the use of an inexpensive receiver and associated r-f
system design (refer to subsection B). In addition, signal strength computa-
tions have been prepared for encounters with ATA CAS equipped aircraft to
verify the adequacy of the GA CAS receiver sensitivity and power output in
these cases also (refer to subsections D and E). Similar calculations have
also been performed for ATA CAS "limited" (Level 1) equipment. It appears
that power transmission levels and receiver sensitivity will suffice in these
cases also (refer to subsections F and G).
B. GA-TO-GA ENCOUNTER
The-proposed-systenr-must-provide a CAS~hazard"evaluation^or~GA=to-GA"
encounters at ranges of no more than 5. 6 nautical miles. A power budget
calculation, detailed in table 8, indicates that a transmitter capable of generat-
ing 56 watts or more peak power is adequate. The output power of the trans-
mitter selected and detailed in another section of this final report will be a
minimum of 75 watts (48. 8 dbm) at "end of life" conditions. This relatively
low power requirement is a significant factor in achieving a low-cost system.
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TABLE 8. CAS POWER REQUIREMENT CALCULATION
(GA/GA ENCOUNTERS)
Transmitter power requirement
(4Ti)2 (K)2 (M)3 k TN (BWIF) R2 (SNIF) L F
GT GRx2
where: .db db
(4n)2 = constant expressed in db above unity (20 log 4ir) +22. 0
K2 = nautical miles to meters conversion in
db above unity (20 log 1852) +65. 4
M2 = wavelength conversion, cm to meters
(20 log 100) +40. 0
-23
= 1. 38 x 10~ joules/degree Kelvin
(10 log k) -228.6
TN = system input noise temperature = 14500°K
(refer to discussion in text) 41. 6
BWIF = 3 db I-F bandwidth in db above one cycle
I-F bandwidth = 2 MHz (10 log BWIF) +63. 0
R2 = system operating range in db above one nmi
R max = 5. 6 nmi (20 log R max) +15.0
SNIF = IF signal-to-noise per ATA Spec
IF S/N = 15 db (SNIF) +15.0
L = transmit loss (2 db cable + 1. 5 r-f switch, etc.) + 3. 5
GT = antenna gain on transmit expressed in db .
above unity, 2 db .('-GT db) - 2
\
GR = antenna gain on receive expressed in db
above unit, 2 db (-GR db) - 2
X2 = wavelength in cm. for 1615 MHz
(-20 log x cm.) - 25.4
F = fade margin 10 db
-258.0
= 17. 5 dbw
so that P = 56 watts transmitter power
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The calculations were performed using a 15-db signal-to-noise ratio and a
fade margin of 10 db. A 15-db noise figure for the receive system was assumed
in order to permit use of a relatively inexpensive receiver. Typical diode
mixers with transistorized i-f amplifiers yield noise figures of 8 db or less,
allowing 7 db for moderately priced r-f switching, limiting, and preselection
components.
In addition to a 2-db cable loss in the transmit system, the power budget
calculation includes a 1. 5-db transmitter r-f system loss. This margin should
be adequate to provide for the duplexer and r-f antenna switch losses for those
installations where two antennas are required.. Thus, the power output require-
ment at the output connector is 1. 5 db less than 56 watts, or 40 watts.
Following the discussion in the ATA CAS document, we have estimated
the noise temperature from the formula:
TN = Ta + (Tf) (LR-1) + TQ (LR) (NF-1)
where
T = antenna temperature = 300° K
cl
Tf = thermal temperature receiving transmission line = 290°K
LR = receive cable loss = 2. 0 db
TQ = 290°K
NF = receiver noise factor = 15 db
8 db 'IF; 7 db r-f switching, etc.
TN = 300 •* 290 (1. 58 - 1) +290 (1. 58) (31. 6-1) = 14500°K
Since the three temperatures Ta, Tf, and TQ are almost equal in the
present application, this formula for TN can be replaced by the simpler
formula:
TN = TQ (LR) NF
with a maximum error of less than 0. 01 db.
C. RECEIVER SENSITIVITY
It is appropriate to calculate the sensitivity of the GA CAS receiving
system. As defined in the ATA CAS specification, this refers to the minimum
power level at the receiver input that provides a 15 db signal-to-noise level.
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It is appropriate to calculate the minimum power level at the receiver «
input that provides a 15 db signal-to-noise level (as also provided in the ATA-
CAS specification).
The minimum signal P . required at the CAS receiver (in order to
provide 15 db IF signal-to-noise ratio) can be calculated from
Pmin = k TN (BWIF) (SNIF)/LR
'\
where the various terms on the right side of the equation have the same defini-
tion as in table 8. In that table, the noise temperature TN, included the over-
all losses from the antenna output and also included the noise figure of the
receiver. Thus division by LR is required so that the cable loss in going from
the antenna output to the receiver input is not included twice. The calculations
in table 9 indicate a requirement for an input power level of -81 dbm.
TABLE 9. MINIMUM SIGNAL LEVEL CALCULATION
db dbw
-228.6
= 41.6
BWIF = 6 3 . 0
SNIF = 15.0
1/LR - 2.0
P . =119.6 -230.6 =-111.0 dbwmm
= - 81. 0 dbm
D. PROTECTED GA CAS ENCOUNTER WITH ATA CAS INTRUDER
As noted previously, table 6 indicates that the GA CAS must receive an
ATA CAS at 55, 200 feet. It is convenient to call
PL = (4iT)2 K2 M2 R2/x2
the path loss and either use direct calculation or a nomogram to calculate this
path loss for any range, R, and wavelength, \. The signal received at the
GA CAS can be calculated using the following parameters specified for the
ATA CAS in the ANTC-117 document.
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PQ = Power output = 62 ±3 dbm
LC = Cable loss = 4 ±2 db
AG = Antenna gain = 2 db
The signal path is as assumed in figure 17. The minimum specified power
output and maximum cable loss will be assumed in the calculations presented
in table 10.
TABLE 10. CALCULATION OF SIGNAL RECEIVED .AT GA CAS
db
PQ 59 dbm
+2 db
Path Loss, 55,200ft.
(from nomograph) -121.2
Fade - 10.0
GD 42 dbrv
LR _^ _ - 2.0
63 dbm -139. 2 db
Received signal = +63 dbm -139. 2 db = -76. 2 dbm
This signal is greater than the -81 dbm sensitivity of the GA CAS.
E. ATA CAS PROTECTED AIRCRAFT IN ENCOUNTERS WITH
GA CAS INTRUDER
As-rioted-in table-7y an-ATA- GAS may have to-reeeive the signal from-a —
GA CAS at ranges of up to 53,400 feet. This case involves military aircraft
flying subsonically at speeds near Mach 1. The signal path and power levels
are shown in figure 18. Calculation of the signal strength at the input to the
ATA CAS receiver is summarized in table 11.
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TABLE 12. SIGNAL STRENGTH RECEIVED BY GA CAS
FROM LIMITED ATA EQUIPMENT
P = Power Output = 56 ±3 dbm
L = Cable loss = 2 db
c
Ap = Antenna gain = 2 db
The minimum power output will be assumed.
Calculation of signal received at GA CAS:
PQ = 53 dbm
LC = - 2 db
A_ = 2 db
Lr
Path loss, 55, 200 ft. -121. 2 db
Fade - 10 db
GR = + 2 db
LR = - 2 db
57 dbm -135.2 db
Received signal is +57 dbm -135. 2 db = -78. 2 dbm
This signal is greater than the -81 dbm sensitivity
of the GA CAS.
G. LIMITED LEVEL 1 ATA CAS ENCOUNTER WITH GA CAS
Table 7 indicates that an ATA CAS LIM Level 1 must receive the signal
from a GA CAS at 53, 400 feet. This case involves an aircraft equipped with
limited CAS equipment and flying at 600 knots just above 10,000 feet altitude.
The signal receiver from the GA CAS is calculated in table 13.
H. DYNAMIC SIGNAL STRENGTH CALCULATIONS
The GA CAS receiver is required to operate over a dynamic range, from
a minimum input signal level of -81 dbm to a maximum input signal level of
-14. 5 dbm. These are power levels into the input connector on the CAS
receiver.
Maximum signal levels at the receiver input are calculated in table 14. In
this calculation, only the differential terms are presented, and the maximum
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signal level is calculated as the sum of the minimum power level in dbw, and
the various power and gain level changes.
TABLE 13. SIGNAL STRENGTH RECEIVED BY
LIMITED ATA EQUIPMENT FROM GA CAS
-db
PT +48. 8 dbm
L - 2.0
T _ 1 KS , . 1-5
GR + 2. 0 db
Path loss 53,400 -120.9
Fade - 10.0
AG 2.0 db
LC - 2.0
52. 8 dbm -136. 4 db
The received signal of 52. 8 dbm -136. 4 db = -83. 6 dbm is consistent
with the specified -84 dbm sensitivity of the Lim CAS equipment.
TABLE 14. MAXIMUM SIGNAL LEVEL CALCULATION
Range decrease, 5. 6 nmi to 0.1 nmi 35 db
Power increase, 56 watts to +35 dbw 35 dbw -17. 5 dbw
Differential antenna gain 4 db
Elimination of fade margin 10 db
84 dbw- 17. 5 dbw = 66. 5 db
Thus the maximum received signal level will be -81. 0 dbm + 66. 5 db =
•14. 5 dbm.
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SECTION VII
THREAT DETERMINATION AND RESULTANT EVASIVE MANEUVERS
A. SUMMARY
 :
This section compares safe threat-boundaries for a range/altitude Gener-
al Aviation Collision Avoidance System with the corresponding boundaries for
a tau/altitude General Aviation Collision Avoidance System, in encounters be-
tween General Aviation (GA) and airliner aircraft flying at maximum cruising
speeds. The required expansion of threat boundaries to account for anticipated
inaccuracies in the range and doppler velocity measurements are indicated.
It is explained that the protected region that can be safely utilized in a range/
altitude Collision Avoidance System (CAS) is not substantially larger than the
corresponding protected region for a tau/altitude CAS in this case.
Recognition of shorter pulse-width transmissions from the GA CAS per-
mits guarding a smaller range circle in encounters between two GA CAS air-
craft, equipped with the proposed system.
In addition, a pi lot-operated "instantaneous-on" switch permits further
reduction of the range circle for short intervals when the aircraft is flying at
low speed in the terminal area.
Other possibilities for reduction of required airspace are indicated, for
instance, extracting closing rate from the GA CAS transmissions (without the
use of doppler). One approach involves telemetry of airspeed and heading
while a second approach involves digital processing of closing rate from suc-
cessive range differences. The digital closing rate measurements should be
of comparable accuracy to what can be achieved with present pulse-doppler
CAS equipment but the digital equipment would probably be cheaper to build.
Adoption of such digital processing by ATA-CAS equipped aircraft would per-
mit their use of smaller protected regions in encounters with GA-CAS equip-
ped aircraft (who do not guaranty the spectral purity of their short pulse trans-
missions). Telemetry has potentially lower accuracy (unless complex
processing is employed) and.requires considerable interfacing. Further in-
vestigation of such approaches is beyond the scope of the present contract, but
may be of interest for users who need more sophisticated equipment to fly in
high-density airspace.
B. EQUIPMENT SIMPLIFICATION
In designing a Collision Avoidance System (CAS) for general aviation (GA)
aircraft, it is essential to keep the "threat" evaluation techniques and associ-
ated hardware design as simple as possible. However, it is also essential to
minimize the number of resultant evasive maneuver commands that may be
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provided to the pilot. This is required to limit the interaction between the
collision avoidance system and the existing ground-based air traffic control
system. In proposing a collision avoidance system design study to NASA,
Sierra Research elected to eliminate dependence on doppler measurement of
range rate as an essential criterion of the "threat" determination, in encoun-
ters involving the smaller GA aircraft.
In addition to eliminating the doppler measurement by the general aviation
CAS equipment, it was also decided to eliminate the hardware complexity as-
sociated with transmission of coherent RF signals. This results in hardware
simplifications in the GA CAS through deletion of requirements for careful
preservation and monitoring of transmitted signal phase-coherency. Much
simpler transmitter design suffices for generation of the shorter pulse dura-
tions used for ranging. Without this simplification, potentially expensive pro-
cedures would have to be used for testing and manually adjusting the individual
transmitters. Elimination of requirements for transmitter coherency also
deletes any requirement for precisely monitoring the transmitter frequency,
including use of an on-board discriminator. By contrast, use of coherent
transmission would require elaborate monitoring provisions in order to ensure
that any transmitted long pulse signals were adequate to permit their safe use
in "threat" evaluation by aircraft equipped with ATA's full CAS system or with
an ATA limited CAS system, (level 1 or 2).
C. IGNORING CLOSING RATE
The ATA CAS system utilizes range and range rate (as well as relative
altitude) for threat determination. At high closing rates where range rate can
be extracted quite accurately, it is possible to reduce the number of unneces-
sary maneuvers by providing good discrimination between near-approaches
and true collision threats. One-way doppler measurements, performed in
Baltimore exhibited one-Sigma errors of 47 knots or 80 ft. per second.26 Thi
is not very accurate for low-speed aircraft. Even larger doppler errors
could be anticipated in low-cost CAS equipment. Thus, deletion of doppler
range rate measurement introduces only a limited number of extra unneces-
sary maneuvers for low-speed GA aircraft. Nevertheless, it is probable that
an aircraft equipped with the proposed limited GA CAS will display alarms
and will maneuver somewhat more often than a similar aircraft equipped with
a full CAS system.
An ATA-CAS equipped aircraft encountering the GA-CAS equipped air-
craft may also maneuver more often. This follows since deletion of require-
ments for transmitting (and monitoring) long, phase-coherent RF pulses
prevents safe extraction of one-way doppler velocity information from the GA
CAS transmissions. Of course, the ATA CAS could be modified to extract
closing rate from successive range measurements, and thereby avoid some
unnecessary maneuvers. This would require some changes in CAS equipment
design.
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D. AIRSPACE REQUIREMENTS
1. Maximum Protected Region (Tau System). Analyses of the maximum
protected area* corresponding to the Tau threat logic may be derived in various
ways. Sierra Research has previously employed a non-accelerating model to
predict the area where Tau warnings may result.^ For the particular case of a
25-second Tau warning, with own aircraft and co-altitude intruder aircraft
speeds of Vi and V2 respectively, the intruder has to be located on a circle of
radius 25V2 centered 25Vj feet ahead of own aircraft in order for a true colli-
sion to impend in precisely 25 seconds.
A circular protected region about own aircraft can be defined for each
set of intruders approaching on a given heading and at a given speed, V2 (see
figure 19). For this case, only the aircraft that is heading directly toward a
point 25 Vi ahead of own aircraft, and which is precisely 25 V2 feet away is
on a true collision course. Appropriate circular protected regions can be
defined for each approach heading, and the envelope of these circles is a car-
dioid26 in the equal speed case (Vj = V2). In the more general case where
V2 ^ Vl, a limaqph of the form: R =
 T (Vj cos B + V2) results (refer to figure
20). When coupled with a proximity warning circle of radius 0. 5 nmi, this
yields the maximum protected region for the ATA CAS system. However, it
is possible to penetrate the Tau cardioid (or Tau limacon) on certain headings
without forcing a Tau alarm.
2. Expanding Protected Region (Tau System). The foregoing discussion
was based on the hidden assumption that range and range rate to the intruder
 2
are exactly known. However, actual measurements exhibit significant errors.
If full collision protection is to be provided, it is essential to generate timely
evasive maneuvers, even when measurement errors indicate an unrealistically
large separation or an inadequate closing rate. Use of uncorrected range and
range rate would result in reduced time for performing the evasive maneuver,
with a 50% probability. Therefore it is desirable to insert a correction factor
into the Tau computation in order to compensate for the component measure-
ment errors.
The estimate of time to closest approach ( T ) is obtained from mea-
surement of R (by means of one-way ranging) and from measurement of R (by
means of one-way pulse doppler). .T is then estimated from: re = .-Rm/Rm>
where re is the estimated time to closest approach while Rm and Rm are
respectively the one-way range and the doppler velocity measurements.
It is important to calculate the error in the estimate for r , based on
the measurement errors in estimating R and R. This is easily accomplished.
Thus we may write:
* Throughout this section, the warning areas that are discussed and compared
correspond to range zone 1 or Tau zone 1, which are the mandatory maneuver
zones for the co-altitude case.
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25 V2
COLLISION RADIUS
FOR INTRUDER
AIRCRAFT AT SPEED V2
OWN AIRCRAFT
AT SPEED
INTRUDER
AIRCRAFT
ON COLLISION
COURSE
TAU - ALARM CIRCLE FOR INTRUDER AIRCRAFT
AT 45° HEADING AND SPEED V2 990-031
Figure 19. 25-Second Tau-alarm Circle and Collision Circle
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Rm = R + AR and Rm = R + AV
whence AT = re - T can be estimated as AT = -Rm /Rm + R/R
or
AT = ( -RR +R R)/R R = (-R AR + R AV)/R R
m m m m
In particular, at the instant when a tau-alarm is defined,
T = -Rm /Rm , and also -R /R «T so that
AT « {-AR-TAV)/R .
m
This calculation emphasizes the strong increase in timing error that
vitl ' ' - '
it f
of errors),
results w h fixed range and range rate errors at low closing rates, R .
Looked a rom a statistical point of view (and assuming Gaussian distributions
T2a2 A R
This indicates that the one-sigma increase in timing error exceeds the larger
°*
 a
 AR/ ' km I and TOAV/ I ^ m I • Furthermore, if either term is
substantially greater than the other, the square root of the sum of the squares
closely approximates the absolute value of the larger term. It is noted else-
where in this document that the one-sigma error in extracting range is typi-
cally 200 to 500 feet, while the one-sigma error in extracting dqppler is
approximately 80 ft. per sec. Even with a minimal • T = 25 second warning
time, TaAV = 2000 > 500 aR . Thus
Actually, the present Tau CAS logic provides a maneuver command if
the measured range to the intruder is less than'O. 5 nautical miles or if
Rm ^ 25 Rm + .25 (6076) = 25 Rm + 1519.
This includes a nominal range variation of 1519 feet, which would correspond
to a doppler variation of 1519/25 = 61 ft/sec. It would appear that this system
is somewhat under-designed, in view of the rather larger doppler errors pre-
dicted by McDonnell Douglas28 and measured by Martin Marietta.26
The present ATA CAS also utilizes a minimum protected range circle
of about 0. 5 nmi. For very low .closing rates, it is this minimum range
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(and not the tau calculation) which generates an evasive-maneuver command.
In particular, if R = 0. 5 nmi = 3038 feet and T = 25 seconds, the
smallest true closing rate that should generate a tau alarm is given by
-R = R/T = 3038/25 = 122 fps. For such a low-closing rate, the one-
sigma timing error is given by:
aAr = rav / |R| * 25(80)7122 = 16.4 sees.
Some of this variation is eliminated by the 0. 25 nmi offset in the Tau calculation.
If a one-Sigma (80 ft/sec) doppler error reduces the measured clos-
ing rate from a true 141 ft/sec to an apparent 61 ft/sec, then the threat would
be detected at a range of 3038 ft (0. 5 nmi). At that instant, the intruder
could be 3038/141 = 21. 5 seconds from a collision. With a 2 sigma doppler
error at a true closing rate of 221 fps, again yielding a measured closing rate
of 61 ft. per sec, the remaining time to closest approach or to collision would
be 3038/221 = 13.8 seconds since the threat would be detected at Ro =0. 5 nmi
This 11.2 second warning delay is a very substantial fraction of the nominal
2 5-second warning time that is supposed to be available for generating an
evasive maneuver.
It should be noted that in paragraph B-3c of the pessimistic first draft
of the ATA CAS Specifications, dated June 30, 1967, a minimum protected
range of 1. 5 nmi was provided, and an additional Q. 5 nmi was added
to the range estimate for all but the 3 highest-hierarchy units. The resulting
minimum closing rates that generate a pure tau-alarm may be calculated
(with this logic) for the 25 second evasive-maneuver time, yielding:
R . = -R/T = -9120/25 = -365 ft/sec, for a 1. 5 nmi circle
mm • >
and
R . . = -R/T = -12160/25 = -486 ft/sec, for the 2 nmi circle,
mm
In the latter case, the minimum closing velocity that could generate
a tau alarm exceeded the maximum closing speed that might be expected be-
tween two typical single engine general-aviation aircraft. Based on this
threat-logic, the ATA's Tau CAS system effectively corresponded to a range/
altitude CAS at the lower closing rates. In particular, this would have been
-true-for-any- velocities--that_might_be_anticipated_in_encountersJ)elween_two _ _ _
single engine GA aircraft.
As noted earlier, the present ATA specification is equivalent to a
pure 25 second Tau threat evaluation with a 0. 25 nmi allowance effectively
corresponding to a 61 ft/sec, doppler velocity error. In view of the known
inaccuracy of the doppler measurement, it is essential to utilize a somewhat
larger allowance. The range offset allowance should correspond to increasing
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the measured closing rate by more than the equivalent of 61 ft/sec. A 98%
probability of having at least the nominal evasion time available can be as-
sumed by utilizing the measured closing rate plus twice the one-sigma velocity
error in determining tau violations. Having assumed that such an allowance
would be included in an eventual safely-designed Tau CAS, the calculations
of protected region have been performed on the basis of a "two-sigma" expan-
sion of the tau protection. This has been done on the assumption that full col-
lision protection is desired (with very high confidence).
The present Tau CAS utilizes closing rate +61 fps (or closing rate
+ . 76 cr y) which will not be exceeded 78% of the time, since this is the inte-
gral of the Gaussian (normal) probability density function form - °° to 61 a /80.
It might be argued that use of 1. 5 sigma to generate 93% confidence, or even
use of one sigma to yield 84% confidence, would give "enough" protection.
Alternatively, it might be argued that at least a 3-sigma allowance should be
utilized to assure "enough" protection. Calculations of protected regions
could be made under each of these assumptions, but such alternative calcula-
tions have not been included in this study.
3. Protected Region, Range/Altitude System (Maximum Speed
Encounters). The maximum protected region for the range/altitude CAS is
easier to define (refer to section V). If own maximum airspeed is V< , and
if intruder's maximum airspeed is V2m> then we can define a protected
region:
R
 • ' <Vlm + V2m>'
and provide a warning (evasive command) whenever a coaltitude aircraft ap-
proaches within a radius R of own aircraft. The proposed GA CAS equip-
ment is being designed for use below 10, 000 feet MSL. In this region, the
intruder's airspeed is generally supposed to remain below 250 knots IAS (less
than 291 knots = 492 ft/sec true airspeed), in accordance with Federal
Air Regulation 91. 70. However, some aircraft may fly at 280 knots IAS or
550 ft/sec TAS (as explained in section V). It is therefore appropriate to de-
fine R = T (Vjm + 550). Complete protection would not be provided against
exceptional flights by higher speed aircraft at these lower altitudes (e.g.,
military oil burner routes). As at present, protection against collision dan-
ger could be provided by warning the single engine general aviation pilot not
to fly through such reserved regions of airspace, and by requiring CAS-equip-
ped military aircraft to detect any GA intruders and provide timely avoidance
maneuvers.
Considering a Cessna 172, the maximum recommended airspeed is
131 mph or 192 ft/second. Thus a value of Vlm = 192 ft/sec may be used in
calculating the protected radius.
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4. Expanded Protection Zone (Range/ Altitude System). For maximum
safety, it would be desirable to increase the protected region slightly. In this
case, the added protection can be provided by increasing the protected radius
by 2 to 3 times the 1- a range error. A 1000 to 1500-foot increase in the pro-
tected radius would appear to be conservative, and should be employed in the
range/altitude GA CAS. For comparison purposes, it is appropriate to use
T = 25 seconds for both the Tau CAS and the range CAS design. Thus we
could choose R = 25 (550 + 192) = 18550 ft. or approximately 2.8 nautical miles
as the protected radius for an "ideal" range-CAS system, and increase this
radius to 19550 feet, or about 3.2 nautical miles, after adding a 1000- foot
allowance for the range error.
5. Comparison of Protected Regions. A comparison of the protected
regions for the various cases is presented in figure 21 A for the parameter values
noted earlier. This comparison is based on flight by .a Cessna 172 (at maxi-
mum recommended airspeed) in encounters with aircraft flying at maximum
anticipated airspeed for encounters below 10, 000 feet MSL. It will be seen
that in the "ideal" case, the 25-second tau-limacon is significantly smaller
than the corresponding range circle. However, when a 4000 foot allowance
is made in the threat logic for the anticipated two-sigma doppler velocity
error (160 ft/sec), in the case of the Tau CAS, and 1000 ft allowance is pro-
vided for the two-sigma range error in the case of the GA CAS, then the im-
provement due to use of range rate largely disappears. In fact in the expanded
tau-limacon, the tau boundary directly in front of aircraft number 1 extends
beyond the boundary of the expanded protected range circle corresponding to
the GA CAS. However, directly behind aircraft 1, the protected (Iima9on)
boundary remains well inside the boundary of the protected range circle.
6. Increase in Safe Evasion Times for Low- Performance Aircraft. The
previous. estimates of protected-areas have employed a 25-second warning-
time in comparing the tau logic with the range/altitude logic. >
This 25-second warning-time (or any other fixed warning-time esti-
mate) is completely adequate for comparing the protected areas for the two
alternative threat-logic determining techniques. However, to obtain a true
estimate of the actual sizes of the respective protected areas, it will be.nec.-
essary to use more realistic estimates of the warning time requirements of
the protected aircraft.
The-2 5- second-warning Jime^has, fceejL us^d^n^^ATA' s Tau- ^
design, since their design was based on providing collision protection to fairly
high performance aircraft. A similar (25-second) warning time would provide
the same degree of "safety" if a range/altitude CAS were to be utilized to pro-
tect aircraft of similar performance. However, if a CAS system is to be used
to protect a low-performance (single- engine general aviatioii) aircraft, then
the warning time must be increased, regardless of whether tau logic or range/
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1. IDEAL CASE 2. WITH EXPANDED .
PROTECTION ALLOWANCE
FOR MEASUREMENT ERRORS
CASE A. T = 25 SEC
CASE B. T » 49 SEC
CASEC. T = 55SEC
RANGE CIRCLE
FOR GA CAS
TAU LIMACON t
OWN CESSNA 172
AIRCRAFT
(SPEED - 192 FT/SEC)
INTRUDER
SPEED- 550 FT/SEC
-- EXPANDED
RANGE CIRCLE
FOR GA CAS
TAU LIMAgON
WITH DOPPLER ERROR
ALLOWANCE
1264426
Figure 21. Threat Boundary Comparison: Enroute Encounter
Between Cessna and High-Speed Intruder
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altitude logic is employed.
As noted earlier, this change in warning time will not change the rel-
ative sizes of the respective protected areas. However, the actual dimensions
of the tau limacon and the range circle will grow in direct proportion to the
warning time. Therefore it is useful to interrupt the discussion of protected
areas in order to examine the single-engine general aviation aircraft's warn-
ing-time requirements; This will involve some repetition .of the discussion
in section V. ,
,Ratipnale for selecting safe warning times could parallel the para-
meter selection in the ATA CAS. The ATA specifications mandate vertical
evasive maneuvers. Such collision avoidance maneuvers in a vertical plane
were deemed safest by Bendix as early as 1958.3 Since many single-engine
general aviation aircraft have climb rates that are significantly smaller than
the 2000 feet-per-miriute envisaged by the ATA's collision avoidance system,
it may be necessary to provide significantly longer lead times. Luckily, be-
cause of the lower airspeeds involved, overall airspace requirements may not
increase unduly.
In designing the air carrier GAS it was possible to assume climb-
rate capabilities of up to 2000 feet per minute, although acceleration limita-
tions of approximately 1/4 g were imposed to avoid maneuvers that might
frighten or even injure the air carrier passengers. Such maneuvers permit
one aircraft to perform an evasion maneuver which may involve an altitude
change of some 465 feet within 25 seconds after crossing the threat boundary.
(This includes some 245 feet of 3 sigma altitude error, plus about 220 feet of
clearance between air carrier aircraft. With typical aircraft delays, some 4
seconds are required to reach the desired climb rate (with a resultant average
climb rate of about 1000 fpm for 4 seconds) while a climb rate of 2000 feet per
minute for 12 more seconds provides a total of about 67 +400 = 467 feet of
altitude change. This leaves approximately 9 seconds,for pilot/sensor delays.
One half of the interval required for the aircraft to reach its desired climb/
dive rate may be lumped into an overall lag of 9+2 = 11 seconds to simplify
the calculation. Since almost half the GA aircraft have climb rates of no more
than 800 feet-per-minute under ordinary circumstances, it is apparent that
either longer warning times or dependence on both aircraft maneuvering is
required in order to avoid potential collision. This could involve doubling the
width of the requisite air corridors for a given air speed. Luckily, however,
~the-generaLaviation aircraft with the climb/rate limitations are also the ones
that travel at the slowest speedsTand sTnce~the~Fequisite""corridor-is-a-linear
function pf^the-air speed, this may not involve excessive requirements for air
space. ; . : . < , . ' . ; . : • - , '
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In particular, the evasion time may be calculated from:
= T =
e
A H T « 60 AH
Hs Hm
•
where A H is the incremental climb altitude, Hs is the climb rate in feet
per second, Hm is the corresponding climb rate in feet per minute, and Td
is the sensor/pilot/aircraft response delay.
It may be assumed, as in the ATA specification, the altimeter is ac-
curate-to 150 feet (3<7 ) and that the altitude is reported (telemetered) in 100-
foot increments. The "worst" (three sigma) relative error between nominally
co-altitude aircraft is approximately:
he « /(ISO)2 +(150)2 + 100 ) +3( 100
2 yT
« 245ft.
An additional 100 feet is required to provide minimal clearance between two
small aircraft. Thus the maneuvering aircraft may have to climb 345 feet in
order to accomplish an adequate evasive maneuver. If we employ the adver-
tised climb rate of 645 fpm for a Cessna 172 as the lower level of attainable
climb rates, and add a sensor /pilot/aircraft response delay of about 11 sec-
onds, this yields:
T = 645 11 = 43 seconds.
As noted in section V, extra clearance is required in encounters between an
•airliner and a GA CAS. This suggests a 49-second warning time to allow the
GA to avoid the airliner (refer to table 5; section V). . Similar calcula- .....
tions based on 250 foot (3 a ) altimeter inaccuracy for the GA CAS, corres-
pond to a total warning time of 60 (475)/645 + 11 = 55 seconds (refer to table 6,
section V).
As noted elsewhere, such increases in warning time will result in
corresponding increases in the protected area, no matter what sort of CAS
logic is utilized. In particular, with a Tau CAS, the protected range for a
given closing rate will increase linearly with any increase in evasion time.
Furthermore, the minimum protected range Rm and the offset range, RO,(as used in the ATA CAS characteristic) should also be increased, since both
of these range terms serve to overcome possible excessive delay in the tau
warnings that may occur at low closing speeds. As noted earlier, a large
warning time delay can result at moderately low closing rates (due to doppler
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velocity errors) unless Ro is increased. However, at the lowest closing rates,
the minimum range, Rm, provides safe protection. In addition, this minimum
range provides protection against horizontal acceleration. The resulting un-
expected change in relative aircraft position would increase with required
evasion time. It is necessary, therefore, to extend the minimum range,
and the offset range, Ro with the required warning time, r .
However, the range expansion due to ranging measurement errors
would remain a fixed 1000 feet, and would not increase with warning times.
Thus, figure 21A provides a good comparison of the protected areas of a Range/
Altitude CAS and a Tau CAS for a short warning time. The threat boundaries
in figure 21B and 21C, coorespond to larger delays required for safe evasions
by GA CAS. These figures employ different scale factors and therefore are
nearly identical to the drawings in figure 21A (except for a slight decrase in
the relative dimensions of the expanded range warnings circle). Of course,
the requirement for longer warning times results in larger protected areas
for use by the single-engine general-aviation CAS.
7. Protected Region; Lower Speed Encounters. The preceding discus-
sion concerned the threat boundaries that result when a Cessna-172 is equip-
ped with a range-only GA CAS and encounters an aircraft travelling at maxi-
mum anticipated speed at an altitude of 10, 000 MSL or less. If the Cessna
encounters another small low-speed aircraft, however, the simplest CAS
might define threats on the assumption that the intruder is travelling at the
same high speed. Under those assumptions, the tau lima^on would shrink
significantly while the protected range circle might not decrease. Thus the
airspace requirements for an encounter between two slow GA aircraft would
be as large as those required between a GA aircraft and an airliner.
As explained in sections n and V, a simple method for reducing air-
space requirements in encounters between two GA CAS has been adopted, and
the resulting threat boundaries are discussed in a subsequent paragraph. The
present discussion, however, is based on the use of common threat boundar-
ies for all intruders.
The protected area about own aircraft may also be excessive when
own aircraft flies at speeds significantly below its maximum assumed air-
speeds. The resulting threat boundaries are discussed in the following para-
graph. In these cases, the tau lima^on shrinks while the range/altitude disk
remains-unchanged
The protected regions for these lower speed encounters can be
plotted. A case of particular interest results when two GA aircraft, each
travelling at 192 ft. per second, meet. If the dimensions of the protected
range/altitude disk (for such encounters) were selected equal to the dimen-
sions for the case where the assumed maximum intruder velocity is 550 ft.
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per second, then the range disk would remain the same as in figure; 21 A, B and
C. However, the tau lin^on would shrink substantially. In fact, in this case
where intruder speed equals own speed, the closing rate falls to zero on para-
llel-course encounters. This is illustrated in figure; 22 A, B, and C where the
ideal tau cardioid and a tau-limacon that includes a correction term for the
assumed two-sigma doppler error, are compared to the ideal and expanded
range/altitude disks which protect against encounters with a maximum speed
(550 ft/second) intruder. In this case, the figures compare the protected
areas for warning times of 25, 43, and 55 seconds, respectively. It can be
seen that the resulting expanded protected disk ahead of the aircraft does not
extend very far beyond the boundaries of the tau lima^on. However, the sig-
nificantly lower protected zone behind own aircraft in the tau Iima9on permits
close in-trail flights to a terminal with consequent faster acceptance rates
there.
8. Reducing the Protected Area for Slower Speed Encounters.
a. Reduced Protection Against Own Kind. Some reduction in the
disk radius can be achieved if it is known that the intruder's maximum air-
speed is limited to a number'that is significantly less than 550 ft/sec. One
approach might involve protection against GA aircraft. This reduces the
protected threat zone substantially (refer to figure 23 A, B, and C). Hard-
wired protection against own-kind-only might lead to problems in encounters
with a high-speed intruder in situations where the intruder cannot provide the
safe escape maneuver. This problem is overcome by coding the CAS trans-
missions appropriately. For example, if the slow speed aircraft that is en-
countered is a single-engine aircraft equipped with a similar GA CAS, then a
relatively, short CAS transmission would be utilized, whereas a faster, ATA-
CAS equipped aircraft would utilize a 200-microsecond coherent pulse trans-
mission. After receiving a shorter pulse width CAS transmission, the equip-
ment in the Cessna could reduce its protected range to correspond to the max-
imum anticipated airspeed of a single-engine category intruder. Similarly, if
a long (doppler) pulse is received, the GA CAS could utilize a protected area
corresponding to the maximum 550 ft/sec, airspeed of the low-altitude intrud-
er. If use of the GA CAS is restricted to aircraft travelling at an airspeed of
260 ft/sec or less, the resultant ideal protected circle would have a radius of
(192 + 260) Tc feet where we will consider values of TC = 25, 43, and 55
seconds, respectively. As before, the expanded range circle would increase
the range protection by 1000 feet to allow for a two-sigma range error, while
the tau limacons would move outward by an amount 160 Tc, corresponding to
the two-sigma doppler error (see figure 23 A, B, and C).
It would, of course, be possible to increase the GA CAS system com-
plexity slightly by using pulse-position telemetry to transmit own aircraft's
maximum speed, and by changing threat parameters according to intruder's
speed telemetry. While this approach might yield some advantages in reduced
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1. IDEAL CASE 2. WITH EXPANDED
PROTECTION ALLOWANCE
FOR MEASUREMENT ERRORS
RANGE CIRCLE
FOR GA CAS
TAUCARDIOIDPLUS
WIN. RANGE CIRCLE
OWN CESSNA 172
AIRCRAFT
(SPEED = 192 FT/SEC)
INTRUDER
SPEED" 192 FT/SEC
•• EXPANDED
RANGE CIRCLE
FOR GA CAS
• • • • TAULIMACON
WITH DOPPLER ERROR
ALLOWANCE
1264-025
Figure 22. Threat Boundary Comparison: ^Encounter Between Two Cessnas,
Threat Logic Based on 550ft/sec Intruder
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1. IDEAL CASE 2. WITH EXPANDED
PROTECTION ALLOWANCE
FOR MEASUREMENT ERRORS
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Figure 23. Threat Boundary Comparison: Enroute Encounter Between Two
Cessnas, Threat Logic Based on 260ft/sec Intruder
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protected regions, the resultant small increase in system complexity dis-
courages adoption of this improvement.
b. Reduced Protection in Terminal Areas. The preceding discussion
has been limited to aircraft encounters between a Cessna, travelling at maxi-
mum recommended speed and an intruder. However, it is common for single-
engine aircraft to fly substantially below maximum recommended airspeeds,
especially when approaching a destination (or departing from the originating
airport). Typical maximum speed of the Cessna, under these circumstances
would be about 90 mph or 132 ft/sec. Higher speed aircraft would also reduce
airspeed to 200 knots or 338 ft/sec, indicated or less in this area (refer to
section V). Assuming that terminal area flight occurs at or below 5000 feet
allows designing for true airspeeds of 142 and 363 fps, respectively. It ap-
pears practical to reduce the range/altitude protection to conform to these
assumed airspeeds in the immediate terminal area. However, the maximum
assumed airspeed for other GA intruders has been assumed as 120 mph lAS
or 190 fps true airspeed, which is again faster than the 142 fps maximum as-
sumed airspeed of the Cessna.
The threat boundaries for the terminal area logic in such encount-
ers are discussed in subsection E.
While various means may exist for initiating the operation of the
"terminal area" switch, it would probably be least complicated to allow pilot
selection of this logic. As explained in a later paragraph, we propose that
this protection switching logic remain effective for a limited time after pilot
actuation and then return automatically to the normal-protection condition.
This should help guard against use of limited-protection logic because of pilot
oversight.
9. Additional Comments on Threat Boundaries. It should be noted that
the threat boundaries shown in the various figures correspond to regions where
threats might be detected when the actual range and doppler velocity are per-
fect, but where some margin is included in the system to allow safe evasion
with possible range and velocity errors. The boundaries may expand further
in specific cases where range is measured low or closing rate is measured
high. These cases will not be considered at the present time. Furthermore,
the limac.on is a maximum boundary for possible threat detection. It is pos-
sible for an intruder, travelling at speed V2 to penetrate the lima^on on some
headings without causing a threat alarm. Nevertheless, the limacon does give
"a"reali'stic~indication~of-airspace requirements-needed in-a-tau-system.—The——
limacon boundary that can be safely used (when appropriate account is taken of
the doppler error) is not significantly smaller than the corresponding protected
range circle, especially when the intruder and own aircraft are travelling at
the assumed maximum speeds, or when the appropriate reduced-range pro-
tection areas are utilized.
93
E. THREAT BOUNDARIES FOR SPECIFIC ENCOUNTERS
1. Range Ratios. In comparing the tau/altitude criterion used in the
ATA CAS with the range/altitude criterion proposed for the low-cost General
Aviation CAS, we have so far limited our consideration to the overall threat
envelopes.
A more detailed comparison is helpful for indicating airspace require-
ments in specific critical situations. This comparison is based on the esti-
mates of the safe protected range for the selected CAS. The safe protected
range, RQ, for a range-altitude threat evaluation corresponds to the safe
escape time, tau, multiplied by the maximum anticipated closing rate plus an
estimate of range error, with en-route logic. A similar calculation, based
on alternative range rate estimates, yields the "terminal" logic. The corres-
ponding safe protected range, Rrj,, for a tau system is given by the same
value of tau times the sum of the measured closing rate and an estimate of
the error in the closing rate measurement.
Thus RG . = (Vmo + V J r + kaR
while RT = RT + k Vr2 oy2 oR2 •* RT +
Rr (Vm« + V.) + kaR/T
so that G - - mo m> RRT R + kav
where Vmo and Vmi are respectively own and intruder's maximum antici-
pated airspeed, is the one-sigma closing-rate error and
 R is the one-
sigma ranging error of the system, while k is a selected safety factor. Typ-
ically, we would use k = 2, or k = 3, and perform separate calculations for the
terminal and en route areas.
At present, the ATA CAS protects a half-nautical mile range circle
about own aircraft, regardless of the closing rate measured and also includes
a 0.25 nmi bias to account for the doppler errors. The 0. 5 nmi minimum
range provides timely warnings at low closing rates. The 0.25 nmi bias
presumably was to account for the ranging and doppler errors of the Airline
CAS. 0.25 nmi would not adequately correspond to the errors noted in the
systems tested by Martin Marietta in Baltimore. There, the one-sigma
doppler error was estimated at 47 knots or 80 ft/sec., and the one-sigma .
error was estimated between 200 and 500 feet. Thus for a tau of 25 seconds,
and for k = 3, the error terms would be:
krav = 6000 ft., while 600>^ kaR ^ 1500ft. Even if we use
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k = 2, we would require a larger minimum protected radius in a Tau CAS.
This would suggest a bias range of at least 25(160) ft = 4000 ft « . 66
nautical miles in the ATA CAS. The smaller threat boundaries employed
presumably assume 2.8 times better doppler measurement in the future and
do not leave any margin for error. They cause relatively little interaction with
the ground ATC but they also would not provide a reasonable degree of safety
for a relatively inexpensive doppler processing unit that might be installed in
GA CAS aircraft.
In the ensuing discussion, we reexamine the protected ranges that
result from use of a safe protection envelope for a hypothetical GA CAS with
doppler measurement capabilities.
It will be seen that in comparison to such a GA doppler CAS, the
range/altitude GA CAS would utilize the most excess space when the closing
velocity is zero and would utilize little or no excess space when aircraft tra-
velling at expected speed, meet in worst case head-on encounters.
2. In-Trail Encounters. In particular, if similar-performance aircraft
travel in-trail (as in conventional takeoffs and landings), the ratio of minimum
separation dimensions for the two approaches is given by:
RG 142+190+1000/55 350
 0 <o
RT 0 + 160 160 '
This is obviously a significant increase in required airspace. In
fact, for a Tau of 55 seconds RQ would be about 3.2 nautical miles. This is
similar to presently-utilized separations under radar control, but is some-
what larger than the separation utilized under VFR. Furthermore, if we con-
sider a similar encounter between a Cessna and an aircraft equipped with
ATA CAS, the corresponding ratio would be:
RG 142+363+1000/55 523
 Q Q
= 0.0RT 160 160
In this case RG = 4.7 N. miles. In each case, the Tau CAS would rely on its
zero measured closing velocity protection of 160 (55) = 8800 ft.« 1. 5 nmi
-corresponding to-the-two-sigma-veloeity-er-ror.
3. Anti-Parallel Encounters. It should be noted that another important
case was mentioned in the original proposal. This is an anti-parallel en-
counter that can occur in typical landing and takeoff patterns at uncontrolled
airports (see figure 24). As noted in the proposal, such encounters could
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easily require evasive maneuvers whether a range/altitude or a Tau/altitude
threat criterion is employed.
Formulas may be derived for the maximum miss-distance that can
result in a Tau alarm between two aircraft on antiparallel courses. Suppose
that two aircraft are flying at speeds Vj and V2 respectively, and that time
0 is referred to the point of closest approach (see figure 25). The separa-
tion R at time t is given by:
while
or
990034
Figure 25. Aircraft on Antiparallel Courses
R2 = D2 + j + V2)t ]
RR =. v/t
Let the Tau alarm be defined by
. R R2T "~ "" '- •• — ~ ^^^—^^—
R RR
-T = D2/[(V1 + V2)2t] +t , whence,
D D
D
This_negativ.e_quantity.has_a minimum_absolutejvalue_when
(V + V ^ t\ » ^ "^ V f \ 7 *••D
t D = -1
97
-2D
V1+ V2
while
-Dt ' =
V1+ V2
If the minimum absolute value of -R/R is precisely the Tau- alarm value
 a,
then
V + V1 9
where D represents the maximum miss distance that can generate a Tau
alarm between two aircraft on ahtiparallel courses, while:
2
R2 = D2 + Rv. + Vjtl = D2 + D2 = 2D2
R = D -,'fi
so that the aircraft are at relative bearings of 45° at the instant when the
limiting Tau alarm is exceeded (in the no wind case).
The average range at the Tau alarm would increase by r k a
 v> ^ a
suitable range bias is included to compensate for a k av doppler error. In
that event, the maximum miss distance, M, would increase by approximately
M = D + T k a = (
For a 55-second T alarm in encounters between two Cessna 172's,
travelling at Vj = V2 = 142 ft/ sec, the maximum miss distance that could
generate a Tau alarm is given by M = (142 + 160//2" ) 55 = 14020 ft = 2.3
N. miles. This is not much less than the 3. 2 N. mile protected region pro-
vided by the GA CAS with terminal logic, but is substantially better. than the
6.9 nmi spacing basedjDn a single range/altitude protected radius.
4. Summary. The spacings, permitted by the various logic categories,
are summarized in table, lo arid 16. Column A_ in table 15 indicates the pro-
tected range based on the use of range/altitude terminal logic. Column B in-
dicates the minimum terminal miss distance required to avoid a Tau alarm
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between two aircraft on anti-parallel courses. Column C contains the range
separations required between equal-speed in-trail aircraft, when Tau logic is
used, (it is unlikely that this situation will generally occur between a single-
engine general-aviation aircraft and an airliner, except perhaps in the
terminal area.)
In table 16, Column A indicates the protected range using the range/
altitude en-route logic. Column B indicates the minimum en-route miss dis-
tance required to avoid a Tau alarm between two aircraft on anti-parallel
courses. Column C shows the Tau.alarm on a true head-on encounter.
Perhaps the most pertinent comparison can be made between the 55-
second warning time figures shown in Columns A and B of table 15. While the
While the Tau logic permits spacings that are about 70% to 80% as large as is
permitted by the range/altitude CAS, the figures are not grossly different.
Even with the Tau logic, it might very well be necessary to make
changes in the presently-accepted procedural turns under some conditions in
order to avoid possible evasive maneuver commands in the landing pattern.
Such procedural changes are undoubtedly required, but any changes would
require FAA rule making and might encounter considerable user resistance.
The 43 to 49-second warning time values corresponding to use of high-
er quality altimeters by GA aircraft are included to show the effect on threat
zones of altitude sensing errors.
Table 17 demonstrates the superiority of the planned use of coarse
velocity estimates from pulse length as a modifier of the threat envelopes
over plain elimination of doppler detection. We have mentioned one way of
reducing the protected range for terminal in-trail encounters at low speed.
We now review other available techniques for reducing threat boundaries, as
appropriate.
F. METHODS FOR REDUCING MINIMUM SEPARATION FOR IN-TRAIL
ENCOUNTERS
1. Available Alternatives. Various methods have been suggested for re-
ducing the protected range in the immediate terminal area (without using
doppler) in order to permit shorter interaircraft separations on departure and
arrival. .
Some of the approaches that might be considered are included in the
following list: Possibilities (a) and (c) have been embodied in the present
system design, and have been considered earlier.
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a. Use of Significantly Reduced Range Protection Under Pilot
Control. This might involve selecting a "VFR terminal-logic" switch during
final approach and departure. The terminal-logic switch would not provide
adequate protection against full speed head-on encounters. Luckily, there is
some statistical support for assuming that head-on encounters are a very in-
frequent source of mid-air collisions. 29 Perhaps this is because good for-
ward visibility is available under VFR conditions. In addition, aircraft tend
to fly at lower speed in the immediate vicinity of a terminal. If this terminal
logic approach is employed, it would be highly desirable to include a time-
delay circuit to restore en-route logic after a specified time. This would re-
duce the likelihood of using reduced protection because of pilot error.
i b. Telemetry of Each Aircraft's Maximum Airspeed for Use in the
Threat Evaluation. If each aircraft telemetered its maximum airspeed, it
would be possible for own aircraft to calculate the requisite separation range
based on the sum of own (or own maximum) and intruder's maximum airspeed.
This would reduce airspace requirements somewhat in the case of an encount-
er between two GA CAS (see figures 23 A, B, and C for reduced range circle).
However, large range separations would be required between an aircraft that
can travel at high speed and a GA aircraft.
c. Use of Pulse Width Discrimination for Limited Airspeed Tele-
metry. Since the GA CAS equipped aircraft transmits a shorter pulse than the
full-CAS equipped aircraft, pulse width discrimination can be used to differ-
entiate between the higher and lower speed aircraft (refer to b). This would
be relatively simple, and would provide significant reduction in spacing be-
tween low-speed aircraft.
d. Telemetry of Faster Aircraft's True Airspeed for Use in Threat
Evaluation. An additional reduction in airspace requirements between a GA
aircraft and a high-speed aircraft is possible if the latter telemeters his true
airspeed. This would require further complications in AT A-CAS equipped
aircraft. Furthermore, this would still make use of the sum velocity in an
overtake or in-trail flight condition where the difference velocity is applicable.
Both this and the preceding approach permit somewhat closer spacing but do
not allow very close in-trail flight.
e. Measurement and Telemetry of North and East Components of
Airspeed. This could permit much closer spacing when aircraft fly in-trail.
Telemetry could be accomplished with the aid of an electrical output from the
airspeed indicator, use o!T~cblnpass"-^rrverrfesolve"r7"and~te'lem-etry-provi^-—
sions. Some reduction in spacing might be achieved by telemetering compass
heading alone. Either approach would appear to require considerable develop-
ment and would probably involve excessive expense for the GA CAS equipment.
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f. Use of a Display of Range to Closest Aircraft to Allow Pilot Over-
ride of an Evasive Maneuver Command. It would not be difficult to provide a
display of range to the closest aircraft. At least one extra digital register and
associated comparison circuitry would be needed to extract the requisite range.
The approach might not add very much to the system cost, but would add a
significant monitoring/scanning burden on the pilot at a time when he already
is overloaded.
g. Extraction of Closing Rate Without Doppler. Change in range to
the closest aircraft could be divided by elapsed time to yield closing rate.
This involves additional logic circuitry to compute range difference after ex-
tracting range to the closest coaltitude aircraft. Some chance in threat
computation might be required. Some limitations on clock correction rates
would have to be added to ATA CAS specifications. The full-CAS units could
use very similar logic to extract closing rate to GA aircraft with high accu-
racy. This might require some additional changes in ATA specifications. In
its simplest form, this method would not provide complete protection against
more-distant faster-closing aircraft. This approach still appears to be
cheaper than the system modifications required to assure adequate operation
of a one-way pulse doppler.
h. Two-Step Logic. This would involve range/altitude logic and
subsequent checking for closing or opening conditions. It is doubtful whether
this could be accomplished without doppler or the circuitry described under
subitem g.
i. Front/Back Discrimination. This would tend to reduce the in-
trail protected range requirements, but would require two antennas with
somewhat directional characteristics and.additional circuitry making use of
signal strength measurements.
2. Selection of Alternatives. It will be seen that most of the alternative
methods for reducing spacing during in-trail flight in the immediate terminal
area would add excessively to the cost of a GA CAS, while others require
excessive pilot effort. This contractor believes that only two of the approaches
are simple enough to permit their inclusion in lower-cost GA CAS equipment.
These approaches would consist of (a) reducing range protection in the termin-
al area under pilot control, and (c) use of pulse-width discrimination for
limited airspeed telemetry. Both of these features have been included in the
system design.
It would appear that significantly closer in-trail spacings could be
achieved with either method (e) or method (g). However, these approaches
would be more expensive and would not be included in the simplest GA CAS
equipment. Detailed investigation of these approaches for a full CAS or a
more sophisticated GA CAS is undoubtedly desirable. However, these ap-
proaches do not fall within the scope of the present contract.
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SECTION VIII
ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES
• •• . \J '
A. GROUND EXTRACTION OF AIRCRAFT LOCATION
The Time/Frequency CAS approach utilizes precisely-timed trans -
missions by all participants. Thus any (ground) receiving station that is
similarly synchronized to common time can extract relevant ranging informa-
tion from time of arrival of the CAS transmissions and can decode the tele-
metered altitude information. If such information were received at two or
more intercommunicating ground stations, it would be possible to combine
the information in a computer which extracts aircraft position in three dimen-
sions. Alternately, azimuth information could be extracted from signal
strength measurements, us ing a very rapidly (electronically) scanned antenna
or from a multiplicity of fixed narrow beam antennas. This information
could be displayed to ground traffic-control personnel to permit aircraft
monitoring and could also be used by such personnel in the terminal area to
display and control approaching aircraft. Use of this information for mon-
itoring requires the deployment of ground clocks, synchronized to CAS time,
with associated receiving, logic, and display circuitry to indicate the rele-
vant positional information to the ground personnel. (These clocks and
receivers could also be collocated at VORTAC or TVOR sites for system
economy.)
The GA CAS described in this report radiates sufficient power to assure
accurate range measurement at 9 nautical miles (with a 10 db fade: margin)
through use of an ATA CAS quality receiver and an associated omnidirectional
antenna. Some increase in communication range can be achieved by suitable
ground station design. For example, ANTC-117 specifies ground station
cable losses of 1.1 db and a ground antenna gain of 6.15 db. This provides a
net gain of approximately 9 db, over the power estimates used to calculate
the communication range in ATA/GA CAS encounters. A consequent reliable
communication range of more than 25 nautical miles results (even with a 10 db
fade). .This should suffice for terminal area operations.
Use of the received CAS signals for en route monitoring (either as a
supplement or replacement for ATCRBS) may prove more difficult.' There it
-might-be-necessary-to-ineFease-transniitted-power-from-the-air-craft-or-;else_._
utilize an array of directional horns and associated fixed or switched
receivers to increase the communication range. The communication range
can be increased substantially by utilizing an electronically scanned narrow
beam antenna. This approach is attractive since it may permit extraction of
azimuth information from a single 30 microsecond pulse transmission if the
beam scanning is sufficiently rapid. This ultra high-speed scanning requires
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an all electronic phased array antenna system which would be excessively
expensive at this point in time.
The alternative of a substantial increase in transmitted power to allow
extraction of aircraft position with the aid of omnidirectional antennas does
not seem to be cost effective. In fact, replacement of ATCRBS by a com-
bined Time/Frequency CAS/ATCRBS using VORTAC sync would not be
attractive if it reduced the availability of suitable backup equipment to the
basic airborne navigation system. Nevertheless, ATCRBS operation has
been less than completely satisfactory, and alternatives or improvements to
ATCRBS should be considered.
In any event, the possibility of extracting precise positioning information
in the terminal area is attractive since this additional capability could be
provided without any change in required airborne hardware. The approach
would require substantial deployment of ground station equipment in critical
terminal areas. Long delays in deploying ground receiving and display
equipment would not interfere with the operation and utility of the CAS.
Of course, installation of CAS in aircraft would become more attractive
if unmodified CAS equipment could also be used to provide other essential
services to the operation of that aircraft, such as improved surveillance and
vectoring in the terminal area.
Actual use of the time/frequency system to provide aircraft positioning
information in the terminal area would be assisted by ground assignment of
the aircraft's CAS slot. This would permit direct identification of the
positioning transmissions with the aircraft from which they emanate. Such
ground assignment of slots would obviate the need for "shut up and listen"
circuitry, and would therefore eliminate some of the potential sources of
delay in the threat determination. Since such ground assignment of slots
would not be immediately available, the present GA CAS logic design includes
shut-up-and-listen capabilities. Eventual elimination of this logic would
result in minor system simplification.
B. OBSTACLE AVOIDANCE
A proposal has been made to set aside certain CAS slots for use as
obstacle avoidance beacons. Synchronized transmissions from such stations
could be used to define an avoidance circle about the ground obstacle (hill or
tall building) in the vicinity of the terminal area. Appropriate adjustment of
the transmission time by the ground station would permit generation of a
circular protected zone of appropriate radius about the obstacle. Similarly,
slight adjustment of the beacon's transmitted altitude could modify the
altitude protection. Since these transmissions would be in preassigned slots,
it is feasible to add logic in the protected CAS aircraft to give the aircraft a
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climb command (and thus prevent a low-flying CAS! from generating a com-
mand to tunnel under a high obstacle). Since"obstacle avoidance capabilities
are required by low slow-flying aircraft, doppler range ratei measurementis
not needed. This suggests deployment of cheaper obstacle avoidance1 beacons
emitting short non-coherent transmissions in assigned slots on the appro-
priate CAS frequency. Since these stations woukPhave to be heard by the
GA CAS, all such transmissions should be on the common frequency (F4).
30The most recent draft of the ATA CAS technical description sets aside
specific slots for use as obstacle avoidance beacons. If these beacons are to
be heard by the GACAS, then they would have to operate on the common fre-
quency. Simple logic would prohibit use of these slots for normal CAS opera-
tion and would force generation of a climb command even when the aircraft is
below the obstacle altitude. It was not convenient to conform to the slot
selection called out in the latest spec revision since the specific reserved
slots and the associated frequency assignments would have to be modified to
conform to single-frequency use for all low altitude operations: Embodiment
of:th0 needed logic would be readily accomplished and would not significantly
;
 affect cost or complexity of the GA CAS. '
C.. ONE-WAY DME
' T h e present GA CAS design is based on the use of ground VORTAC which
emits a carefully timed sequence of reference bursts for synchronization.
Once the airborne clock is synchronized, it is possible to extract range to the
ground station from time of arrival of the reference bursts. Excellent
ranging accuracy is achievable in this manner since a quite high "one-way"
range update rate is provided. (Sierra Research Corporation's current sync
equipment for FAA transmits a reference pulse every 12 milliseconds. The
very accurate airborne clock acts like a flywheel to permit continued range
measurements at this high data rate even though the ground station is only
interrogated at infrequent intervals (e.g., once or twice per second) to
measure and correct clock phase and frequency errors.
This'Approach permits significantly reduced interrogation of the ground
stations with resultant significantly increased VORTAC capacity for providing
DME information'to-aircraft. Present VORTAC stations can provide a
maximum of 2700 range replies per: second which can accommodate a maxi-
mum of about 90 to 110 airborne interrogators (at a normal data rate of
__abput S^nterrogations jaer second in "track" and a higher data rate in
"search"). SiglTiffcalff gr^ —
aircraft aloft, both as a result of the shift to area navigation and'as a re-
sult of projected growth in the number of aircraft flying IFR. Under these
circumstances the need for a viable method for providing DME information
to increasing'riumbers of aircraft has been recognized: While various other
alternatives have been put forth, it is generally1 recognized that the one-way
107
approach is the only one that can provide undegraded service to a mix of air-
craft equipped with DME's of current design, and with suitably modified DME
equipment.
This capability for one-way DME requires a highly accurate airborne
crystal clock and associated time synchronization logic. It therefore seems
quite appropriate to include the costs of the crystal clock and associated
timing and sync circuitry in the cost of the DME unit. In fact, one of the
cost estimates for the GA CAS assumes the use of such a quasi one-way DME
and therefore does not include the clock costs in the CAS.
D. STATIONKEEPING
Under the chairmanship of J. W. Prast, ATCAC's System 4 Subcommittee
studied distributed air traffic control. This group suggested-* 1 a need for air-
to-air navigation in order to permit safe spacing between aircraft and to pro-
vide overtake and merge capabilities. Sierra Research is presently produc-
ing Time/Frequency stationkeeping equipment for the Air Force, which could
provide many of the required capabilities.
It would appear desirable to provide such stationkeeping capabilities to
the pilot, including azimuth measurement and an associated situation display
(showing relative location of other essentially co-altitude aircraft). Unfortu-
nately, extraction of azimuth is relatively costly, and relatively wide band-
width and ultra-accurate synchronization would be required in this approach.
While it might be possible to embody stationkeeping capabilities in more
expensive CAS equipment (with some effort), it seems unlikely that such
features could be included in moderately-priced equipment for use in single
engine General Aviation aircraft.
E. DATA TRANSMISSION
The ATA's Full-CAS includes data transmission in the form of bi-phase
modulation of the long (doppler) pulse, plus limited capabilities for data
transmission (in the form of pulse position modulation) near the end of the
slot. While time (and r-f power) may be available for data transmission with
the GA CAS message, this approach \^ould again complicate the system some-
what.
Perhaps the most relevant data for transmission would include aircraft
identity and maximum airspeed.
Need for transmitting aircraft identity would be obviated by unique ground
assignment of transmitting slots, as suggested in an earlier paragraph. This
would also eliminate many potential future problems when a considerable
number of CAS units are deployed and where slot jumping to avoid coslot
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occupancy could result in a significant probability of double occupancy of the
successive new slot selections.
Transmission of maximum airspeed as pulse position information is
possible in the time between 750 and about 1000 microseconds after the
start of the range pulse transmission. This information could be used to
modify the threat boundaries. Embodiment of encoding or decoding equip-
ment in the GA CAS would require some increment in cost, and this feature
has therefore not been included.
F. OPERATION ABOVE 10, 000 FEET
The overall GA CAS equipment was initially designed for use^by single
engine GA aircraft operating below 10,000 feet pressure altitude. This
altitude limitation is not a problem in most parts of the conterminous United
States, where very few single engine GA aircraft fly above this altitude. In
fact, the big peak in GA altitude assignments is at about 5,000 to 6,000 feet.
In accordance with table N of Ref. 15, of 692 peak day IFR departures in
fiscal 1969, 634 single engine aircraft received tower altitude assignments
below 6,000 feet, 45 had assignments between 6,000 and 9,999, while only 12
had assignments above 10,000 feet. However, a tabulation of VFR flight
plans^2 for calendar 1969 indicates 35,453 flight plans were filed for single
engine GA aircraft. Ignoring the 801 aircraft cleared to fly "on top" and the
2510 aircraft with unknown altitudes, there were 18,922 aircraft assigned to
altitudes below 6,000 feet, 11, 283 to altitudes between 6,000 and 9,999 feet,
and 1,939 aircraft assigned to fly above 10,000 feet. 1,078 of these higher
flying aircraft were cleared for altitudes of 10,000 to 10,999 feet, and only
79 flew above 14, 000 feet. These higher altitude flights include the small
aircraft that fly over the Rocky Mountains.
There does not appear to be any reason for prohibiting such flights by
GA CAS equipped aircraft if they remain substantially below the 14,000 foot
upper altitude limit where the selected common frequency (F^ is utilized.
Such flights would not provide complete CAS protection since the typical
single engine aircraft has little reserve power to climb at altitudes near their
service ceilings. Thus the diving aircraft would have to provide safe separa-
tion in GA/GA encounters. (In losing altitude, such aircraft would have to
avoid ground obstacles.) Such GA/GA encounters at or above 10,000 feet
altitude do not require additional threat range (refer to section V) nor ad-
-ditional4ransmitteT_ppwer_(refer_to section VI).
Encounters between GA and ATA CAS equipped aircraft could be detected
by the CAS equipment (refer to power calculations at end of section VI). The
ATA CAS might have to utilize slightly larger threat boundaries than those
employed below 10,000 feet, since the larger aircraft could fly at high sub-
sonic speeds in this area. However, the power transmitted by the GA CAS
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suffices for this application (as was verified for the case of high-speed
military aircraft flying in special restricted zones). Similarly, it would
be desirable to expand the threat boundaries for the GA CAS (in encounters
with these faster flying aircraft). This would involve a range increase of
about 30% to 40%, which could be accommodated in the available power budget.
Again, the more maneuverable faster aircraft may have to provide the safe
separation, especially if the GA aircraft is at a higher altitude.
The expanded threat zone would not involve significant interference with
traffic since considerable space is available in such en route areas. Further-
more, faster flying aircraft would be expected to fly significantly above any
mountain passes or other regions when high flying low performance GA air-
craft might have to operate.
Thus the GA aircraft could operate above 10,000 feet with reasonable
CAS protection if this operation should prove necessary. Simple changes
in the threat boundaries for encounters between GA and ATA CAS aircraft
above 10,000 feet pressure altitude could be embodied easily. However,
such logic has not been included in the present design.
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PART TWO
DETAILED HARDWARE DESIGN AND COST ANALYSIS
SECTION I
FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
This section defines a functional description of the proposed General Avia-
tion Collision Avoidance System (GA CAS) and is presented in block diagram
format in figure 1.
Initially, the system is turned on without sync attained. The sync logic
inhibits the transmit and receive logic until sync is attained. Aircraft power
is converted to supply the voltages required for the digital and analog circuitry.
Altitude data is taken from an on-board source and converted to a pulse posi-
tion code in the altitude and pulse measurement logic.
When the sync logic receives fine and coarse sync data from the Distance
Measuring Equipment (DME) and aligns the local time base with the ground
station time base to the required accuracy, the transmit and receive logic
inhibit signal is removed.
The slot logic provides a local slot once every three seconds during which
a fixed-time range pulse and an altitude pulse that is time-positioned from the
range pulse and is proportional to the aircraft altitude is transmitted on F..
Other cooperating CAS participants can now measure one-way range and
altitude to determine the local aircraft threat status.
During all other usable slots (other than local slot and some reserved test
slots) other aircraft transmissions may be received. It must be remembered
that with the frequency switching format proposed, a suitable (F4) slot appears
every other slot. The F4 receiver detects the r-f, the altitude and pulse measure-
ment logic verifies the data, and the threat logic determines if a threat exists.
If a threat is such that a climb or dive command results, the threat logic adds
a 200-foot bias to the transmitted altitude only. Any threat condition causes
the display to activate with both an aural and a visual indication.
The slot logic (in addition to selecting slots) occasionally inhibits the
transmitter during a local slot and looks at the receiver for the presence of
video. If video is detected, more than one user is in this slot and a new local
slot must be selected.
The oscillator supplies a 5-MHz signal, which drives the timing chain in
the sync logic. Time comparison circuitry in the sync logic provides a fre-
quency control error with which to correct the oscillator frequency to the sync
source.
/
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SECTION II
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
A. R-F ASSEMBLY
1. Function. The r-f assembly provides a duplexing function to permit
receiving and transmitting on the same antenna, a low pass filter to suppress
transmitter harmonically generated signals, a limiter to prevent mixer over-
load, a preselector for eliminating out-of-band interference signals, a local
oscillator filter to eliminate unwanted signals from the local oscillator signal
source, and a balanced mixer for detection of the r-f signal.
2. Description. The r-f assemb y characteristics are described in
Specification SP7115-0100 of appendix A. Proposals were received from
various suppliers of r-f assemblies on detail techniques for providing the
function described.
B. TRANSMITTER POWER AMPLIFIER
1. Function. The power amplifier provides approximately 24 db of gain
to the 1615 MHz signal from the X8 multiplier to obtain the required minimum
power output of 80 watts.
2. Description. The power amplifier characteristics are described in
Specification SP7115-0103 of appendix B. Proposals were received from
various suppliers of power amplifiers on detailed techniques for providing the
function described. Note that the specification calls for a minimum of 150
watts power output to allow about 3 db of tube degradation.
C. ANTENNA
The antenna is a simple quarter-wave monopole structure that has a nom-
inal input impedance of 50 ohms with a voltage standing wave ratio (VSWR) of
1. 5:1 or less. The antenna is vertically polarized and should be located to
provide as nearly omnidirectional coverage as possible.
During local flight tests of the Sierra- Wilcox limited CAS, some qualita-
tive experiments were conducted to determine typical antenna coverage and the
following results~were^noted:
1. A top antenna on the fuselage of the Cessna 180 gave good all around
CAS threat coverage but provided poor ground sync coverage when the aircraft
was headed toward the ground station. The reason for this poor coverage was
attributed to the upward slope of the Cessna 180 fuselage in level flight and
was somewhat validated by noting good coverage when outbound from the ground
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station and even good coverage when a 90° turn was made except when directly
over the ground station. Only the top antenna was used in this experiment.
2. A bottom antenna on the Cessna 180 also gave good all around CAS
threat coverage but provided poor sync coverage when the aircraft was on a
heading tangential to the ground station and with the landing gear obstructing
the path to the ground station. The landing gear was assumed the most likely
cause of the signal loss and was validated by making small turns and noting the
'reacquisition of the signal.
The bottom antenna also provided poor ground sync coverage but in
the opposite direction of the top antenna. When the aircraft was outbound,
poor ground sync coverage was noted but inbound to the ground station good
ground sync coverage was noted.
3. On the Beech Baron, the top fuselage coverage for CAS threat cover-
age was good but ground sync coverage was very poor. Good ground sync
coverage was not noted until the antenna was placed on the top of tail where
excellent all around coverage was noted. The only problem noted on the tail
location was when the aircraft was heading toward the station and either the
fuselage or a wing would shield the antenna. No problems with ground sync
reception were noted on the bottom antenna of the Beech Baron.
While these tests were qualitative, they do indicate that several loca-
tions provided CAS threat coverage with one antenna. Since the system defined
herein does not require synchronization data on the CAS antenna, no problem is
foreseen on the use of one antenna; however it is suggested that a separate
program be funded to conduct quantitative tests before implementation. Cir-
cuitry for the use of two antennas is included for those that require it, but
costing is based on only one antenna.
D. VARACTOR MULTIPLIER
1. Function. The varactor multiplier provides an X8 multiplication of
the 201.875 MHz, 600-milliwatt signal from the exciter to feed the power
amplifier of the transmitter with a 1615 MHz signal.
2. Description. The varactor multiplier characteristics are described
in Specification SP7115-0102 of appendix C. Proposals were received from
various suppliers of r-f assemblies on detail techniques for providing the
function described.
E. PRECISION OSCILLATOR
1. Function. The precision oscillator provides a highly stable 5 MHz
signal source for the precise timing required for the time/frequency system
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defined. A frequency control input is provided to frequency-synchronize the
oscillator to the system frequency if sync data is available.
2. Description. The precision oscillator characteristics are described
in Specification SP7115-0101 of appendix D. Proposals were received from
various suppliers of precision oscillators on detail techniques for providing
the function described.
F. LOCAL OSCILLATOR SIGNAL SOURCE
1. Function. The local oscillator signal source uses a standard oscilla-
tor and appropriate multipliers to generate a 1555 MHz signal, at a power
level of 4 milliwatts, into the mixer part of the r-f assembly.
2. Description. Figure 2 shows a block diagram of the local oscillator
signal source and schematic 7115-0517 shows the circuit diagram of the local
oscillator signal source. A basic crystal controlled transistor oscillator at
97.1875 MHz feeds a buffer/multiplier transistor stage that provides isolation
for the oscillator and a X2 multiplication to 194.375 MHz. The output of the
buffer/multiplier drives a step recovery diode (SRD) X8 multiplier to produce
the 1555 MHz local oscillator signal at the 4 milliwatts power level required
by the mixer in the r-f assembly.
OSCILLATOR
97.1875 MHz BUFFER/
MULTIPLIER
(X2)
194.375 MHz
MULTIPLIER
<X8)
4MW
1555 MHz
1264402
Figure 2. Local Oscillator Signal Source Block Diagram
G. EXCITER SIGNAL SOURCE
1. Function. The exciter signal source uses a standard oscillator and
an appropriate multiplier to generate a 201.875 MHz signal, at a power level
of 8 watts, into the X8 multiplier for the transmitter signal source.
2. Description. Figure 3 shows a block diagram of the exciter signal
source and schematic 7115-0517 shows the circuit diagram of the exciter
signal source. A basic crystal controlled transistor oscillator at 100. 9375
MHz feeds an amplifier which isolates the oscillator and provides a gain of
TO db. The amplifier output drives a transistor multiplier (X2) which produces
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a 201.875 MHz that in turn is amplified by 10 db to produce an output power
level of 2 watts which is fed into a 6 db gain amplifier to produce an output of
8 watts in a 50 ohm load. Pulsed 28 vdc power is applied from the modulator
to conserve power significantly since the duty cycle is very low (0. 000018) and
8 watts of power are required.
MULTIPLIER
X2
3db
CONVERSION
GAIN
PULSED
+ 28 VDC
201.875MHz
2W
201.875MHz
8W
Figure 3. Exciter Signal Source Block Diagram
H. POWER SUPPLY
1. Function. The power supply converts the standard aircraft +13. 75
vdc or +27. 5 vdc into the necessary voltages and currents that are required
for the various circuits in the equipment. The power supply also provides
line and load regulation as well as aircraft power transient protection.
2. Description. Figure 4 shows a block diagram of the power supply and
schematic 7115-0537 shows the circuit diagram of the power supply. A
switching regulator is used as an efficient line regulator over the expected
±10% variation of the 13. 75 vdc or 27. 5 vdc input voltage to provide 10 vdc to
the d-c to d-c converter. A conventional regulator could be used but is much
less efficient and although they cost less to build, the cost of higher dissipa-
tion creating heat is more than offset. Also, when switching installations
-from-a-13 .-7-5-vdc-to-a-2-7.-5_vdc-power_ sour_ce,_.no^changes_in .power_ho.ok^up_are_
required. The d-c to d-c converter changes the 10 vdc to the voltages at the
stated currents as follows:
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a. +5 Volts dc @ 3 Amps
b. +22 Volts dc @ 280 MA
c. 6.3 Volts rms @ 2 Amps
d. +1400 Volts dc @ . 02 MA(Avg)
e. +28 Volts dc @ 250 MA
f. -18 Volts dc @ 50 MA
g. +15 Volts dc @ 50 MA
Total Power Required from Supply 42.48 watts
a. Power Requirements. As can be seen in the preceding paragraph
a total of 42.48 watts must be supplied to the circuitry. With a d-c to d-c
converter efficiency of 80%, this means that 53 watts must be supplied to the
d-c to d-c converter and with an 80% Switching Regulator efficiency, the total
power supplied is 66.3 watts.
15.0
6.2
12.6
0.028
7.0
0.9
0.75
watt
watt
watt
watt
watt
watt
watt
13.75 VDC
OR
27.5 VDC SWITCHING
REGULATOR
DC/DC
CONVERTER
- +5VDC
+22VDC
- 6.3 VAC
-+1400 VDC
-+28 VDC
•-18 VDC
-+15 VDC
1264-004
Figure 4. Power Supply Block Diagram
b. Switching Regulator. Figure 5 shows a block diagram of the
Switching Regulator elements. The input voltage range is from 12.375 vdc to
30. 25 vdc when a 10% line variation is allowed. To provide an output regula-
tion of 10%, an output voltage of 10. 0 vdc was chosen to be consistent with the
nominal 12 vdc and 31 vdc input variation.
Since a switching regulator operates essentially as a switch, in-
put~and output"voltages"need-only-differ-by-the-saturation voltage-of-the-series-
switch transistor. Some switch considerations for the series transistor and
driver transistor are as follows:
condition (V
(1) Low saturation voltage to keep dissipation down during on
ce
Volt).
sat
121
UNREGULATED
INPUT
(13,75 VDC
27.5 VDC)
•
INPUT
FILTER
SERIES
SWITCH
I
DRIVER AMP
ri
OUTPUT
FILTER
_ REGULATED
COMPARATOR
1 1
. 1 '
* 1
L
-J
^ REFERENCE
' OUTPUT
|
> 1 SAMPLE
> OF OUTPUT
_J
I M>4.oor,
- V output.
Figure 5. Switching Regulator Block Diagram
(2) Collector to emitter breakdown voltage must be V input
(3) Collector current rating > 1.5 times the d-c output current
for the series transistor and a collector current rating > 1. 5/10 times the
dc output current for the driver transistor for reliable operation.
(4) Fast switching speed to keep switching losses to a minimum
(turn-on and turn-off < 1 microsecond).
The frequency of the switching regulator is determined by:
(a) Output filter components,
• (b) Output load,
(c) Gain and hysteresis of comparator,
(d) Input voltage.
The values shown on the schematic 7115-0537 were experi-
mentally determined to give a frequency of operation of 10-40 KHz depending
on load and/or input voltage. The frequency chosen represents a compromise
between efficiency and size of filtering components, that is, if frequency of
operation is increased, filter components get smaller, but switching losses
get greater.
All of the transistors in the switching regulator operate in a
switching mode, i. e., on or off. Resistor values for bias are calculated as-
suming a current gain of 10-20 at saturation, (depending on manufacturers'
specifications at current level being used).
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Transient protection is provided by the 33-volt Zener diode
firing and turning off the series switch and driver for the duration of the
transient.
c. D-C to D-C Converter. The d-c to d-c converter inverts the
10 VDC from the switching regulator and converts this signal to fixed load
voltages as required by conventional rectifiers.
The inverter shown in figure 6 is a conventional square wave,
10VDC /
-10
-12
-13
^TO RECTIFIERS
-14
-15
-16
-17
-18
12644)06
Figure 6. Inverter Circuit Diagram
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saturable core, free-running multivibrator. Frequency of operation is about
10 KHz which represents a compromise between size (of both transformer and
filtering components) and efficiency. Q1 and Q2 must have low saturation
voltages (< 1.0 volt), have voltage breakdown Byceo ^ 20 volts, have
switching speeds < 1.0 jusec, and be capable of switching collector currents
of at least 6. 5 amps without secondary breakdown. The transformer must
provide the necessary secondary voltages and currents, must be designed to
operate at about 10 KHz in a saturating mode with 10 vdc input to the inverter,
and should be as efficient as possible.
The rectifiers are standard design and values of filter compon-
ents used to filter secondary voltages are experimentally determined to pro-
vide an acceptable level of ripple. Choke input filters are used to prevent
excessive "spike" currents from being generated when the filter capacitors
are being charged with a square wave voltage.
I. VIDEO AMPLIFIER AND NOISE AGC
1. Function. The video amplifier and noise AGC circuit receives the low
level video signal from the i-f amplifier and, after appropriate signal condi-
tioning, provides a standard logic output for signal processing. In addition,
a noise detection/amplifier circuit provides a noise AGC for i-f amplifier
gain control.
2. Description. Figure 7 shows a block diagram and schematic 7115-
0522 shows the circuit diagram of the video amplifier and noise AGC. The
requirements of the circuit are as follows:
Approximately 40 db of gain is required to bring the i-f amplifier
output level up to a value that is sufficient to drive the threshold
circuit at the minimum signal input.
Approximately 20 db of dynamic range is required since the log-
arithmic/linear i-f amplifier will vary the 20 db for an input
level variation of 80 db to the receiver.
No pulse stretching or compression since pulse width tests are
made for signal validation.
The threshold circuit must detect signals that are at least 10 db
above noise.
The noise AGC must hold the gain of the i-f amplifier constant.
a. Video Amplifier. The video amplifier is identical to that which
was used in the Sierra/Wilcox test and evaluation CAS flown in the Air
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Transport Association sponsored tests at Baltimore. The circuit is a conven-
tional' differential amplifier with negative feedback added to provide the neces-
sary linearity without stretching the video pulse. To provide the 20 db dyna-
mic range, it is necessary to operate with the high Vcc voltage (+22 and
-18 vdc).
The thresholding is accomplished with a conventional schmitt
trigger which has the capability of being adjusted at a signal-to-noise ratio of
10 db to allow thresholding. Fixed thresholding is acceptable as long as the
i-f gain is held constant.
LOW LEVEL
VIDEO IN .
VIDEO
AMP
THRESHOLD-
ING
CIRCUIT
THRESHOLD VIDEO
OUTPUT
NOISE
AMP/
DETECTOR
AGC
AMP
TO I-F
AMPLIFIER
AGC
SIGNAL
CLIPPER '
1264-007
Figure 7. Video Amplifier and Noise AGC
b. Noise AGC. The AGC circuit holds the i-f gain constant by de-
tecting the noise level out of the video amplifier and producing a d-c voltage to
vary the gain of two stages of the i-f amplifier. The signal fed to the noise
AGC circuit contains both signal and noise; therefore, a clipper is used to
eliminate the signal at a level just above the noise. Some signal may be pre-
sent at the noise detector/amplifier but, because of the low duty cycle, will
not contribute significantly to the gain control voltage. The AGC circuit has
a very long time constant to provide a correction voltage that is essentially a
function of noise level or i-f gain.
J. I-F AMPLIFIER
1. Function. The 60 MHz difference frequency from the mixer is ampli-
fied by the i-f amplifier, and provides a video signal to the video amplifier
that is a logarithmic function of the receiver input signal level. The i-f ampli-
fier also provides the band-limiting function of the receiver with a band-pass
filter (BPF).
126
2. Description. Figure 8 shows a block diagram of the i-f amplifier and
schematic 7115-0527 shows a circuit diagram. The i-f amplifier and BPF
provide 12 to 14 db of gain; the remaining 6 stages of amplification provide 14
to 18 db of gain each, which results in an overall gain of from 96 to 122 db of
gain. Approximately 100 db of gain is necessary for inexpensive detection,
and it is very unlikely that the worst case gain of 96 db would ever occur with
a normal distribution of transistors. Since it is quite likely that gains in ex-
cess of 100 db will be realized, gain control is included in the 2nd and 3rd i-f
stage to allow adjustment to the desired gain. The transistor (2N4123) on
schematic 7115-0527 acts as a variable resistor in the emitter circuits of the
2nd and 3rd stage. The gain of these stages decreases with increasing emitter
current. Controls for receiver adjustment are located on the video amplifier
and noise AGC circuit diagram to provide for 20 to 30 db of i-f gain difference.
The approach used is to broadband all amplifier stages to minimize
passband shift with temperature or signal level. The selectivity of the i-f
amplifier is then determined by a bandpass filter inserted between the first
and second i-f stage.
I-F FROM
MIXER "**
AGC
FROM VIDEO
AMPLIFIER AND
NOISE AGC
VIDEO OUT
TO VIDEO AMPLIFIER
1264408
Figure 8. I-F Amplifier Block Diagram
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a. Design Details. Appendix H describes specific design details
of the associated circuitry.
K. MODULATOR AND ANTENNA SWITCH DRIVER
1. Function. The modulator accepts start and stop signals from the
transmit logic and, with proper pulse timing, provides the transmitter and
exciter with turn-on and turn-off signals.
The antenna switch driver accepts an antenna control signal from the
synchronization logic and provides the antenna switch, in the r-f assembly,
with the proper bias control to select either the upper or lower antenna.
2. Description. Figure 9 shows a block diagram of the modulator and
schematic 7115-0532 shows the circuit diagram of the modulator.
STOP
PULSE
120 SEC DELAY
TO EXCITER
DRIVER
TO TUBE
BIASING CIRCUIT
(CATHODE MODS)
1264409
Figure 9. Modulator Block Diagram
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a. Modulator. Experience has shown that shaping of the transmitted
pulse can be accomplished best by shaping the r-f pulse before it is fed into the
power amplifier. The power amplifier is then biased into conduction just be-
fore the r-f drive is applied, and left on just slightly longer than the r-f drive.
Figure 10 shows the timing sequence.
The transmit logic provides the start and stop of any transmitted
pulse exactly 1.0 jj.sec. early to provide an adjustment range in the modulator
for transmit delay changes, as well as the normal modulator function of turn-
ing on and controlling the transmitter. Transmitter turn-on and turn-off
delays of 0.3 /zsec. can be controlled independently with the circuit shown
which assumes a minimum OFF-ON or ON-OFF delay of 0.4 jusec. and a max-
imum OFF-ON or ON-OFF delay of 0. 7 jusec. The circuitry shown was suc-
cessfully used in the Sierra/Wilcox CAS equipment flown in the Air Transport
Association sponsored flight test.
START PULSE
PWR AMP
BIAS
R-F DRIVE
TO PWR AMP
STOP PULSE
1/zSEC
\
\
IMSEC
1264-010
Figure 10. Modulator Timing Sequence
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Turn-on delay of 120 seconds for transmitter tube filament warm-
up is provided by the transmit logic and is used to inhibit any transmitter or
exciter turn-on signals.
b. Antenna Switch Driver. The antenna switch driver accepts a
logic control level from the synchronization logic, and appropriately controls
either the top or bottom antenna. The "on" antenna requires a 5-volt signal
at 100 milliamperes, and the "off" antenna requires a back-bias of -18 volts.
The circuit shown on schematic 7115-0532 provides these required values.
L. ALTITUDE AND PULSE MEASUREMENT LOGIC
1. Function. The altitude and pulse measurement logic performs the
following:
Converts the ICAO code from the encoding altimeter into a
binary code.
Provides a pulse position signal relative to aircraft altitude to
the transmit logic for transmission of altitude data in "local slot".
Provides pulse verification of either a 30- or 300-microsecond
pulse for the receive logic in all F. slots except those reserved
for test purposes and local slot.
Provides pulse verification of the 25. 6-microsecond altitude
pulse for internal altitude logic use.
Provides above/below, altitude zone, sample command, and a
valid data signal to the threat logic, depending upon received
information.
2. Description. Figure 11 shows a block diagram and schematic 7115-
0547 shows a detail logic diagram of the altitude and pulse measurement logic.
a. Transmit Mode. In the transmit mode, the circuit simply pro-
vides a pulse position signal (relative to aircraft altitude) to the transmit logic.
The signal is only transmitted in the aircraft "local slot". Figure 12 shows
the timing relationship of the altitude transmission.
Signal LSI5, which occurs 15 microseconds after the start of
local slot, starts the delay counter counting at a 5 MHz rate and is used to
delay the start of the altitude counter. The 662. 8-microsecond (count 3314)
length of the delay counter is chosen as a convenient value to correspond to an
altitude of 14, 300 feet. This delay length is chosen to allow processing of
received data up to this maximum altitude. However, since the general avia-
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o
o
o
400 262.8
662.8
8
CM
57.2 4.8 j
720
1500
LENGTH OF SLOT
1264-012
Figure 12. Altitude Transmission Timing Diagram
tion CAS is red-lined above 10, 000 feet, only 10, 000 feet would have been re-
quired for transmission. To compensate for modulation and transmitter delays
and to provide altitude bias for complimentary maneuver commands, the
altitude counter is actually started at three different counts by the advance/
retard circuit as follows:
(1) If no "dive" or "climb" command exists, a count of 3308
(corresponding to 661.6 microseconds) starts the altitude counter. The 1.2
microseconds early start is to compensate for the modulator and transmitter
delay.
(2) If a "climb" command exists, a count of 3304 (corresponding
to 660.8 microseconds) starts the altitude counter. The 2.0 microsecond
early start is to provide the 1.2 microseconds early start to compensate for
the modulator and transmitter delay and to provide a 0.8-microsecond early
bias (corresponding to 200 feet higher altitude) required by the CAS specifica-
tion to guarantee complimentary maneuvers.
(3) If a "dive" command exists, a count of 3312 (corresponding
to 662.4 microseconds) starts the altitude counter. The 0.4-microsecond late
start is to provide the 1. 2-microsecond early start to compensate for the
modulator and transmitter delay and to provide a 0.8 late bias (corresponding
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to 200 feet lower altitude) required by the CAS specification to guarantee
complimentary maneuvers.
In all cases, the delay counter is reset at a count of 3314.
Depending upon the three aforementioned conditions, the
advance/retard circuit provides an enable level and allows the 2. 5 MHz clock
rate to be applied to the altitude counter. Each clock pulse of 400 nanoseconds
duration corresponds to a 100-foot increment of altitude. The altitude counter,
reset by the STOS signal to a count of 14,300 feet, will start to count down.
The altitude counter consists of a special divide-by-five for the 3 least signi-
ficant bits and normal binary for the 5 most significant bits. Its output is ap-
plied to an 8-bit comparator which compares each count of the altitude counter,
to the pressure altitude from the encoding altimeter in the aircraft. Only the
8 least significant bits of information from the encoding altimeter are used
because of the limited altitude of a general aviation aircraft. Of the 8 least
significant bits applied to the ICAO decoder, the 5 most significant bits are
converted from a gray code to a binary code and the 3 least significant bits are
specially decoded for ease of comparing with the 3 least significant bits of the
altitude counter., ^When the outputs from the altitude counter agree with the
outputs from the ICAO decoder, a TAA signal will be applied to the transmit
logic causing an r-f signal to be transmitted.
b. Receive Mode. In the receive mode, the circuit provides verifi-
cation for 30- or 200-microsecond range pulses, and 25.6-microsecond alti-
tude pulses in all received slots. In addition, the circuit assesses the relative
altitude separation between own aircraft and all participants to provide the
necessary threat logic inputs to assure safe separation. Significant differences,
between the transmit mode and receive mode, are that the delay counter runs
two or three times each active slot, and no altitude bias is used.
Signal THV (Threshold Video), from the video amplifier, in con-
junction with RSW (Received Slot Window) start the delay counter and the pulse
verification logic. The RSvV signal, occuring in every slot except "local slot",
starts at 15 microseconds after start of slot (corresponding to a range of 0
nautical miles) and lasts for 62 microseconds (corresponding to a range of 10
nautical miles). Only range pulses in this window are relevant for threat
evaluation.
After the delay counter has been started by the appropriately
gated range pulse, or a following aj
counter, the time decoder provides 28.4-microsecond, 196.8-micro-
second, and 24.4-microsecond gates off the delay counter to verify that after
a range or altitude pulse has started, no THV signal drop-out occurs for the
duration of the gates. If any one pulse fails, it disables the process data
decision circuit so that the information in that particular slot will not be pro-
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cessed. Therefore, the acceptance criteria for a range pulse is 100 percent
signal from the start of the signal to 28.4 microseconds for a 30. 0-micro-
second range pulse or to 196.8 microseconds for a 200-microsecond range
pulse. In addition, the acceptance criteria for an altitude pulse is 100 percent
signal from the start of the signal to 24.4 microseconds for a 25.6-micro-
'second altitude pulse.
THV occurring in a General Aviation CAS slot will also cause the
delay counter to count out a fixed delay of 662.8 microseconds as it did in the
transmit mode. This corresponds to a count of 3314 and will be gated through
the advance retard circuit to start the altitude counter, and to reset the delay
counter to 0. The altitude counter will count down from 14,300 feet until it
agrees with the altitude information from the altimeter. At this time, a TA
signal will be applied to the counter control circuit and the position decision
circuit.
After the altitude counter has started, the first THV assertion
signal will generate an ALTP signal that is assumed to be the intruder aircraft
altitude pulse. A time comparison of TA (own aircraft altitude) and ALTP
(intruder aircraft altitude) is made to assess whether the intruder is above or
below and if the intruder is close enough in altitude to be considered a threat.
Also, the THV pulse is tested 100 percent from start to 24.4 microseconds
later to verify that it is an altitude pulse.
Three cases must be considered when measuring the altitude of
an intruding aircraft as follows:
(1) Intruder aircraft above,
(2) Intruder aircraft below,
(3) Intruder aircraft co-altitude.
In the case where the intruder aircraft is above, the THV altitude
information will again start the delay counter. In this case the signal TA will
be generated after signal ALTP so that the position decision circuit will decide
the intruder aircraft is above. The time decoder has an output equal to 2.4
microseconds which is equivalent to 600 feet in altitude. If the signal TA
comes during this time, the 0-600 foot output of the AZ decision circuit will
rise to a "1" level signifying the intruding aircraft is between 0 and 600 feet.
If TA comes between 2.4 and 5.2 microseconds, which corresponds to 600 to
1300 feet, the 600-1300 output of the AZ decision circuit will be at a "1" level.
If TA comes after 5.2 microseconds, it disables the process data decision
circuit.
138
In the case where the intruder aircraft is below, the signal TA
will start the delay counter for the second time. Signal ALTP will be gener-
ated after TA so that the position decision circuit will indicate the intruder
aircraft is below. Again, the time decoder has a 0-600 foot output and if sig-
nal ALTP comes during this time, the 0-600 foot output level will rise to a
"1". If ALTP comes between 600 and 1300 feet, the 600-1300 foot level will
rise to "1". If ALTP comes after 1300 feet, it disables the process data dec-
ision circuit. Also in this case, ALTP resets the delay counter to enable it
to count to 24.4 microseconds in order that the altitude THV pulse width may
be measured. Recall in the first case the THV altitude information started
this action.
In the case where the intruder aircraft is exactly co-altitude,
signals TA and ALTP coincide and enable the AZ decision circuit in the 0-600
foot time. The position decision circuit will decide if the aircraft is above or
below depending upon which signal TA or ALTP occurred first. In addition,
the delay counter will be appropriately started to provide the 24. 4 microsecond
altitude THV pulse width check.
In the receive mode, the altitude and pulse measurement logic
provide the threat logic in each active slot with an altitude zone (AZO), an
above/below decision (ACS), an appropriate sample time after all data has
been received (DEI 5), and a signal that the range and altitude pulses did not
fail a pulse width test and the altitude pulse occurred in a time corresponding
to 1300 feet or less of altitude separation (OK). Also, in the receive mode,
the altitude and pulse measurement logic provide the transmit and receive
logic in each active slot with a 30- or 200-microsecond received range pulse
decision.
M. THREAT LOGIC AND DISPLAY
1. Function. The threat logic and display circuit determines when a
threat from another aircraft exists and commands appropriate pilot action to
eliminate the threat.
2. Description. Figure 13 shows a block diagram of the threat logic and
display, Figure 14 shows the commands and advisories to be displayed for each
type of encounter and schematic 7115-0542 shows a detail logic diagram on the
schematic diagram but are physically located on the display that will be dis-
cussed later.
The CAS system will display to the pilot nine different commands
depending on the information received from intruding aircraft. Two types of
encounters are provided for: (a) The 2 aircraft, and (b) the 3 aircraft.
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The two aircraft encounter means that one intruding aircraft is in the
collision circle surrounding the threatened aircraft, and the three aircraft
encounter means there are two intruding aircraft in this collision circle.
In figure 14, the two-aircraft encounter has the altitude position of
the intruding aircraft plotted on the ordinate and the range of the intruding
aircraft plotted on the abscissa. The three-air craft encounter has one intrud-
ing aircraft plotted on the ordinate and the other intruding aircraft plotted on
the abscissa.
The following abbreviations are used in figure 14.
ACA:
ACB:
AZO:
Intruding Aircraft Above
Intruding Aircraft Below
Altitude Zone Zero (0-600 f t . )
ACA
AZ1
ACA
AZO
ACB
AZO
ACB
AZ1
0
ACA
AZ1
RZ1+RZ2
ACA
AZO
RZ2
ACA
AZO
RZ1
X
2 AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTER 3 AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTER
LC 500
1. DIVE
2. DNT
1. CLIMB
2. DNT
1. L.C.O
1. L.D.O
L.D. 500
RZ1
3 AIRCRAFT
1. DIVE
2. DNT
1. DIVE
2. DNT
1. DIVE
2. DNT
ACA
AZO
RZ1
RZ2
ENCOUNTER
1. L.C. 200
1. L.C. 200
1. DIVE
2. DNT
ACA
AZO
RZ2
1. L.C. 500
1. L.C. 200
1. DIVE
2. DNT
ACA
AZ1
RZ2 + R2
ACB
AZ1
RZH-RZ2
ACB
AZO
RZ2
ACB
AZO
RZ1
S
*/^
ACB
AZ1
RZ1 + RZ2
ACB
AZO
RZ2
ACB
AZO
RZ1
<£/&
!1 -^X^°
1. DIVE
2. DNT
3. L.D. 500
1. DIVE
2. DNT
3. L.D. 200
1. D.N.T.
2. L.C.O
3. L.D.O
ACA
AZO
RZ1
3AI
1. CLIMB
2. DNT
1. CLIMB
2. DNT
1. CLIMB
2. DNT
t
ACB
AZO
RZ1
1. L.C. 200
2. L.D. 500
1. L.C. 200
2. L.D. 200
1. CLIMB
2. DNT
3. L.C. 200
ACA
AZO
RZ2
=ICRAFT ENCOUr
1. L.D. 200
1. L.D. 200
1. CLIMB
Z DNT
ACB
AZO
RZ2
1. L.C. 500
2. L.D. 500
1. L.C. 500
2. L.D. 200
1. CLIMB
2. DNT
3. L.C. 500
ACA
AZ1
RZ2+RZ1
JTER
1. L.D. 500
1. L.D. 200
1. CLIMB
2. DNT
ACB
AZ1
RZ2+RZ1
Figure 14. Commands and Advisories
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AZ1: Altitude Zone^One (600 ± 1300ft.) T
RZ1: Range Zone One
RZ2: Range Zone Two
LCO: Limit Climb to 0 fpm (feet per minute)
LDO: Limit Dive to 0 fpm
LC200: Limit Climb to 200 fpm
LD200: Limit Dive to 200 fpm
LC500: Limit Climb to 500 fpm
LD500: Limit Dive to 500 fpm
DNT: Do Not Turn
RZ1 +
RZ2 Range Zone 1 or Range Zone 2
The range and altitude information is stored in a 2-bit shift register
called "storage of information 1 or 2 aircraft", if the "CAS ON" signal exists
(figure 13). The "CAS ON" signal indicates that the power is turned on, syn-
chronization has been obtained, and the unit has passed self test. The infor-
mation to be stored is clocked into storage provided it has passed all the tests
described in the altitude and pulse width measurement system. This is deter-
mined by the information OK in slot circuit. The intruder counter counts the
number of intruders. When this amount gets to two, it inhibits any intruder
information from being stored.
The output of the storage 1 or 2 intruder aircraft is fed to decoder 1
and decoder 2. Decoder 1 is used in the 2 aircraft encounter and both decoders
are used in the 3 aircraft encounter.
Decoder 1 and decoder 2 feed the display processor which determines
the light or lights to be illuminated from the decoding done by decoder 1 and
decoder 2. The output of the display processor is clocked into command
storage in every local slot provided at least 1 intruding aircraft is detected in
the 1999 slots prior to local slot. If no intruding aircraft is detected after 2
times through the 1999 slots, the command storage logic is set to 0 turning
out all command lamps. The frame counter and hold circuits count this time
and the clock inhibit and reset circuits perform the reset and clocking action.
The 10 blocks on the extreme right of figure 13 are the 9 command/
advisory indicators and the "CAS ON" indicator.
The threat logic and display also generates an audible alarm by
providing a 666.7 Hz tone, gated on for 3.0 seconds and then off for 3.0
"seconds, any time an intruder aircraft is detected in the 0-600 foot altitude
zone and is in range zone 1. The audible alarm signal is to be used for con-
nection into the aircraft alarm. The communications receiver usually has
audio jacks provided for interconnection. Another output from the threat logic
and display is the DNT signal which is used in the slot control logic to inhibit
the "shut-up-and-listen" function normally used to detect co-slot occupancy.
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N. SLOT CONTROL LOGIC
1. Function. The slot control logic selects and stores a local slot num-
ber, generates a local slot signal for the transmit and receive logic, selects
and stores an alternate slot, and determines if someone else is using either
the local or alternate slot. Should either the local or alternate slot be busy,
a new slot is automatically chosen for operation.
2. Description. Figure 15 shows a block diagram and schematic 7115-
0507 shows a detail logic diagram of the slot control logic.
a. Shut-Up-and-Listen. The random count generator, count select,
and the divide-by-seven and inhibit circuitry provides a random average in-
terval of fourteen local slots to quench any transmissions for one local slot for
the purpose of determining if someone else is occupying the same local slot.
The random interval is required to assure that two participants do not shut-
up and listen at the same time. The random count generator is a simple heads
or tails circuit that is driven by any thresholded video (THV) from the receiver.
The heads or tails (HT) output is used to count (H) or not count (T) each local
slot (LS). The divide-by-seven and inhibit circuitry counts the count select
output. When a count-of-seven is reached and no inhibit (DNT = 1) exists, the
shut-up and listen (SUL) signal is made active and the normal range and alti-
tude pulse is quenched for that local slot. Since the random count generator
will have half heads and half tails, only every other LS gets counted on the
average which gives an average interval of 42 seconds between the shut-up and
listen intervals. Should a threat condition exist (any intruder detected in
range zone 1 and altitude zone 0), the SUL signal activation is inhibited by
DNT = 0 from the threat logic and display. After any active shut-up and listen
slot, the divide-by seven and inhibit is reset to preclude more than one shut-
up and listen in a row.
, b. Slot Selection. Both the local slot (LS) and alternate slot (AS)
selectors are 10-bit comparators that select 1 out of 1000 possible slots. The
slot counter in the synchronization logic provides one set of comparator inputs
for each slot selector while the alternate slot counter (10-bit binary counter)
provides the other set of comparator inputs for the alternate slot selector and
the local slot storage (10-bit storage register) provides the other set of com-
parator inputs for the local slot selector. One bit, SI, does not require a
comparison since for all F. slots it is by definition a logical 1. After a slot
is selected, it is continuously examined to verify that it is an allowable slot
and that it is not occupied by someone else.
c. Alternate Slot Control. At start up, the alternate slot counter is
permitted to come up in any state and will thereafter be controlled by the
change alternate slot circuit unless it comes up in one of the unused 48 counts
(2000 of 2048 counts of the slot counter are used). Should this occur, the
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alternate slot selector will not generate an alternate slot (AS) and in two slot
counter overflows, the laternate slot detect circuit will reset the alternate
slot counter to its lowest state.
In normal operation the alternate slot counter is a binary counter
driven by the change alternate slot circuit. There are three criteria for mov-
ing the alternate slot as follows:
(1) niegal slot for alternate slot (ISAS)
(2) Alternate and local slot equal (ASLS)
(3) Alternate slot busy (HITAS).
The first condition occurs because some slots are reserved for
test purposes by the ANTC-117 specification. For the one-frequency system
defined, these reserved slots are as follows:
Slots 79 + 128 N (N = 0, 1, 2, 3)
Slots 1101 + 128N (N = 0, 1, 2, 3)
The illegal slot circuit determines when this condition occurs
and activates the change alternate slot circuit.
The second condition normally occurs each time a new local slot
is selected which will be discussed later. If the selected alternate slot is the
same as the local slot, the local slot = alternate slot circuit activates the
change alternate slot circuit and a new alternate slot is selected.
The third condition occurs when thresholded video (THV) occurs
in the alternate slot selected. This condition will exist when someone else is
using the particular slot as his local slot. As soon as the alternate slot busy
is detected, it activates the change alternate slot circuit and a new alternate
slot circuit and a new alternate slot is selected.
d. Local Slot Control. The local slot storage circuit is a 10-bit
storage register and is permitted to come up in any state at start-up and will
be controlled by the change local slot circuit thereafter. Should a decision to
change the local slot occur, the change local slot circuit causes the contents
of the alternate slot counter to be read into the local slot storage and a new
alternate slot is chosen. There are three criteria for moving the local slot
as follows:
(1) Illegal slot for local slot,
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(2) No local slot,
(3) Local slot busy.
The first condition occurs because some slots are reserved for
test purposes by the ANTC-117 specification. For the one-frequency system
defined, these reserved slots are the same as those previously listed under
the discussion on Alternate Slot Control. Should the illegal slot circuit deter-
mine that one of these prohibited slots has been a selected, the change local
slot circuit is activated and new local slot is selected.
The second condition occurs when the local slot storage gets to
one of the 48 unused counts. If no local slot is generated in two slot counter
overflows, the local slot detect circuit activates the change local slot circuit
and a new slot is chosen.
The third condition occurs when another system user is also using
the same local slot. For the local slot busy circuit to activate the following
conditions must prevail:
A previously determined vacant alternate slot has been
chosen (GO).
The shut-up-and-listen ,(SUL) signal is active,
The local slot is active,
Threshold video (THV) is active.
Should all these conditions be met, local slot busy circuit will
activate the change local slot circuit and a new local slot will be selected.
O. TRANSMIT AND RECEIVE CONTROL LOGIC
1. Function. The transmit and receive control logic primarily provides
start and stop control signals to the modulator for transmission of range and
altitude pulses and assesses received video range pulses to provide the threat
logic with signals signifying that an intruder range pulse has been detected in :
a particular range zone. Secondarily, the transmit and receive control logic
provides control signals to the altitude and pulse measurement logic for starts
ing-the~altitude pulse-transmission circuitry in-local-slot-and-for-gating-only——
relevant received data into the pulse measurement circuitry.
2. Description. Figure 16 shows a block diagram and schematic 7115-
0512 shows a detail logic diagram of the transmit and receive control.
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a. Start and Stop Transmitted Signals. The start transmitted pulse
and stop transmitted pulse circuit, shown in figure 16, provides the modulator
with a start and stop control pulse, one microsecond early, to compensate for
modulator and transmitter delays. The enable transmit circuit allows trans-
missions to take place only when the following conditions are met:
Local slot (LS) is active
Warm-up period (10 minutes) has been completed after power
was applied
Shut-up and listen (SUL) is not active for this local slot
Fine sync (S4P) has been obtained
A range pulse transmission must have a pulse width of 30. 2
microseconds, and r-f out at 15.0 microseconds from the start of local slot.
The count 13.8 circuit, with inputs from the main counter in the sync logic,
provides the start transmitted pulse with a gate level at 13.8 microseconds
from the start of slot. Combined with the 5-MHz clock rate, it generates a
start transmitted pulse at 14. 0 microseconds from the start of local slot.
With modulator and transmitter delays at 1. 0 microsecond, the r-f is then
generated at 15. 0 microseconds from the start of local slot. The stop range
pulse circuit, with inputs from the main counter in the sync logic, provides
the stop transmitted pulse with a gate level at 44. 0 microseconds from the
start of slot, and combined with the 5-MHz clock rate, it generates a stop
transmitted pulse at 44.2 microseconds from start of local slot.
The altitude pulse transmission is identical to the range pulse
transmission, except that the start signal (pulse width of 25. 6 microseconds)
is provided by the altitude and pulse measurement logic (TAA), with no alti-
tude pulse transmitted if the aircraft is on the ground. The transmit altitude
pulse circuit allows the TAA signal to start the transmission of an altitude
pulse only if the strut switch (or similar control) is closed. Since the start
signal is variable as altitude changes, a separate counter is required to pro-
vide the stop signal for the altitude pulse. This counter is provided by the
stop altitude pulse circuit, which is a controlled binary divide-by-128 of the
5-MHz clock rate. When the counter reaches a count of 128 (corresponding to
a time of 25. 6 microseconds), the stop altitude pulse circuit generates a sig-
nal which activates the stop transmitted pulse circuit and turns off the
transmitter.
b. Range Zone Detection. The range zone detector provides the
threat logic with a zone one violation (Z1V) signal and a range zone violation
(RZV) for combining with the altitude data for threat evaluation. If both Z1V
and RZV are true a range zone 2 is used in the threat logic. Range values for
152
the different zones are discussed in Part One, section V, paragraph D.
The range zone detector receives gate inputs as shown in figure
17, and a sample pulse (SZ300) to enable either or both the Z1V and RZV signal.
Note that both range zone 1 gates are started at 15. 0 microseconds after the
start of slot, and both range zone 2 gates are started at the end of each range
zone 1. All range gates are reset by the reset pulse gates circuit. Also note
that the resets of all gates can be shortened for terminal area logic by the pilot
activates pushbutton switch and 10-minute timer. This gives about a 70 percent
reduction in all range alarms as discussed in Part One, section V, paragraph D.
The gate inputs in conjunction with the threshold video (THV) cause an active
range zone which could be the result^of a 200-microsecond or 30-microsecond
range pulse from an intruding aircraft. The active range zone is combined
with the 30- or 200-microsecond signal from the altitude logic to finally gen-
erate the Z1V or RZV or both signals.
c. Control Signal Generation. The local slot time of 15 micro-
seconds circuit provides the altitude logic with a precisely timed start signal
for local slot transmission of an altitude pulse.
The received slot window circuit provides the altitude logic with-
a gate during each slot that can contain received range and altitude informa-
tion. The received slot circuit allows all F4 slots (SI), except test slots (IS) •
and local slot (LS), to be included in the received slot window. In each of
these slots, the received slot window is started at 15.0 microseconds after
slot start (range = 0), and stopped at 80. 0 microseconds (by the count 80 cir-
cuit) which corresponds to a window whose length is slightly over 10 nautical
miles. Threshold video which does not occur in this window will not be
processed.
P. SYNCHRONIZATION LOGIC
1. Function. The synchronization (sync) logic accepts range and special
time reference pulse information from a DME in the aircraft and precisely
aligns the time base in the sync logic. Once the time base is in accurate align-
ment, the CAS transmitter is enabled and the normal collision avoidance func-
tion can be provided. After time base alignment has been achieved, the sync
logic continuously validates that the time is correct. If an error is found or
the sync data lost, the sync logic turns off the CAS function and searches for
sync data. In addition, the self test monitor is included in the sync logic.
Signals provided by the sync Jogic_are^as_follows^ •_
Slot counter outputs to the slot control logic,
Main counter outputs to the transmit and receive control logic for
transmission and reception of data,
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10-minute warm-up delay for transmitter and precision oscillator.
CAS ON to display.
2. Description
a. Sync. Figure 18 shows a block diagram of the synchronization
logic and schematic 7115-0502 (sheets 1 through 6) shows a detail logic dia-
gram of the synchronization logic.
The major functions of each of the 6 sheets that make up the syn-
chronization logic are as follows:
Sheet 1
Half-amplitude detector of DME video
DME interface for:
(1) Track
(2) DME video
(3) Range delay counter drive (1.6172 MHz)
(4) Pulse pair decode
Shaping circuit for 5 MHz
D/A converter for VCO frequency control
Sheet 2
Main counter
Slot counter
Epoch counter
Local range delay counter initiation
Epoch pulse decoder and reset
Counter correction
Sheet 3
Bi-quinary to decimal conversion
Range delay counter
Video sampling
Sheet 4
Determines if local time is early or late
Generates_digital_frequency jcontroLvalue
Provides a 10-minute warm-up timer
Generates a power-on reset for initialization
Performs self-test monitor
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Sheet 5
Makes advance or retard decision for timing chain correction
Verifies sufficient sync data is received to control
programmer
Sheet 6
Generates sampling times
Determines what condition of sync exists and controls logic
accordingly
The 5-MHz precision oscillator drives a divide by 7500 main
counter which generates the 1. 5 millisecond (ms) slot timing required for CAS.
This drives a divide-by-8 counter that supplies the 12 ms local reference
pulse required for comparison with the received 12 ms reference pulse which
is continuously transmitted by the modified VORTAC station. The 12 ms local
pulse drives a divide-by-250 and a divide-by-2 counter which generates a
6-second epoch pulse. The divide-by-8 and divide-by-250 counters make up
the slot counter.
The range output of the King 700 DME is in a modified biquinary
format. This is converted to ten's complement BCD. Table 1 shows the
truth table and Boolean functions of this conversion for the tenth nautical mile
range output. The units and tens of nautical mile outputs are converted in the
same way.
TABLE 1. TRUTH TABLE AND BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
Modified BiQuanary
Count
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
TS1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
TSA
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
TSB
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
TSC
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0 _
0
TSD
0
0
0
'1
0
1
1
1
0
1
TSE
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
Complemented BCD
Bl
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1 .
0
B2
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0 ;
0
B3
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
B4
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NOTES:
IF TS1 = 1, set
IF TSC
IF TSC
to a one
TSE + TSB • TSE = 1, set 63 to a one
TSE + TSA • TSD = 1, set 63 to a one
IF TSB • ~TSD = 1, set B4 to a one
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The converted range information is strobed into the range counter
by the local 12 ms reference pulse (STR). The range counter is a 3 decade
BCD up counter. A single flip-flop is used to keep track of the hundreds place.
When the counter overflows, a new local 12 ms reference pulse is generated
(RLCR) which is delayed in time by the one-way range to the VORTAC station.
This signal is routed to the compare circuits where it is compared with the
received 12 ms reference pulse.
RLCR is also routed to the window generation circuits where it
initiates a 4-microsecond (usec) and 20-/isec window. The windows and the
video from the DME are gated and form FS which is compared with the RLCR
signal (see figure 19).
In order to generate a ±2-jLtsec window about the local reference
pulse, the 12 ms local reference pulse (STR) is required to.be decoded 2 jLtsec
to compensate for receiver time. This will most always require the 12 ms
reference pulse to be decoded some time after the normal decode time. With
a receiver delay of 3. 5 jusec, the reference decode time would be 12001. 5 jusec
(or 1. 5 jusec after the start of each 12 ms period).
There are four modes of operation. In mode 1 (search mode)
only the 20-jusec window is used. If the received 12 ms pulse is not detected
in the window, the compare circuitry commands the timing chain to advance
in time by 2.0 jusec. If any verified pulse pair occurs in the window, the ad-
vancing of the master timing chain is stopped and a 3-out-of-5 test is started.
If three of the next five decision of the compare circuit support the trial case
in progress, the compare circuit assumes that the received 12 ms reference
pulse has been foundL At this time, the programmer is forced into mode 2.
In mode 2, both the ±2-jLtsec and 20-/isec windows are in use.
The timing chain is now being advanced in time by 0.8- jusec steps. If a veri-
fied pulse pair is detected in the ±2-/isec window, the advances to the timing
chain are stopped and the 2-out-of-2 verification circuit is initiated. If two .,
of the next two decisions of the compare circuit support the trial case in
progress, the 12 ms received reference pulse is now assumed to be within the
±2-jusec window. The compare circuit now forces the programmer into mode
three, which is fine sync. During mode 2, the 20-,usec window is also in use.
This continuously insures that the verified received pulse pair is indeed within
the 20-|Ltsec window and that the system has not locked on to a received refer-
ence pulse that does not exhibit the 12 ms fixed spacing characteristic of the
sync signal. : •
In mode 3, early-late decisions are made. The video occurring
in the ±2-1usec window is continuously compared with the local 12 ms reference
pulse. If the received reference pulse arrives first four times in a row,
the local time is considered late and a pulse will be added to the timing chain.
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Figure 19. Time Comparison Diagram
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At the same time, the frequency of the oscillator will be increased by 1. 56
part/109. In the case of an early decision, a pulse will be deleted and the fre-
quency of the oscillator will be decreased by 1. 56 part/10^.
The frequency correction is accomplished by a D/A converter
which drives the VCO input of the oscillator. The D/A is controlled by an
up/down counter. When the counter is incremented, the corresponding voltage
change causes an increase or decrease in frequency of the oscillator.
Once fine sync is achieved, two additional circuits, the fine sync
alarm and the epoch sync circuits are initiated. When in fine sync, the ±2-
jusec window is continuously monitored. If 16 reference pulses are not detect-
ed within the window in a 1. 5-second sample each 6 seconds, the system resets
back to mode 2 when two successive failures occur. In mode 2, if insufficient
sync data to pass the 3-out-of-5 test is present, the system is reset back to
mode 1 and search is enabled. When fine sync has been attained, the epoch
pair decoder is activated. Two sets of epoch pulse pairs are transmitted by
the modified VORTAC system every 500th, 12 ms reference pulse. The first
set of epoch pairs occurs at slot zero, with the second pair occurring at slot
eight. The slot zero pulse pairs spacing is 128.8 /usec and the slot eight
pulse pairs spacing is 140.8 jusec (see figure 20). In addition, the epoch pulse
pairs start 6. 0 jusec later than the normal 12 ms pulse pairs.
If the slot zero pulse pairs are detected, the slot counter will be
reset at this time and the programmer will be set to mode 4. Once the pro-
grammer is in mode 4, one epoch pair decode is required each minute to
maintain the programmer in mode 4. Should at least one epoch pair decode
occur each minute, the system is reset to mode 3 and normal operation
continues.
If slot zero is not detected in mode 3, slot eight is searched for.
If detection occurs, the slot counter is reset to slot eight, and the programmer
will set to mode 3. Both epoch pair decodes are used for verification.
In mode 4, both the epoch sync verification circuit and the fine
sync alarm continuously monitor their respective windows. If the fine sync
alarm is triggered, both epoch and fine sync modes are cleared. If epoch
sync verification fails, just the epoch sync mode is cleared.
b. Self Test. Sheet 4 of logic diagram 7115-0502 shows the self-
test circuitry that provides a positive test on a very large percentage of the
circuitry. This assures the pilot that the CAS is operational by signalling CAS
on, only if it passes the self-test criteria. At the end of each local slot, the
results of the tests made are summed and provide drive to the CAS ON indica-
tor if all tests passed. In each slot zero, the drive to the indicator is set to
the failed condition. The criteria and the conditions tested are as follows:
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If the slot logic programmed a shut-up and listen (SUL),
the CAS ON is passed as good since not all self-test data is
available.
If the frequency control counter is close to either end of the
control range (0V), the CAS ON is failed and CAS operation
is not allowed. An oscillator calibration adjustment is
needed.
Mode 4 (S4P) of the programmer must be true to signify the
unit is in good sync alignment and all sync logic is
operational.
A range pulse is detected in local slot (ROK) which signifies
that the transmit and receive logic, the transmitter, and
the receiver are functioning. Power output of the transmit-
ter, receiver sensitivity, or pulse verification is not per-
formed for the purpose of self test.
An altitude pulse is transmitted in local slot (AOK) which
signifies that the altitude logic is functioning in the transmit
mode. Should the aircraft be on the ground, the AOK signal
is passed as good since no altitude transmission is possible
while on the ground.
Q. MECHANICAL PACKAGING, DISPLAY, AND INSTALLATION
The GA CAS is intended for a use in a wide variety of aircraft, thus, the
requirement is for an inexpensively packaged unit that is easy to install.
Since a pilot display is required, it is tempting to consider packaging the unit
in an instrument case with an integrated display. However, when considering
the size of the unit and the lack of instrument panel space, a remote installa-
tion of the electronics is almost mandatory. By remoting the electronics and
integrating the display with a vertical speed indicator (an instrument that
almost all general aviation aircraft have) only the control function requires
any instrument panel space. A small (3/4-by-1-1/2-inch) pane!with two
switches mounted on it provides the control required.
The GA CAS is comprised of three independently mounted sections plus
the antenna installation: (1) a remote unit contains all the electronics;
(2) an instrument display provides the pilot command and advisory informa-
tion; and (3) a control panel for turning the unit on and off and to provide the
choice of terminal area operation at the discretion of the pilot.
1. Remote Unit. The remote unit contains the entire electronic system
comprised of power supply, transmitter, receiver, logic, and precision
168
frequency source. Four connectors are mounted on the front plate for connec-
tion to the upper and lower antenna (if both used) control panel, and instrument
display. Mounting is accomplished by bolting a small rack to the airframe for
remote unit support. The remote unit itself can be removed or installed in the
rack by removing the. connectors and two wing nuts (much like a standard ATR
mount). A single unit protection cover is easily removed with a common
screw driver. Figure 21 depicts the remote unit and associated rack.
Construction is modular for ease of repair and reduction of manufac-
turing costs. The remote unit utilizes an I-beam type of construction. A
master interconnect board is sandwiched in the center of the I-beam with male
interconnects protruding into the left and right compartment. All connections
(except r-f) are made through the master interconnect board, including con-
nection to the two:cable connectors on the front plate.
Critical circuit separation is accomplished by the I-beam construc-
tion. Two independent compartments that are shielded from each other pro-
vide r-f to logic isolation. The left compartment is for logic and power supply;
the right side is for r-f.
Both antenna connectors are mounted on the r-f front end assembly.
This assembly is mounted behind the front plate on the rf side and the connec-
tors protrude through clearance holes for access. This direct connection
eliminates additional cable/connector loss.
All of the integral r-f assemblies are interconnected via coaxial
cable and connectors. This provides adequate control over radiation, coup-
ling, and losses.
2. Instrument Display. A flat, black molded frame of durable material
houses all of the warning lights. It mounts around the Instantaneous Vertical
Speed Indicator (IVSI) or a Vertical Speed Indicator on the front of the instru-
ment panel. Three mounting screws are used to sandwich the instrument
panel between the CAS Instrument Display and the IVSI, therefore providing
a mount. Figure 22 depicts the instrument display.
A thin G-10 printed circuit board (PCB) for all signal routing is per-
manently molded into this frame. In addition, a small cable (that is electri-
cally attached to the PCB) exists at the rear of the frame for connections to
the remote unit. This, cable is routed through a clearance slot in the instru-
ment panej^u^ngjiiowi^g.^^^^^ ------
~
opposite~endof the cable.
Grain- of- wheat type incandescent bulbs are mounted to the PCB for
warning light illumination. Expected life of these bulbs is 5000 hours. Each
warning section is illuminated by one bulb except the MAX CLIMB, NO TURN,
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and MAX DIVE sections, which have two. In a final assembly operation, trans-
lucent caps are cemented over bulb clearance hole or slot. The following
colors are used for these indicators:
ON Green
MAX CLIMB Red
NO TURN Red
MAX DIVE Red
. 5 Amber
. 2 Amber
0 (zero) Amber
A clearance slot is provided in the lower left corner of the frame for
access to the IVSI zero adjustment screw.
3. Control Panel. Two switches (power and terminal area) are mounted
in a convenient place on the instrument panel. Two 1/4-inch holes are drilled
3/4-inch apart and the switches are inserted from the rear. A 3/4-inch high
by 1-1/2-inch wide panel with mating 1/4-inch holes spaced 3/4-inch apart is
then placed over the switch shafts and the nuts secured. All pertinent nomen-
clature is inscribed on this panel. Figure 23 depicts the control panel.
R. ENVIRONMENT
The GA CAS is designed to operate continuously in the following
environment:
Ambient Temperature -15°C + 50° C
Altitude: 15, 000 feet or less
Humidity: 95% @ 50° C for 48 hours
Shock: . Peak acceleration of 6G for time dura-
tion of 10 milliseconds in all axis.
Vibration: 10-55 Hz constant total excursion of
0. 01" from 10 - 55 cps with maximum
acceleration of 1. 5 G in all axis.
Additionally, the unit will withstand storage temperatures of from -40° C
to +71 °C.
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SECTION HI
COST ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL .
The cost analysis for production versions of the GA CAS described herein
is made by combining the labor costs, overhead burden, material costs,
general and administrative allowances, and profit. The overhead burden,
general and administrative allowances, and profit percentages used were
obtained by averaging a small sample survey of the industry. The cost
estimates assume a modern production facility with such capabilities as wave
soldering and automatic testing of components and assemblies considered
standard practice. Also, it is assumed that high quality parts, material, and
assembly techniques are used consistent with the general aviation industry.
Additionally, an assumption of at least 5000 units per production facility was
made.
Nonrecurring costs have not been included because it has been assumed
that only very large quantity production runs can be economically justified.
If GA CAS as defined herein is implemented, it will be a very large scale
which makes the nonrecurring costs insignificant. In reference 33, it is pre-
dicted that 137, 000 single engine aircraft will exist in 1974 and a very large
percentage of these must be CAS equipped to make the system useful. With
even half of the 137,000 single engine aircraft equipped and an estimated
$300, 000 to $500, 000 development cost, it can be seen that the nonrecurring
costs are in the $5 to $8 per unit range.
Included in the cost analysis is a detailed special assembly costs,
material cost details, labor estimates, and cost to the user estimates based
on various marketing schemes.
B. SPECIAL ASSEMBLY COSTS
Table 2 lists the cost of special assemblies that require special tooling
and expertise to design and produce. A specification was written for each
item and these specifications are included in appendixes A through D. Vendors
that have the expertise to design and produce the special assemblies were
contacted for cost and design information and the cost of the lowest estimate
was used. Since the cost of the special assemblies have normal profit and
-overhead-attached-already^-the-user-cost is-determined"by-adding~on~th~e~co"st
of the special assemblies after all other costs are computed. Some costs for
assembly time and test time is included for these special assemblies. A make-
or-buy decision would have to be made on the special assemblies by the
producer depending upon his capabilities.
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C. MATERIAL COST DETAILS
Table 3 shows a summary of the material cost. Tables 4 through 11
list the material cost estimates for the GA CAS described herein. Each of
the tables provide the detail build-up of material costs for that module, and
provide the source of the cost by code letters. The code letters are defined
as follows:
1 - Wilcox Electric Co. standard cost.
2 - Telephone or wire quote from supplier used for
special components with low-quantity usage.
3 - Catalog cost used for common components with low-
quantity usage.
4 - Sierra Research Corporation estimate based on similar
material currently used.
D. LABOR ESTIMATES
The labor estimates detailed in table 12 were derived by an Industrial
Engineer using an estimated standard time to accomplish the task and then
add an allowance for losses such as touch up, rework, spoilage and repair.
Table 13 shows a summary of the direct labor cost.
To obtain costs for direct factory labor, the labor hours were multiplied
by Sierra Research Corporation average labor rate for the category of labor
used. These average labor rates are as follows:
1. Model shop technician - $3.79/hour
2. Test technician - $4.04/hour
,3. Bench assembler - $2.24/hour.
E. SPECIAL VERSION OF GA CAS
Should the aircraft already be equipped with a one-way DME capability
that is currently being built and tested by Sierra under an FAA contract, some
cost reduction is possible since the precision oscillator and sync logic would
already be in the aircraft. The reductions possible by this deletion are as
follows:
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MATERIAL ,
1. Logic cost reduction (Note 1) $105.99
2. Precision oscillator 108.50
Total Material Cost Reduction $214. 49
LABOR
3. Test technician reduction (Note 2) $ 1. 62
4. Bench assembly reduction (Note 3). 8. 96
Total Labor Cost Reduction $ 10. 58
Note 1: Delete the circuitry on Logic Diagram 7115-0502
Note 2: Delete 0. 4 hours of test technician labor at $4. 04/hour.
Note 3: Delete 4. 0 hours of bench assembly labor at $2. 24/hour.
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TABLE 2. SPECIAL ASSEMBLY COSTS
Transmitter Power Amplifier $ 87.50
R. F. Assembly 130. 00
Varactor Multiplier 112. 30
Total $329.80
TABLE 3. MATERIAL COST SUMMARY
Logic $177.37
Miscellaneous (Display, Controls, etc) 55. 80
Exciter.Signal Source 36. 48
Local Oscillator Signal Source . 21.48
Modulator 12.24
Video Amplifier and Noise AGC 16. 01
IF Amplifier 44. 46
Power Supply 81. 74
Precision Oscillator 108. 50
Total $554.08
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TABLE 4. MATERIAL COST FOR LOGIC
Descripiton
P.C. Board
Spacers
Connector Pins (Female)
Resistors (Carbon)
Capacitors (Mica)
Transistors (2N3904/2N2219)
Ladder Network (Helipot 815-R10K)
Diodes (HP5082-2800)
Linear I.C. (National LM201)
Linear I. C. (National LM310)
Linear I.C. (National LM311)
Digital I. C. (7400)
Digital I. C. (7402)
Digital I. C. (7404)
Digital I. C. (7408)
Digital I. C. (7410)
Digital I.C. (7411)
Digital I. C. (7420)
Digital I.C. (74H21)
Digital I. C. (7430)
Digital I. C. (7440)
Digital I.C. (7451)
Digital I.C. (7454)
Digital I.C. (7474)
Digital I. C. (7476)
Digital I. C. (7490) :
Digital I. C. (7493)
Digital I. C. (7496)
Digital I. C. (74107)
Digital I. C. (8280)
Digital I. C. (8551)
Digital I. C. (Fairchild U7B902259X)
Digital I. C. (Fairchild U6A900859X)
Digital I. C. (Fairchild U6N931159X)
Digital I.C. (Fairchild U7B931259X)
Digital I. C. (Fairchild U7B960259X)
-Digital-L-C, -(-Fairchild U4M451059X)
Digital I. C. (Signetics N820 N)
Digital I. C. (Signetics N8203N)
Digital I. C. (Signetics N8241A)
Digital I. C. (Signetics N8284A)
Digital I. C. (Signetics N8285A)
Quantity/
Module
8
32
120
97
36
24
1
-8
1
1
2
18
4 "
11
5
7
7
6
4
4
2
8
10
8
3
8
10
1
47
3
1
3
1
3
1
13
1
2
1
2
1
2
Cost/
Unit
$1. 00
0. 10
0.015
0.04
o. io
0.29
4.87
0.50
7.50
4. 85
3.90
0. 18
0;20
0.20
0.20
0. 18
0.20
0.-18
0.25
0. 18
0.18
0. 18
0.18
0.39
0.44
0.79
0.79
1.23
0.40
1.30
3.25
0.45
0.20
1.95
0.85
1.55
10. 25
4.95
5.25
0.83
1.15
1.08
Total Cost/
Item
$8. 00
.3.20
1.80
3.88
3.60
6.96
4.87
4.00
7.50
4.85
7.80 --
3.24 .
0.80
2.20
1,00
1.26
1. 40
1.08
1. 00
0.72
0.36
1. 44
1.80
3.12
1.32
6.32
7. 90
1. 23
18.80
3.90
3.25
1.35
0.20
5.85
0.85
20.15
10. 25
9.90
5.25
1.66
1.15
2.16
Total $177.37
Cost
Source
' 4
4
4
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
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TABLE 5 . MATERIAL COST FOR MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS
Description
Indicator, Panel
Raw and Bulk Material
Connectors and Fasteners
Master Interconnect Board
\ntenna
Quantity/
Module
1
1
1
1
1
Cost/
Unit
$33. 05
8.75
8.25
2.00
3.75
Total
Total Cost/
Item
$33. 05
8. 75
8.25
2.00
3i75
$55. 80
Cost
Source
4
4 .
4
4
1
TABLE 6 . MATERIAL COST FOR EXCITER SIGNAL SOURCE
Description
91 PF Dura Mica DM10 Cap
33 PF Dura Mica DM10 Cap
5. 5-18 PF Disc Trimmer
2-8 PF Disc Trimmer
9 - 3 5 PF Disc Trimmer
1000 PF Stand Off Cap
1/4 W 5% Carbon Comp Res
2N3866 Transistor
2N3553 Transistor
2N36S2 Transistor
5. 6 /L/.H Wee Ductor
1 juH RF Choke
Misc. Airwound Coils <• :
P. C. Board
Chassis
RF Connector
Misc. Hardware
100. 9375 MHz Crystal
Quantity/
Module
1
1
5
3
2
5
8
3
1
1
1
1
7
1
1
1
1
Cost/
Unit
$.075
.075
.563
.563
.563
.15
.03
1.23
1.75
11.80
.40
.40
.13
4.50
3.00
.93
.45
1.90
Total
Total Cost/
Item
$ .08
.07
2.82
1.69
1.13
.75
.21
3.69
1.75
11.80
.40
.40
.91
4.50
3.00
.93
.45
1.90
$36. 48
Cost
Source
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1:
1
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TABLE 7 . MATERIAL COST FOR LOCAL OSCILLATOR SIGNAL SOURCE
I
Description
33 PF Dura Mica DM10 Cap
91 PF Dura Mica DM10 Cap
 :
15 PF Dura Mica DM10 Cap
. 001 MFD Ceramic Disc Cap
1000 PF Stand Off Cap
2 - 8 PF Disc Trimmer
5. 5 - 18 PF Disc Trimmer
9 - 35 PF Disc Trimmer
1/4 W 5% Carbon Comp Res
2N3866 Transistors
HP5082-0112 Step Rcvry Diode
5. 6 jLiH Wee Ductor
1 /LtH RF Choke
Misc. Airwound Coils
PC Board with Microstrip Circuitry
97. 1875 MHz Crystal
Chassis
Quantity/
Module
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
7
2
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
Cost/
Unit
$.075
.075
.075
.061
.15
;. 563
.563
.563
.03
1.23
4.75
.40
.40
.13
6.00
1.90
2.50
Total Cost/
Item
^$ .08,
.07
.08
. .12
.. .30
.56
.56
.57
.21 .
2.46
4. 75
.40
.40
.52
6.00
1.90
2.50
Total $21.48
Cost
Source
1
1
1 .
1
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
TABLE 8 . MATERIAL COST FOR MODULATOR
Description
270 PF Dura Mica DM10 Cap
51 PF Dura Mica DM10 Cap
100 PF Dura Mica DM10 Cap
190 PF Dura Mica DM10 Cap
4. 7 MFD 35 V Tantalum Cap
150 MFD 35 V Aluminum Cap
1/4 W 5% Carbon Comp Res
10 K 1/2 W Multi-Turn Pot
2N4400 Transistor
2N4403 Transistor
2N4921 Transistor
2N4123 Transistor
5402 Quad 2 Input Nor
PC Board
Quality/
Module
5
2
1
1
1
1
19
2
2
1
1
3
2
1
Cost/
Unit
$ .075
.075
.075
.075
.34
1.78
.03
1.15
.30
.38
.79
. 16
.41
3.50
Total
Total Cost/
Item
$ .38
.15
.08
.07
.34
1.78
.57
2.30
.60
.38
.79
.48
.82
3.50
$12.24
Cost
Source
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
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TABLE 9. MATERIAL COST FOR VIDEO AMPLIFIER AND NOISE AGC
Description
. 001 MFD Ceramic Disc Cap
0. 1 MFD 100 V Mylar Cap
0. 22 MFD 100 V Mylar Cap
3. 3 MFD 15 V Tantalum Cap
47 MFD 10 V Tantalum Cap
1/4 W 5% Carbon Comp Res
1 W 5% Carbon Comp Res
15K 1/2 W Multi-Turn Pot
10K 1/2 W Multi-Turn Pot
2N4123 Transistor
2N4400 Transistor
2N4403 Transistor
1N914 Diode
PC Board
Quantity/
Module
5
2
3
2
1
37
2
1
1
8
4
3
5
1
Cost/
Unit
$ .061
.28
.24
.36
.43
.03
.06
1.15
1.15
.16
.30
.38
.043
5.90
Total
Total Cost/
Item
$ .31
.56
.72
.72
.43
1.11
.12
1.15
1.15
1.28
1.20
1.14
.22
5.90
$16.01
Cost
Source
1
1
1
3
3
1
1
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
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TABLE 10 . MATERIAL COST FOR IF AMPLIFIER
Description
. 001 MFD Ceramic Disc Cap
15 pf Dura Mica DM10 Cap
51 pf Dura Mica DM10 Cap
43 pf Dura Mica DM10 Cap
2. 2 pf Ceramic Stack Pole Cap
1.2 pf
1. 7pf
47 pf Dura Mica DM10 Cap
1/4 W 5% Carbon Comp Res ,
2N4259 Transistor
2N3292 Transistor
2N4123 Transistor
5. 6 ;ith Wee Ductor
18 jnh Wee Ductor
. 13 jLih Tuneable Coil Q2100
IF Interstage Transformer
(Tuneable)
IF Last Stage Coil (Tuneable)
. 36 juh Tuneable Coil Q3100
1N914 Diode
Chassis & Cover
RF Connector
PC Brds
Misc. Hardware
Quantity/
Module
20
5
3
2
1
1
1
1
43
1
. 6
1
8
1
4
5
1
1
5
1
1
3
Cost/
Unit
$ .061
.075
.075
.075
.04
.04
.04
.075
.03
1.38
.95
.16
.40
.40
.95
.95
.95
.95
.043
5.72
.93
.75
Total Cost/
Item
$1.22
.37
.22
.15
.04
.04
.04
.08
1.29
1.38
5.,70
.16
3.20
.40
3.80
4.75
.95
.95
.22
5.72
.93
12.10
.75
$44. 46
Cost
Source
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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TABLE 11 . MATERIAL COST FOR POWER SUPPLY
Description
0. 1 MFD 100 V Mylar Cap
0. 5-. 5 Dual Sect. 1000 V Cap
150 MFD 50 V Aluminum Cap
390 MFD 15 V Aluminum Cap
1000 MFD 7 V Aluminum Cap
100 MED 35 V Aluminum Cap
47 MFD 35 V Tantalum Cap
100 juH 7 Amp Choke
25 juH 3 Amp Choke
1 MH 0. 4 Amp Choke
1 MH 0. 1 Amp Choke
Inverter Power Transformer
1/4 W 5% Carbon Comp Res.
1/2 W 5% Carbon Comp Res.
1 W 5% Carbon Comp Res.
2 W 5% Carbon Comp Res.
6. 5 W 1% Wire Wound Res.
1/2 W Multi-Turn Pot
2N3790 Transistor
2N4036 Transistor
2N4403 Transistor
2N4403 Transistor
2N3714 Transistor
702 OP Amp 1C
1N3899R Rectifier
1N914 Diode
1N746A Zener Diode
1N754 Zener Diode
1N4934 Zener Diode
1N4744 Zener Diode
1N4746 Zener Diode
MR830 Motorola 3A Rectifier
1N4933 1 Amp Rectifier
SFM20 Semtech HV Rectifier
PC BCD
Misc. Hardware
Quantity
Module
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
6
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
8
2
1
1
Cost/
Unit
$ .28
2.01
1.65
1.78
2.24
1.73
1.07
3.00
1.25
2.10
2.10
16.75
.03
.04
.06
.08
.45
1.15
3.85
.80
.38
.30
2.28
2.10
4.90
.043
.20
.21
.95
.95
, .95
1.60
.75
.98
3.90
1.25
Total Cost/
Item
$ .56
2.01
1.65
1.78
2.24
3.46
1.07
6.00
1.25
4.20
2. 10
16.75
.18
.20
.06
.08
.45
1.15
3.85
.80
,38
.30
4.56
2.10
4.90
.09
.20
.21
.95
.95
.95
3.20
6.00
1.96
3.90
1.25
$81.74
Cost
Source
3
3
1
3
3
3
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
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TABLE 12. LABOR ESTIMATES
Final Assembly
Front Panel Assembly
Front Plate
Gable and Connector
Assembly
Chassis Assembly
Right B.eam
Left Beam
Rear Plate
Master Interconnect
Board
Slide On Cover
Mount Assembly
Mount
Mount (Base)
Guide Pins
Printed Wiring
Boards
Power Supply
Exciter Signal
Source
Local Oscillator
Signal Source
Modulator
Video Amplifier and
Noise AGC
I. :F. Amplifier
Cable Sub-Assembly
Packing
Totals
Metal Shop
Technician
(hrs)
0.201
0.526
0.526
0.101
0 . 226
0.250
0. 297
0.132
0.264
•
-
Test
Technician
(hrs)
1.5
\
1.0
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.25
0.2
0.7
Bench
Assembly
(hrs)
1.576
0.093
0.3
0.15
0.4
12.0
1.5
1.9
•-. /
1.6
0. 74
1.425
2.83
0.70
2. 523 hrs. 4. 05 hrs. 25. 214 hrs.
Packing
(hrs)
-
0.05
0. 05 hrs.
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TABLE 13 . LABOR COST SUMMARY
Labor Class
Model Shop Technician
Test Technician
Bench Assembly
Total Hrs.
2.5
4.0
25.2
Labor Rate
$3.79
4.04
2.24
Total
Cost
$ 9 . 4 8
16.16
56.45
$82. 09
F. CCST TO THE USER
1. General. To develop a cost to the user for the equipment described
herein, it is necessary to combine the labor cost with an attached overhead,
the material cost, a general and administrative fee for such costs as adver-
tising, warranties, and future development, profit, and finally distribution
costs.
2. Factory Selling Price. All but the distribution costs make up the
factory selling price and with some estimates on the labor overhead, general
and administrative fee, and profit, the estimated factory selling price can be
well determined. Table 14 shows a factory selling price for the GA CAS de-
scribed herein. Also shown in table 14 is the factory selling price for the
special version of the GA CAS where the precision oscillator and timing chain
have been deleted as described in paragraph E. For the discussion, the ver-
sion with the precision oscillator and clock will be called Version A and the
one without the precision oscillator and clockwill be called Version B.
3. Distribution Channels. There are three major distribution channels
that a manuiacturer can use to get his product to the general aviation market
as follows::
a. Sell directly to an aircraft manufacturer for factory installation
of the equipment. A larger discount is usually offered by the avionics man-
ufacturer in this distribution channel because orders are placed annually and
in lot sizes of about 100. Demand is well known and the avionics manufacturer
does not tie up inventory or take any risk in producing the.units. In addition,
any installation is easier to make as the aircraft is in assembly - especially
wiring and panel mounting. Typical discounts of 50% are given from one
manufacturer.
b. Sellto a distributor that also sells aircraft. The distributor
normally lias the installation made and adds this cost on to the list price of the
equipment. The advantage of selling to a distributor is primarily one of
quantity since dealer lots usually run 6 to 10. The distributor must either
install the equipment or pay someone else to install it and this cost is passed
on to the buyer on top of the list price. Typical discounts of 457c are given
from one manufacturer.
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TABLE 14. FACTORY SELLING PRICE
Labor .
Overhead (150%)
Labor and Overhead,
Material (Note 1)
.Factory Cost -; . ,
General and Administrative (15%)
'Selling Cost -, -
Profit (20%) '
Selling Cost and Profit
Special Assemblies
Factory Selling Price ;
.' .
$
.: $
• ' - . $
. <$
. ; '• ,
$
Version A ,;
, 82.09
. 123.14
205.23
498.67
: 703.90
105,59 ' . ' . " ,
809/49 .
161.90 :
971.39
329.80
. $ 1301.19
Note 1: ;; !
- $
j '
- . < : •$
. ' " $
:• " $
." $
' ' • *
Version B-
. .
•-U.-51-'
, 107^27
178.78
339.59
'518.37
77.76
596.13
119. 23
715.36
329.80
.1045.16
The material cost listed is 90% of the total bill of '
materials quote which is consistent with industry experience
that 10% lower average material cost can be negotiated at time
 ;
of manufacture ;
c. Sell to a dealer that normally runs a servicing shop. The dealer
usually installs the equipment and the cost of installation is added to.the list
price of the equipment as in the case of the distributor. No quantity advantage
is available to the producer. Typical discounts of 40% are given from one
manufacturer.
It is not possible to compute the distribution cost for each of the
channels - especially the one involving the aircraft manufacture- Assuming
he installs avionics on the aircraft at the time of manufacturer and then sells
-to a-distributor7-how- does-he-discount that-small~portion~off the ~li~st~price~of
the unit? He must cover labor costs for handling, installation, etc. and some
profit but how much? For the distributor and dealer it would be easier to
estimate the distribution costs but the number w.ould vary widely depending on
the quality and service back-up provided by the distribution channel.
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Fortunately, in the real world, distribution costs do not have to be determined
directly to obtain a user cost as shown below in the.selling price discussion.
4. Selling Price. The avionics manufacturer through his sales literature
or quotes to customers develops a list price for his equipment. This pub-
lished list-price, as in the automotive industry, is only a figure the seller may
use during the negotiation of a sale. The published list price does not neces-
sarily reflect the manufacturing or distribution costs of the product. The
seller will usually offer the largest off list amounts on equipment that does not
fail under the normal warranty period and on equipment that has features (such
as additional capability, safety, and price) that allow a high inventory turn-
over rate.
5. Typical User Cost. Since some 137,000 single engine aircraft will
exist in 1974 and a very large percentage of these must be CAS equipped to
make the system useful, as was assumed in section HI paragraph A, the only
practical distribution channel is through the dealer for a majority of users.
In a small survey of existing dealer practices, it was found that many dealers
now will usually make a sale at between 10% and 20% off list and installation
done at the dealer costs. Additionally, as shown in reference 34, the list
price of similar equipment as it is widely accepted and used, tends to fall at
about 15% per year.
To determine the acquisition cost to the user, more conservative
assumptions have been made as follows:
a. Manufacturer gives dealer a discount of 40%,
b. Shipping charges are $5.00 per unit,
c. List price falls 5% per year for the first 3 years,
d. Dealer gives 10% off list to user the first year, 15% off list to
user the second year, and 20% off list to user the third year.
Following is an estimated cost to the user for Version A and Ver-
sion B for the first three years with the assumptions listed above.
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Estimated Cost to User for First Year
Factory Selling Price
Shipping
Dealer Discount
List Price
Off List to User (10%)
Cost to User
Version A
$1301.19
5.00
867.46
$2173-65
217.37
$1956.28
Estimated Cost to User for Second Year
List Price (reduced 5%)
Off List to User (15%)
Cost to User
Version A
$2064.97
309.75
$1755.22
Estimated Cost to User for Third Year
List Price (reduced 10%)
Off List to User (20%)
Version A
$1956.28
391.26
$1565.02
Version B
$1045.16
5.00
696.77
$1746.93
174.69 .
$1572.2T
Version B
$1659.58
248.. 94
$1410.64
Version B
$1572.24
314.45
$1257.79
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PART THREE
CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of this study, it is concluded that the projected $1500 target
cost can be met, although one version would be somewhat more expensive
when it first appears on the market.
Meeting the target cost requirements would not be feasible without some
significant simplifications in the CAS design. In particular, no really in-
expensive approach to doppler range-rate extraction appears consistent with
required system safety.
It is possible to simplify the GA version of Time/Frequency CAS by
deleting requirements for phase-coherent long-pulse transmissions, doppler
processing, and multifrequency reception. Use of synchronous reference
pulse transmissions by ground VORTAC stations also permits reduction of
transmitter power and receiver sensitivity requirements and deletion of the
back-up mode. The transmission of auxiliary data (as biphase modulation of
the doppler pulse) is also eliminated.
Deletion of doppler range rate extraction involves some increase in the
protection envelope about own aircraft. However, use of a shorter pulse
to distinguish GA CAS transmissions, and inclusion of pilot selection of
temporary terminal logic reduces this increment to tolerable proportions.
It may be possible to reduce the threat protection in terminal areas
somewhat further^ however, this might not provide absolute collision
protection against head-on encounters.
The detailed cost estimates, presented here, indicate that if there is
sufficient user interest, the system target cost to the user for either version
will fall below $1500 within a reasonable time after introduction of the
GA CAS equipment on the market.
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SPECIFICATION FOR GENERAL AVIATION COLLISION
AVOIDANCE SYSTEM RF ASSEMBLY
General Description
The RF assembly described by this specification consists of a SPOT
switch, a three-port circulator, a limiter, a preselecter, a balanced mixer, '
a local oscillator bandpass filter, and a transmitter lowpass filter (see figure
1). The assembly is to be an integrated package utilizing strip line techniques
wherever practical. The interfaces with the assembly shall consist of: two
antenna connections, a transmitter input, an IF output, and a local oscillator
input.
The RF assembly will be used in an airborne box that is intended for use
in general aviation type aircraft with temperature-controlled non-pressurized
environment.
Please suggest any minor modification of these requirements that may
result in significant cost savings.
System Performance Specifications
The RF assembly will meet or exceed the electrical specifications listed
below, when subjected to the required environmental conditions.
Transmit Mode
1. Frequency
2. Transmitter Input VSWR
3. Peak Power Capability
4. Average Power Capability
5. Insertion Loss - Transmitter
to Antenna
1615 MHz
The input VSWR shall be 1. 5:1
maximum for any terminating
impedance. The VSWR shall
remain within a 1.1:1 VSWR
circle over the temperature
range of -10°C to +50°C.
150 Watts
3 mw
1. 5 db Max.
6. Isolation - Transmitter to Mixer 60 db Min.
7. Low Pass Filter Harmonic 40 db Min.
Rejection
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Receiver Mode
1. Preselector Center Frequency
2. Preselecter 3 db Bandwidth
3. Image Rejection (fo ± 120 MHz)
4. Half. Image Rejection (1585 MHz)
5. Out-of-Band Frequencies
Rejection (fo + 120 - 60 MHz)
6. Passband Ripple
7. Receiver Input VSWR
8. Noise Figure (3 db IF)
9. IF Impedance
10. LO Input VSWR
11. LO Input Power
12. Isolation-LO to Antenna
13. LO Filter Rejection @ 1361 MHz
and 1749 MHz
14. LO Frequency (Fixed Tuned)
1615 MHz
6 MHz Min.
60 db Min.
60 db Min.
60 db Min.
1. 0 db Max.
1. 5:1 Max.
12 db Max.
150 ± 25 ohm 12 ± 3 pf
1. 5:1 Max.
2. 0 mw Min.
60 db Min.
20 db Min.
1555 MHz
NOTE: All connections to be OSM female.
Environmental Requirements
1. Temperature Range
2. Altitude
3. Humidity
4. Shock
-15°C to+50°C
15, 000 ft. test
48 hrs. @ 95% and +50°C
Apply three shocks to the equipment,
mounted in each of the following
positions:
A. Normal upright.
B. Suspended upside down.
C. At positions such that the
majofl5fthogonal"axis of the
equipment successively forms
angles of plus 90° and minus 90°
(two positions)with the plane
of the table.
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Vibration
Physical Requirements
1. Size
2. Weight
D. At positions such that the second
major orthogonal axis of the
equipment successively forms
angles of plus 90° and minus 90°
(two positions) with the plane
of the table.
A peak acceleration of at least 6 G
shall be reached in approximately
5 1/2 milliseconds. The total time
duration shall be 11 ± 2 milliseconds.
Equipment shall be vibrated from
5 to 55 Hertz with amplitude excursion
of . 010" and maximum acceleration
of 1. 5 G. Vibration shall be for a
minimum of one hour in each of the
three major orthogonal planes.
Vibration frequency shall vary at
a rate not to exceed 1. 0 octave/minute.
Please specify.
Please specify.
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General Description
The power amplifier described by this specification will be used in a
low-cost airborne Collision Avoidance System intended for use in general
aviation type aircraft with temperature controlled, non-pressurized environ-
ment.
i
It is anticipated that this amplifier will be a two tube coaxial cavity or
stripline resonator type configuration; however, in the interest of cost savings
other approaches (e.g., lumped constant, microstrip) will be given equal
consideration provided performance specifications are met.
Please suggest any minor modification of these requirements that may
result in significant cost savings.
Performance Specifications
The transmitter power amplifier will meet or exceed the electrical
specifications listed below when subjected to the required environmental
condition. ;
Electrical Specifications
1. Frequency
2. Bandwidth (3 db)
3. Peak Pulse Power out
(Pulse width = 30 jus)
, •• - •• t
4. Power Gain (@ 150 w out)
5. Modulation
6. Modulation Pulse Characteristics
7. Input VSWR
8. Load VSWR
9. Duty Cycle (see figure 1)
1615 MHz
8 MHz min.
150 watts min.
30 db min.
Cathode Pulsed
Please Specify
1.5:1 (ref. to. 50 ohm)
The load VSWR shall be 1. 5:1
maximum. The load VSWR shall
..r_emain_w-ithin-a-l-.-1:1 -VSWR circle-
over the specified temperature
range.
. 002%
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CAS MESSAGE FORMAT
(Shown at Maximum Duty Cycle)
Rep. Rate= 1/3 HZ
Figure 1
10. Harmonics
11. Pulse Rise Time
12. Pulse Decay Time
13. Pulse Droop
14. Input/Output RF Connectors
15. Tube Life
16. Plate and Filament Voltage and
Current Requirements
Physical Requirements
1. Size
2. Weight
Environmental Requirements
1. Temperature Range
2. Altitude
3. Humidity
4. Shock
20 db down min.
0.1 /isec. max.
0.1 /isec. max.
2% max.
OSM Female
2000 hrs. min. with not more
than 3 db loss in power out
P,lease specify
Please specify
Please specify
-15°C to +50°C
15,000ft. test
48 hrs. @ 95% and 50°C
Apply three shocks to the equipment
mounted in each of the following
six positions:
A. Normal upright.
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B. Suspended upside down.
C. At positions such that the first
major orthogonal axis of the
equipment successively forms
angles of plus 90° and minus
90° (two positions) with the
plan of the table.
D. At positions such that the second
major orthogonal axis of the
equipment successively forms
angles of plus 90° and minus 90°
(two positions) with the plan of
the table.
A peak acceleration of at least 6G
shall be reached in approximately
5 1/2 milliseconds. The total time
duration shall be 11 ± 2 milliseconds.
5. Vibration Equipment shall be vibrated from 5
to 55 Hertz with amplitude excursion
of . 010" and maximum acceleration of
1. 5 G. Vibration shall be for a
minimum of one hour in each of the
three major orthogonal planes.
Vibration frequency shall vary at a
rate not to exceed 1. 0 octave/
minute.
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General Description
The varactor multiplier described by this specification will be used in a
low-cost airborne Collision Avoidance System intended for use in general
aviation type aircraft with temperature-controlled, non-pressurized environ-
ment. The multiplier is to be of stripline construction were practical and
economical.
Please suggest any minor modification of these requirements that may
result in significant cost savings.
System Performance Specification
The varactor multiplier will meet or exceed the electrical specifications
listed below when subjected to the required environmental conditions.
1. Output Frequency (Single Freq.) 1615 MHz
2. Input Frequency (Single Freq.) 201.875 MHz
3. Multiplication Factor X8
4. Power Out (@ 2 W In) 150 mw Min.
5. Fundamental Frequency
Suppression -30 db Min.
6. Suppression of 7th and 9th
Harmonics -25 db Min.
7. Non-Harmonic Components -55 db Min.
8. Input VSWR (Ref to 50 ) 2:1 Max.
9. Output Impedance 50
NOTE: RF Connectors to be OSM female.
Environmental Requirements
1. Temperature Range -15°C to +50°C
2. Altitude 15,000ft. test
.1 Humidity -48-lTrs'@'9"5%"and~+50^C
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Environmental Requirements (cont)
4. Shock
5. Vibration
Physical Requirements
1. Size
2. Weight
Apply three shocks to the equipment
mounted in each of the following six
positions: .
A. Normal upright. .
B. Suspended upside down.
C. At positions such that the first
major orthogonal axis of the
equipment successively forms
angles of plus 90° and minus 90°
(two positions) with the plane
of the table.
D. At positions such that, the second
major orthogonal axis of the
equipment successively forms
angles of plus 90° and minus 90°
(two positions) with the plane of
the table.
A peak acceleration of at least 6 G
shall be reached in approximately
5 1/2 milliseconds. The total time
duration shall be 11 ± 2 milliseconds.
Equipment, shall be vibrated from
5 to 55 Hertz with amplitude excursion
of .010" and maximum acceleration of
1.5 G. Vibration shall be for a
minimum of one hour in each of the
three major orthogonal planes.
Vibration frequency shall vary at a
rate not to exceed 1.0 octave/minute.
Please specify.
Please specify.
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General Description.
••"•
The high stability oscillator described by this specification will be used
in a low-cost airborne Collision Avoidance System intended for use in general
aviation type aircraft with a temperature-controlled, non-pressurized environ-
ment.
Please suggest any minor modification of these requirements that may
result in significant cost savings.
System Performance Specification.
The high stability oscillator will
cations listed below when subjected to
1. Frequency ,
2. Frequency Stability
(a) Aging ,
(b) Short Term
(c) Supply Voltage
., . (d) Resistive Load Change
(e) Capacitive Load Change
(f) Temperature
(g) Vibration .
(h) Shock
(i) Orientation , .< .'
3. Warm-up Time (after
four-hours-off-referenced
to the turn-off frequency
and at -15°C) '"
meet or exceed the electrical specifi-
the required environmental conditions.
5.0 MHz ±1 x.10
and 25 °C
-8
at nominal bias
±5 x 10~9/day .,:,.......
±1 X 10~ /Second , ; ; . ; , ; . ;
_ Q • * , ' . . > • - *
±1 x 10~ for a ±0. 5 volt change
in supply voltage
- 9 - ' . , . • • - .
±1 x 10 for ±10% resistive load
change
_g
±1 x 10 for ±10% capacitive load
change
-8
±1 x 10 for an ambient temperature
change from -15°C to +50°C
±5 x 10
±5 x 10-9
,-8±1 x 10 for all positions with respect
to the gravity vector
-7
±5 x 10 g in 10 minutes
-±5-x-10~—in-15 minutes
227
4. Output
5. Input Power
6. Frequency Adjust
7. Voltage Control
(a) Range
(b) Slope (positive)
10 0 VRMS or greater into 1 K ohm and
50 pF load with less than 10% distortion
±22 ±0. 5 vdc 6 watts maximum for
normal operation; .10 watts maximum
for warm-up
±2 x 10"6 settable to ±5 x 10"9
±2 x 10"7
40 x 10"9/volt ±8 x 10"9/ volt
NOTES:
1. All inputs and outputs to.be solder hook terminals.
2. Voltage control terminals shall not be internally D-C
referenced to any other circuit
Environmental Requirements.
1. Temperature
2. Altitude
3. Humidity
4. Shock
-15°Cto+50°C
15,000ft. test
48 hours @ 95% and +50°C
Apply three shocks to the equipment
mounted in each of the following six
positions:
(a) Normal upright
(b) Suspended upside down
(c) At positions such that the first
major orthogonal axis of the
equipment successively forms
angles of plus 90° and minus 90°
(two positions) with the plane
of the table.
(d) At positions such that the second
major orthogonal axis of the equip-
ment successively forms angles of
plus 90° and minus 90° (two
positions) with the plane of the
table.
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5. Vibration
Physical Requirements
1. Size
2. Weight
A peak acceleration of at least 6 G
shall be reached in approximately
5-1/2 milliseconds. The total time
duration shall be 11 milliseconds.
Equipment shall be vibrated from
5 to 55 Hz with amplitude excursion
of . 01" and maximum acceleration of
1. 5 G. Vibration shall be for minimum
of one hour in each of the three major
orthogonal planes. Vibration frequency
shall vary at a rate not to exceed 1. 0
octave/minute.
Please specify
Please specify
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